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ABSTRACT  
 
This research investigates the relative effectiveness of different modes of regulation of access 
to personal data on social networking services in the UK.  A review of the literature 
demonstrated that there was a gap in research comparing different regulatory modes applied 
to online social networking services (SNSs).  A model of regulation was developed based on 
Lessig͛s fouƌ ŵodes of ƌegulatiŶg the iŶteƌŶet.  ‘isk to iŶdiǀidual useƌs ǁas seleĐted as a ǁaǇ 
of testing different regulatory approaches, using the premise that risk-based regulation has 
become a key consideration in European regulation.  The regulatory effects were tested 
using: online surveys, interviews with industry experts, content analysis of privacy policies, and 
a legislative review.  The research data are appended to the main body of the thesis.  The 
research demonstrated the potential of risk as a means of distinguishing between different 
regulatory modes and concluded that a combination of regulatory approaches was the most 
effective way of protecting individuals against abuse of personal data on online SNSs.  
Further research suggested includes: looking at risk from the perspective of companies, and of 
society; further development of the regulatory model; and country comparisons to discover 
whether the findings of this study are more generally applicable. 
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CHAPTER 1  –  INTRODUCTION  
BACK GRO UN D  
The idea for this research arose from the personal experience of the researcher as an 
information consultant working extensively in the public, private and voluntary sectors.  By 
2010, when this research started, information governance had become a major concern for 
many organizations and legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1998 prompted a strong 
focus on compliance issues. 
From 2004 onwards first large-scale online social networking services (SNSs) began to take 
hold.  By 2010 there were increasing concerns about privacy and abuse of personal data.  As 
companies began to consider the benefits of using social media for marketing there was 
widening awareness of the risks posed by the disclosure of personal data.  This preoccupation 
with risk presented an opportunity to consider ways in which access to personal data is 
regulated.  
Although social media are global in nature, they are delivered to users with an expectation 
that they are protected by national laws.  This study considers SNSs available to UK users and 
examines the regulatory landscape that exists in the UK. 
An example of the concerns that initiated this study is the reported declaration by Mark 
Zuckerberg that the age of privacy was over (Johnson 2010).  In 2010 the default privacy 
settiŶgs foƌ FaĐeďook͛s theŶ ϯϭϬ ŵillioŶ useƌs ǁeƌe ĐhaŶged to ŵake theiƌ pƌofiles puďliĐ.  
This caused an outcry and forced the company to revert to a private default, and to update its 
privacy policy.   
Facebook, as a US-based company, is subject to the voluntary, self-regulatory U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor framework run by the US Federal Trade Commission (International Trade 
Administration 2009).  It is also subject to public pressure and this could be argued to be a 
form of regulation directly influenced by users.  Are these two methods of regulation 
effective means of protecting personal data, or are there more effective methods that could 
be applied? For instance, does the legislative regulatory approach adopted in the UK with the 
Data Protection Act 1998 afford better protection of personal data? 
One way of testing this is to compare the ways in which social media, and specifically online 
social networking services (SNSs) respond to data protection regulation in the UK.  There may 
be variations in attitudes to regulation and the different modes of regulation that may apply to 
this sector to protect users against misuse of their personal data.  For instance, SNS providers 
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who are based in the United States, and are members of the self-regulating U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor scheme have adopted different provisions of the scheme (Connolly 2008).  Does this 
difference in approach make a material difference to UK users and are they exposed to greater 
risk as a result of non-compliance with EU legislation? 
WHAT  IS  AN  ON LIN E SNS? 
Before going any further it helps to outline what is meant by online Social Networking Services 
(SNSs) and why regulation of access to personal data might be significant and topical.  Online 
SNSs are internet services based on individual members who put up profiles (containing 
personal information) that are available to other users or members of the service.  Users are 
able to link to other members to build up their own personal networks.  This may include 
concepts such as: ͚liŶkiŶg͛; ͚ĐoŶŶeĐtiŶg͛; ͚folloǁiŶg͛; aŶd ͚fƌieŶdiŶg͛.  IŶ soŵe Đases peƌsoŶal 
profile information may be limited to authorised members who have been specifically 
identified by a user as being part of their network. In other instances profiles may be available 
to all users of the service.  At the most extreme end of this range, the information in personal 
profiles may be available to general internet users regardless of membership of the network 
service.  The area of debate is around the release of personal data by the social network 
providers to third party external agencies (such as advertisers and recruitment agencies) so 
that they can target their marketing.  Tracking technologies such as cookies and beacons are 
widely used by social network providers to pass on detailed information to commercial 
enterprises for behavioural advertising. 
In a series of articles the Wall Street Journal described the tracking technologies used by the 
most popular websites in the United States, including many of the largest SNSs (Angwin & 
Mcginty 2010).  Cookies are the most widely used tracker, and have been the subject of 
recent European legislation, implemented in the United Kingdom as the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulation (SI 2011/1208).  A cookie is a small 
text file with a unique identifier that the website places iŶ the useƌ͛s ďƌoǁseƌ to keep tƌaĐk of 
the online session.  Many websites require cookies to operate effectively (they ensure the 
continuity of a session and can be useful if there is an interruption or if a user logs off and then 
logs back onto a website). 
Where a website provider belongs to an advertising network or purchases the services of a 
tracking company, a third-party cookie tracks usage from site to site and records this data 
centrally for exploitation, by selling to advertisers, for instance.  These advertisers, without 
necessarily knowing very much about an individual user, can target advertisements to them 
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automatically.  For instance, a search of a travel site may indicate interest in visiting a 
particular city and subsequently ads for hotels in that city may start to appear in banner ads 
when browsing.  This technology is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9. 
Gathering all this personal data allows for extensive data mining by data aggregators.  An 
alternative approach has been taken by Blue Cava, which has developed a very large database 
of all the devices on the Internet (Auerbach 2013).  It is constructed by creating a unique 
fingerprint of each device based on its settings, which are detected by web servers.  Once a 
device has been identified it is possible to track online behaviour and to generate massive data 
sets that can be exploited by data mining techniques to target services and advertisements.  
Another technology increasingly used is location-based tracking of mobile devices such as 
smart phones and data pads. 
Sites without adequate security can be subject to scraping where an anonymous login allows 
access to the profiles of other members of the site, thus enabling the scraper to capture 
personal data without reciprocating.  Linking data gathered online with offline and published 
personal records (such as post codes or electoral registers) or blogs and tweets is also of some 
concern ;IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ϮϬϭϮͿ.  
RES EAR CH OBJ ECTIV ES  
This research aims to analyse the regulatory landscape and to compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of different modes of regulation.  It uses a model of regulation based on an 
analysis of formal and informal measures to protect users from misuse of personal data.  The 
research combines risk analysis and a legislative review to assess the relative effectiveness of 
different modes of regulation and to gain an insight into ways in which the regulatory 
landscape might be changed to protect users more effectively. 
This work sets out to test the hypothesis that law-based regulation alone is not the most 
effective way of protecting users against the risks associated with use of SNSs.  It also 
considers the hypothesis that risk to individual users can be used to compare the 
effectiveness of different modes of regulation.  Risk assessments are used to compare the 
different modes of regulation.  In order to test these hypotheses a number of research 
questions need to be asked: 
 What is the nature of regulation of access to personal data on social networking 
services (SNSs)?  What are the risks to users of having personal data on SNSs? 
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 How have law-makers responded to the inception and growth of SNSs?  What effects do different regulatory methods have on risk to individuals?  Is risk to users an effective method of comparing different modes of regulation?  
THESIS  ST R UCTU R E  
This thesis is divided into four main sections with individual chapters arranged by theme within 
each section: 
Section I. INTRODUCTION 
Section II. RISK 
Section III.  REGULATION 
Section IV. CONCLUSION 
In Section I the research questions are introduced in Chapter 1 and prior research in the area is 
investigated by means of a literature review in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 describes the 
methodology and in particular the development of a risk-based approach to evaluation of 
regulatory modes.   
Section II considers what personal data is and works toward a definition of information privacy 
in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 defines risk and develops a model of personal risk that can be used 
to compare the effects of different modes of regulation. 
Section III considers different approaches to modelling regulation before developing a model 
based on Lessig͛s ŵodes of iŶteƌŶet ƌegulatioŶ (Chapter 6).  Each of the Ŷeǁ ŵodel͛s modes 
of regulation is described and investigated in turn: Legislation (Chapter 7), Self-regulation 
through privacy policies (Chapter 8), Self-regulation of digital advertising (Chapter 9), Code 
(Chapter 10) and Norms (Chapter 11). 
In Section IV the thesis revisits the research questions and discusses the results of the different 
research investigations (Chapter 12) before pulling together all the strands in the Conclusion 
(Chapter 13). 
The appendices contain details of the research instruments and data from the investigations 
that support the arguments put forward in this thesis and the attached CD-ROM contains data 
sets gathered during this research.  
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CHAPTER 2  –  LITERATURE REVIEW  
REVI EW MET HO DO LOG Y  
Preliminary reading focused on the key texts in the areas of: regulation, research 
methodology, and relevant legislation (Room 2007; Jay 2003; Baldwin et al. 2012; Pickard 
2013; Brown & Marsden 2013).  Some of these texts were identified from academic 
departmental reading lists, and searches of library catalogues (notably the M25 union 
catalogue for academic and research libraries in and around London, and the British Library). 
Literature from peer-reviewed journals was identified by searching a range of aggregated 
electronic journals and bibliographic databases.  They were chosen for their subject 
emphasis, comprehensiveness and the features that they offered: 
GoogleScholar – general bibliographic database resource used as a starting point and 
as a ͚ĐatĐh-all͛ to suppleŵeŶt seaƌĐhes oŶ ŵoƌe speĐialist sǇsteŵs 
EBSCOHost – aggregated journals 
Emerald – aggregated journals 
World of Knowledge – social science and science bibliographic database including 
Social Science Citation Index 
LexisNexis – comprehensive legal journals and news reports 
ACM – informatics journals 
UK and European legislation from www.legislation.gov.uk and 
http://eur-lex.europe.eu.  
Wikipedia and Google Search were also used as sources to supplement the scholarly services 
above.  Items identified through these two routes were evaluated in the same way as those 
from the scholarly sources. 
Key papers were identified by sorting on citation count coupled with an analysis of recent 
downloads for newer papers that may not have had time to build up a significant citation 
count. 
Bibliographic search results were assessed for relevance by title and abstract.  Where there 
was doubt, an assessment was based on examining the full text.  The majority of journal 
articles cited in this review were downloaded as e-journal articles.  Most books were read as 
hardcopies at the British Library, although in a few cases e-book versions were available and 
were downloaded. 
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Although this was a systematic literature review, as defined by Bawden and Robinson (2012, 
p.316), some sources of information were identified by following references made by speakers 
at seminars and conferences, in blogs, on websites and via social media services.  References 
identified in this way were tracked back to the original source and retrieved from peer 
reviewed journals or formal publications where possible. 
The original literature review was conducted in 2012 during preparation of the transfer report.  
After that point, as new sources became available they were incorporated into the Mendeley 
database compiled for this research.  The literature review was updated in November 2014 
to incorporate material published from 2012 onwards. 
SEAR CH STR AT EGIES  
This research sets out to test the hypothesis that assessing risk to individuals can be used to 
compare the effectiveness of different modes of regulating access to personal data on SNSs. 
This is a large and complex question and for the purposes of a literature review can be broken 
down into a series of search queries.  This approach allows more comprehensive searching of 
the component concepts in the main questions and allows navigation and refinement.  The 
expectation was that the research question had not been expressed in this form before and 
that there would therefore be little literature specifically addressing the question.  The focus 
of the literature review was on the following questions: 
 What are the risks associated with making personal data available via social networks?  How is access to personal data on social networks regulated?  How is the relative effectiveness of different modes of regulation evaluated? 
Embedded within these questions are a number of concepts that require further exploration.  
These are addressed in the discussion below, which considers each of the review questions in 
turn. 
WHAT AR E T HE R I SK S?  
The search is broken down into three concept areas as seen in Figure 1.  Within each concept 
are synonyms that express that concept.  In some cases truncation was necessary to spread 
the search scope.  The process was iterative and the three concepts were combined using the 
Boolean AND operator to narrow the search down successively.  The first concept was 
enhanced by including the name of the two most frequently cited SNSs in the literature.  An 
analysis of search performance using EBSCOhost using the OR operator to link the terms 
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͞“oĐial Netǁoƌk*͟, ͞Google͟ aŶd ͞FaĐeďook͟ iŶĐƌeased the ƌetƌieǀal of sĐholaƌlǇ aƌtiĐles siŶĐe 
2012 by 45% (from 8,732 to 12,662 hits).  Further searches with this group of terms showed 
that inclusion of Ning provided an additional 3% increase (from 12,662 to 13,043 hits) and 
Twitter an additional 2% increase (from 12,662 to 12,958 hits) (Appendix A).  Examination of 
the additional hits found no relevant articles.  The remaining SNSs increased the hit rate by 
less than 0.3%.  Table 23 in Appendix A contains the results of this sensitivity test. 
 
FIGURE 1  -  SEARCH QUERY ON ͚R ISKS͛  AND ͚SOCIAL NETWORKS͛ 
The core theme for this search was online social networking services.  A general search 
(which will pick up some irrelevant material – suĐh as ͚offliŶe͛ soĐial ŶetǁoƌksͿ was narrowed 
down by introducing the concepts of risk and privacy.  A manual trawl of the resulting items 
eliminated articles that were not about the risks associated with personal data – for instance 
reputational risk to organisations where an employee defames a customer or a supplier or 
competitor using social media. 
HOW I S ACC E S S TO PER SO NAL DA TA O N SO CIA L  NET WOR K S RE GU LAT E D? 
The next search, Figure 2, ĐoŵďiŶed the ĐoŶĐepts of ͚soĐial Ŷetǁoƌk͛ ǁith ͚ƌegulatioŶ͛.  This 
was narrowed down specifically to consider privacy and personal information to eliminate 
literature on copyright. 
A key element of this research was to identify the different modes of regulation of access to 
personal data, with reference to social networks.  For the purposes of this ƋuestioŶ ͚peƌsoŶal 
data͛ is takeŶ to ŵeaŶ data relating to an individual that can be uniquely associated with that 
individual.  It refers to data that would not normally be in the public domain such as their 
political or religious views, information about their personal or private life, their personal 
finances and their behaviour or habits.   
Social Network*
Facebook
Google
Risk
Threat
Privacy
Personal data
Personal information
OR
OR
OR
AND
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Personal data includes aggregated data as well as identifying data that can be associated with 
a specific individual, whether named or not.   
 
FIGURE 2  -  SEARCH QUERY ON ͚REGULATION OF PERSONAL DATA ON SOCIAL NETWORKS͛ 
HOW IS T HE R EL ATIV E EF F ECT IV E NE S S O F D IF F ER EN T MOD ES OF  REGU LAT IO N  
EV ALUA TED?  
The third query, Figure 3, combines the concept of effectiveness/evaluation with regulation.  
There is a large, well-established body of literature on regulatory effectiveness and evaluation.  
The teƌŵs aƌouŶd ͚eǀaluatioŶ͛, ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ aŶd ͚assessŵeŶt͛ ǁeƌe ĐoŵďiŶed usiŶg the 
BooleaŶ ͚O‘͛ opeƌatoƌ ďefoƌe ďeiŶg ƌefiŶed ďǇ the ͚AND͛ opeƌatoƌ foƌ ĐoŵďiŶiŶg ǁith the 
ĐoŶĐept ͚ƌegulatioŶ͛. 
 
FIGURE 3  -  SEARCH QUERY ON ͚REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS͛ 
APP RAI S AL CRI T ERI A  
Where the search results were too broad, they were narrowed down to look at sources 
specifically relating to the UK, although care was taken not to eliminate literature about other 
territories that could provide comparative material for this study, or which might inform the 
methodology used for this study. 
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The scope of the searches focused on more recent material, mainly published from 2004 
onwards, as this is when the current generation of SNSs emerged with the launch of Facebook.  
Apart from the paucity of literature about online SNSs before that date, this is a very rapidly 
evolving sector and older material is less relevant to the services available at the time of 
writing.  Some exceptions were made for key references that are widely cited and which have 
had a strong influence on subsequent thinking, particularly in the area of regulation. 
Bibliographic databases were selected for their subject coverage, with an emphasis on 
peer-reviewed journals.  This was supplemented with manual searching of key journals 
identified during bibliographic searches and by recommendation and searches for key authors.  
“eleĐted keǇ papeƌs ǁeƌe also seaƌĐhed oŶ I“I͛s “ĐieŶĐe CitatioŶ IŶdeǆ to ideŶtifǇ suďseƋueŶt 
references.  These searches were repeated periodically to update the literature review. 
Primary and secondary legislation were also directly accessed and commentaries on the 
legislation were referred to.  There was a strong emphasis on monographs and multi-author 
handbooks for the legal literature in addition to peer reviewed literature, published reports 
and academic studies.   
CONT EXT  FO R  T HIS  RES EAR CH  
THE NATUR E O F TH E PR OBL E M  
This research considers the nature of risk associated with use of online SNSs and focuses 
specifically on risks associated with personal data on social networks.  An internet user in 
effect makes a contract with an SNS provider when they sign up to a service.  In exchange for 
providing personal data about themselves, they are given access to a range of services and 
features.  They also benefit from having access to the personal profile of others on the 
network. This may be tightly controlled, so that they can only see details of individuals who 
have given them permission to view their profiles, for example a reciprocal arrangement like 
͚fƌieŶdiŶg͛ oŶ FaĐeďook oƌ ͚JoiŶ ŵǇ Ŷetǁoƌk͛ oŶ LiŶkedIŶ.  The less eǀideŶt paƌt of this 
equation is that in exchange for use of online SNSs, the service provider may sell on the 
personal data or access to personal behavioural data to third parties. 
A comprehensive review of the research literature on Facebook considered five different areas 
of research: ͞desĐƌiptiǀe aŶalǇsis of useƌs, ŵotiǀatioŶs foƌ usiŶg FaĐeďook, ideŶtitǇ 
presentation, the role of Facebook in social interactions, and privacy and information 
disĐlosuƌe͟ (Wilson et al. 2012) 
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WHAT I S A SO CI AL NE T WOR K?  
With the widespread recognition of the power of social media as a marketing and promotion 
tool there is a plethora of guides and manuals on how to exploit social media for business 
success available (Comm 2010; Clapperton 2009).  Some of the more authoritative guides 
provide a starting point for a common understanding of what social media are and how social 
networks fit into this sector.  For instance, Wollan, Smith and Zhou (2011) make the 
distinction between social media, which have been around for millennia and digital social 
media, which have grown with the internet and which correspond to current usage of the term 
͚soĐial ŵedia͛.  Digital soĐial ŵedia aƌe desĐƌiďed iŶ teƌŵs of theiƌ ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs: 
 Peer-to-peer communications  Content created and posted by users  Easy to use  Highly accessible, scalable and operates in real time  Public and transparent 
Online social networking services (SNSs) can be characterised by their use and there was a 
marked increase in their use between 2009 and 2011, mainly for social activities (89% of users) 
and with only 22% of users using it for informational activities (Dutton & Blank 2011).   
Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) identify six types of social media which they go on to classify 
according to social presence/media richness on one scale and self-presentation/self-disclosure 
on the other.  This starts to address one of the fundamental issues of control of personal 
data, which is explored later on. 
TABLE 1  -  SOCIAL PRESENCE V.  SELF-DISCLOSURE (AFTER KAPLAN AND HAENLEIN, 2010) 
 Low social 
presence/media 
richness 
Medium social 
presence / media 
richness 
High social presence 
/ media richness 
High 
self-presentation 
/self-disclosure 
Blogs Social networking 
sites (e.g. Facebook) 
Virtual social worlds 
(e.g. Second Life) 
Low self-presentation 
/self-disclosure 
Collaborative projects 
(e.g. Wikipedia) 
Content communities 
(e.g. YouTube) 
Virtual game worlds 
(e.g. World of 
WarCraft) 
 
Social networking services are placed firmly in the middle of the social presence / media 
richness scale and are classed as being high self-presentation / self-disclosure services.  
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KaplaŶ aŶd HaeŶleiŶ go oŶ to desĐƌiďe soĐial ŶetǁoƌkiŶg sites as ͞applications that enable 
users to connect by creating personal information profiles, inviting friends and colleagues to 
have access to those profiles, and sending e-mails and instant messages between each other.͟ 
Cavazza (2010) divides social media into categories based on functionality of the sites (with 
some overlap for services with multiple functionality): 
Publish – this is primarily for blogging, micro-blog, social stream services and wikis 
Share – allows users to share externally sourced media, including material that they 
have created themselves 
Discuss – bulletin boards and social search tools 
Commerce – including reviews of services and tools for e-purchasing 
Location – including event organisation and geo-location tools 
Network – personal and professional networks of contacts 
Games – social gaming, virtual worlds and casual gaming services. 
This definition can be refined further by focusing specifically on social networking services 
which are a sub-set of social media.  Boyd and Ellison (2007) make a distinction between 
social networking sites and social network sites.  They define social networking sites (the 
subject of this research) as: 
… web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or 
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system. 
The main online SNSs covered by this research (and conforming to the above definition) were 
selected on the basis of: their size, the fact that they offer a service in English, and their 
availability to UK users: 
 Badoo  Facebook  Google  hi5  Instagram  LinkedIn  Myspace 
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 Ning  Snapchat  Twitter  WhatsApp 
(Wikipedia 2014) 
EXP L OIT ATI ON OF PER S ONA L DATA  
The teƌŵ ͚peƌsoŶal data͛ ĐaŶ haǀe a ǀaƌietǇ of ŵeaŶiŶgs.  “ĐhŶeieƌ (2010) suggests that 
different types of personal data on social networks will require different measures to protect 
them.  He identifies the following categories of personal data (with some degree of overlap) 
that can be used as a typology of personal data: 
Service data is data provided to the service provider to set up an account 
Disclosed data is what users put up on their profiles, this may include content that 
they have created 
Entrusted data is like disĐlosed data, ďut is peƌsoŶal data pƌoǀided foƌ ͚fƌieŶds͛ 
ĐoŶtaĐts͛ sites oŶ the soĐial Ŷetǁoƌk seƌǀiĐe 
Incidental data is data that other people post about the user – which may include text, 
photos or moving images 
Behavioural data is data that the site collects about the useƌ͛s behaviour on the 
internet, this may be restricted to the SNS, or may be based on monitoring his or her 
interactions with other web sites  
Derived data is that derived from other personal data to make assumptions about the 
user, his or her views or behaviour (or from a third party source such as a published 
directory) 
A great deal of recent attention in the press has been devoted to behavioural data, which 
users may not have provided explicit, informed consent for the service provider to sell or use 
(Angwin & Mcginty 2010).  The permission may be hidden in the terms of service that a user 
signs up to in order to gain access to the service.  This information may then form the basis 
for intrusive advertising directed at the user when they open their browser.  
Warren and Brandeis (1890) provide a starting point for a definition of privacy which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
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Discussions of privacy are made more complicated by the differing definitions of privacy.  
Krotoczynski (2013) argues that there is a fundamental difference in concept between the 
United States with its emphasis on freedom of speech and Europe with its emphasis on 
preservation of human rights values such as dignity and privacy.  Unless this difference in 
concept and meaning is acknowledged it is not possible to implement global human rights 
values as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1950.  This is a particularly 
important consideration when it comes to extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
Wacks (2010) contends that there is no right of privacy by statute in UK and that protections 
arise from common law.  That said, it could be argued that privacy is provided for in a 
number of UK General Public Acts including: the Data Protection Act 1998, the 
Communications Act 2003 and the Human Rights Act 1998.  These are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7.  
Bélanger and Crossler (2011) in their review of privacy research contend that privacy research 
in the context of information systems tends to be very US-centric and often focuses on student 
surveys.  This limits their generalizability and they recommend that ͞‘eseaƌĐheƌs should 
utilize a broader diversity of sample populatioŶs͟.  Their meta-analysis of the literature 
gƌouped theoƌǇ tǇpes iŶto the folloǁiŶg Đategoƌies aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Gƌegoƌ͛s (2006) taxonomy: 
 Analysing theories  Explaining theories  Predicting theories  Explaining and predicting theories  Design and action theories 
Bélanger and Crossler also recommended that ͞‘eseaƌĐheƌs should ĐoŶduĐt ŵoƌe studies 
iŶǀestigatiŶg the ǁhǇ ƌelated to pƌiǀaĐǇ as opposed to the hoǁ͟. 
Some commentatoƌs haǀe distiŶguished ďetǁeeŶ ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌiǀaĐǇ͛ and wider definitions 
of privacy.  For example Westin (2003) iŶĐludes iŶ his defiŶitioŶ of pƌiǀaĐǇ: ͞the claim of an 
individual to determine what information about himself or herself should be known to others͟.  
This is a theme comprehensively addressed in Smith, Dinev and Xu͛s (2011) review of 
Information Privacy Research.  They make the distinction between physical privacy, which 
͞ĐoŶĐeƌŶs phǇsiĐal aĐĐess to aŶ iŶdiǀidual aŶd/oƌ the iŶdiǀidual͛s suƌƌouŶdiŶgs aŶd pƌiǀate 
space͟ aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌiǀaĐǇ, ǁhiĐh ͞concerns access to individually identifiable personal 
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information.͟  IŶ theiƌ aŶalǇsis of ƌeseaƌĐh the authors suggest that much privacy research 
has ŵeasuƌed pƌiǀaĐǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ͞because of the near impossibility of measuring privacy itself͟.  
Privacy concerns include beliefs, attitudes and perceptions about privacy.  This in turn may be 
informed by the experiences of individuals, their awareness of privacy issues, personality 
differences, as well as demographic differences and the general culture or climate within 
which they live.  In their APCO (Antecedents, Privacy Concerns, Outcomes) model Smith et al 
point out the current privacy research rarely considers outcomes as a result of privacy 
concerns. 
Gurses (2014) in considering whether privacy can be engineered provides a thoughtful 
overview of privacy definitions, which is useful when considering options for technological 
approaches to privacy regulation.  Solove (2007) goes on to discuss the common problem of 
ĐoŶflatiŶg ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ͛ aŶd ͚seĐƌeĐǇ͛, the so-Đalled ͚seĐƌeĐǇ paƌadigŵ͛, aŶd suggests that these tǁo 
concepts need to be distinguished from one another. 
The OǆI“ ϮϬϭϭ suƌǀeǇ, fouŶd that ŶeaƌlǇ half of those suƌǀeǇed thought that ͞the current use of 
the internet is a threat to privacy͟ (Dutton & Blank 2011).  However a large number of 
respondents were happier to give out sensitive personal data.  Next Generation Users1 were 
less likely (42%) than non-users and ex-users (63%) to consider the use of computers and the 
internet a threat to privacy.  
For gathering personal data Christiansen (2011) distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ ͞a useƌ͛s ǀoluŶtaƌǇ 
sharing of such information͟ aŶd ͞involuntary/uninformed collection by other parties͟.  “he 
goes on to describe three types of data collection: 
1. Collect personal data, then anonymize and aggregate it to sell to third 
parties and/or for use internally 
2. Collect personal data, keeping personal data within the company but 
providing the opportunity for advertisers to specify a certain range of traits for 
target marketing 
                                                          
1
 Next Generation User  “...someone who accesses the internet from multiple locations and 
devices. ...someone who uses at least two internet applications ... on their mobile or who fits two 
or more of the following criteria: they own a tablet, own a reader, own three or more computers.” 
(Dutton and Blank, 2011, p4) 
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3. Collect personal data with the intention of selling the information, 
sometimes including specific profiles or names, to third parties 
Christiansen (2011) also identifies some of the ways in which personal data can be used or 
misused, although this is far from comprehensive: 
 Running of background checks by employers for hiring decisions; 
 Pricing and assessing risk of injury or death by insurance companies (based 
on Internet searches, blogs, and confidential online support groups, for 
example); 
 Termination decisions by employers (for example, if a user is criticizing the 
workplace or found to be lying to the employer); 
 Recruiting and scholarship decisions by athletic coaches; 
 Searching for relevant evidence by attorneys in the course of case 
preparation; 
 Detecting political leanings for fundraising purposes and to target 
individuals who are undecided on an issue or a candidate; and 
 Facilitating criminal attacks. 
These ĐaŶ ďe addƌessed ďǇ legislatioŶ, ďǇ ŵeaŶs of ͚do Ŷot tƌaĐk͛ lists ;ƌatheƌ like the 
telephone preference service) and ad blockers in web browsers.  Finally Christiansen 
advocates better public education as a key means of reducing the risks associated with use of 
social media. 
McGoldrick (2013) suggests that the European Court of Human Rights ruling in Google Spain 
SL, Google Inc. v AEDP, Mario Costeja González aďout the ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ ƌepƌeseŶts a 
reassertion of the societal value of privacy, which needs to be protected.  
R ISK  
The focus on risk is a key element of this research.  The EŶglish ǁoƌd ͚ƌisk͛ is deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the 
ItaliaŶ ǀeƌď ͚ƌisĐaƌe͛ to ƌuŶ iŶto daŶgeƌ.  It aĐƋuiƌed its ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ŵeaŶiŶg iŶ the ϭϴth 
century when it was applied to iŶsuƌaŶĐe losses.  “iŶĐe theŶ, the usage of the ǁoƌd ͚ƌisk͛ has 
moved away from the idea of a measurable hazard calculated on probability and size of loss, to 
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a more nebulous range of uses encompassing more subjective assessments of likelihood and 
impact.  It is applied extensively in project management and in general management of 
organisations as well as in more traditional commercial environments such as banking. 
In a UNESCO workshop Mansell (2008, p.16) identified risk as a significant area of potential 
research in information and communication studies.  The report stated: 
Research is needed on the potential of digital communication and information 
networks to produce data about all human activity and with respect to all 
people. 
 How can we evaluate the impact of the development of computing and 
artificial intelligence needed to engage in surveillance? 
 What is the potential for the (mis-)use of such data by government 
institutions or private enterprises? 
 What aƌe the daŶgeƌs oƌ ƌisks to the puďliĐ iŶteƌest?͟ 
Fischhoff et al (1984, p.124) suggest that it is often difficult to be objective in the assessment 
of risk: 
WithiŶ the philosophǇ of sĐieŶĐe, ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ tǇpiĐallǇ ŵeaŶs soŵethiŶg akiŶ to 
͚iŶdepeŶdeŶt of oďseƌǀeƌ͛.  That is, aŶǇ iŶdiǀidual folloǁiŶg the saŵe 
procedure should reach the same conclusion.  However meritorious as a goal, 
this sort of objectivity can rarely be achieved.  Particularly in complex, novel 
areas, such as risk analysis, research requires the exercise of judgement. 
TheǇ go oŶ to saǇ: ͞Thus, objectivity should always be an aspiration, but can never be an 
achievement of science.͟  TheǇ aƌgue that researchers need to state what dimensions of risk 
they are considering: ͞aŶ aŶalǇsis of ͚ƌisk͛ Ŷeeds to speĐifǇ ǁhiĐh of these diŵeŶsioŶs ǁill ďe 
included.  In general, definitions based on a single dimension will favour technologies that do 
their harm in a variety of ways (as opposed to those that create a lot of one kind of problem).͟  
In other words the way of measuring each dimension of risk will have an effect on the overall 
assessŵeŶt of ƌisk aŶd as theǇ state: ͞Evaluating it fairly requires knowing what it was 
intended to accomplish.͟  The steps Ŷeeded to do this, theǇ suggest, aƌe: to deĐide which 
consequences to include; the development of a risk index based on different risk attributes; 
identification; and application of simplifying assumptions to ŵake the pƌoďleŵ ͚tƌaĐtaďle͛.  
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The different attributes for a technology make up a vector which can then be turned into a 
single number.  Fischhoff et al (1984, p.137) aƌgue that ͞Developing a definition of risk 
requires a variety of explicit value judgments.͟  
Aven and Renn (2009, p.2) review a number of definitions of risk before arriving at a new 
definition of risk that addresses some of the concerns they raise about lack of precision and 
the need to separate risk measurement and the decisions on the response to risk: 
Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences 
(or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value. 
They point out that: 
The assigned probability and judgements about risk tolerability or acceptability 
are different dimensions, or separate domains in the world of risk professionals 
who make a clear distinction between risk assessment and judgement of 
acceptability.   
This allows for a qualitative approach to risks where probabilities or outcomes cannot be 
quantified.  They conclude by stating that:  
Our proposed definition provides a conceptually consistent and practically 
compatible concept of risk without falling into the extreme of total subjectivism 
and relativism but also not pretending that risk is a measurable object similar 
to other physical entities. 
Objectivity or subjectivity is a theme taken up by Hansson (2010, p.237), who concludes that 
͞risk is both fact-laden and value-laden and that it contains both objective and subjective 
components.͟  He suggests that:  
The real challenge is to identify the various types of factual and valuational 
components inherent in statements about risk and to understand how they are 
combined. 
There is a considerable body of research into risk and the internet (Nissenbaum 2010; Desai, 
MonicaLodge, DeborahGates, MelodiWolvin, MariaLouer 2012) and significant studies on risk 
associated with SNSs (Rosenblum 2007; Toch et al. 2012; Kiser 2011; Sellars 2011).  Much of 
this focuses specifically on risks to children – an area that raises specific issues about 
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vulnerability and this is beyond the scope of this study (Slavtcheva-Petkova et al. 2015; 
Staksrud & Livingstone 2009; Livingstone 2013).  The focus of this research is on risks to 
adults that are associated with use of SNSs and on ways of measuring those risks. 
The Oxford Internet Institute (OII) is conducting a longitudinal survey OxIS which regularly 
surveys public attitudes to the internet and perceptions of risk.  An OxIS report describes the 
paradox of increases in bad experiences on the internet and an increasing trust in the internet 
(Blank 2010).  In other words bad experiences do not seem to undermine trust in the 
internet.  It is suggested that the most experienced users of the internet are more likely to 
have had a bad experience but are better able to cope with problems that subsequently arise, 
because they are more experienced. 
Xu, Michael and Chen (2013) haǀe deǀeloped a ŵodel of ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ disĐlosuƌe͛ ;i.e. disĐlosuƌe of 
personal information on SNSs) which is affected by perceptions of privacy risk and information 
ĐoŶtƌol.  This is ďalaŶĐed agaiŶst peƌĐeiǀed ďeŶefits suĐh as ͚soĐial Đapital͛ aŶd ͚ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ 
attaĐhŵeŶt͛, ǁhiĐh teŶd to ŵotiǀate gƌeateƌ disĐlosuƌe.  CuƌiouslǇ theǇ fouŶd that benefits 
such as access to free or reduced cost services were less of a motivating factor than the social 
factors.  The research does not take into account the personal characteristics of individual 
users, such as age and gender.  Nosko et al (2012) for instance suggested that there is a 
difference in disclosure behaviour between women and men.  Subsequent work also starting 
with the ͚Theory of Planned Behaviour͛ by Saeri et al (2014) suggested that norms and 
peƌĐeptioŶs of ƌisk ǁeƌe sigŶifiĐaŶt faĐtoƌs affeĐtiŶg useƌs͛ pƌiǀaĐǇ ďehaǀiouƌ oŶliŶe.  TheǇ 
found contrary to a review of earlier research ;O͛BƌieŶ & Toƌƌes ϮϬϭϮͿ that trust was not a 
significant factor in determining user behaviour. 
As well as explicit disclosure, there are risks associated with un-informed consent and 
inadvertent disclosure.  For instance, social log-in represents a significant area of data 
leakage and some research has identified the risks associated with this and suggested technical 
solutions to limit this data leakage (Kontaxis et al. 2012).  Carmagnola et al (2014, pp.194–
195) in contrast looked at relationship data and non-personal information that can be 
associated with a personal profile and concluded:  
In recent years, OSNs have been used by increasing numbers of people, with 
the result that much personal data are stored on these systems. Even if a social 
Ŷetǁoƌk͛s pƌiǀaĐǇ settiŶgs eŶsuƌe that useƌ pƌofile iŶfoƌŵatioŶ is pƌoteĐted, 
they do not ensure protection from attackers who may combine disparate 
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pieces of information about a user from multiple networks, thus allowing user 
identification and the retrieval of user personal data. Cross-site user 
identification may be very useful for the optimization of some tasks requiring 
user modelling, such as user support and personalization. However, it can also 
be used with criminal purposes, thus representing a risk for user privacy. 
Weiss (2008) suggested that there needs to be a shift away from privacy-enhancing 
technologies that concentrate on access protection, anonymity and unlinkability.  He 
advocates a move toward privacy safeguarding measures that enable greater transparency and 
that facilitate context and purpose limitation to personally identifiable data.   
REG ULATIO N  
The following factors have affected the rise of regulation in the UK (Moran 2005): 
 Crisis and scandal  European Union - culture of greater regulation  Power and democracy 
One of the purposes of regulation is to control risk.  In the introduction to the Better 
‘egulatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s (2006, p.3) report, Rick Haythornthwaite, the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s 
Chairman, states:  
Our specific recommendations are, though, for Government, and the most 
important of these calls is for our leaders to redefine our approach to risk 
management in a number of ways:  
 Emphasising the importance or resilience, self-reliance, freedom, 
innovation and a spirit of adǀeŶtuƌe iŶ todaǇ͛s soĐietǇ;  
 Leaving the responsibility for managing risk with those best placed to 
manage it and to embark on state regulation only where it represents 
the optimum solution for managing risk;  
 Re-examining areas where the state has assumed more responsibility 
foƌ people͛s liǀes thaŶ is healthǇ oƌ desiƌed; aŶd  
 Separating fact from emotion and emphasising the need to balance 
necessary levels of protection with preserving reasonable levels of risk. 
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The BRC report (2006, p.51) goes on to identify five principles of good regulation: 
 PƌopoƌtioŶalitǇ ͞regulators should only intervene when necessary. Remedies should be 
appropriate to the risk posed and costs identified and minimised͟  AĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ ͞regulators must be able to justify decisions and be subject to public 
scrutiny͟   CoŶsisteŶĐǇ ͞government rules and standards must be joined up and implemented 
fairly͟   TƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ ͞regulators should be open and keep regulations simple and 
user-friendly͟   TaƌgetiŶg ͞regulation should be focused on the problem and minimise side effects͟.  
These principles apply to government regulation and specifically regulation that is based on 
legislation.  However some of these principles could be applied to other modes of regulation 
such as: self-regulation; and technology-based regulatory measures.  Haythornthwaite (2006) 
suggests that government regulation should be based on a sound risk assessment and not be 
subject to public opinion, pressure groups and politics.  However he recognises the need for a 
conversation between different interest groups in order to arrive at workable regulation.  The 
administrative costs of regulation (red tape), is estimated at £30 – £40 billion a year in the UK.  
This is in addition to the cost of lost opportunities and non-financial costs such as: erosion of 
personal responsibility, loss of trust.  This suggests that regulation should only be used where 
absolutely necessary.  Haythornthwaite suggests that government should not regulate where 
the individual taking the risk is the only one that can be harmed.  In other words, legislation 
may not have been considered the best way of protecting users against risk.  In light of recent 
developments in the financial markets, the balance may shift back towards greater regulation 
(Heffernan 2011; Slattery & Nellis 2011). 
REG ULA TI NG T H E INT E R NET  
There are a variety of modes for regulating the internet generally and SNSs in particular.  
Ofcom (2009) identified the following types of regulation in relation to the internet: 
 Personal responsibility – regulation by individual users  Self regulation – regulation by site owners and content providers  Self regulation – regulation by internet service providers  Statutory regulation  
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An alternative view of regulation can be described in terms of a response to risk, and in 
particular risk associated with loss of privacy.  Lessig (2006, pp.233, 234) identifies two main 
threats to privacy from the internet: 
The first is the threat from 'digital surveillance' - the growing capacity of the 
government (among others) to 'spy' on your activities 'in public' […] The second 
threat comes from the increasing aggregation of data by private (among 
other) entities.  These data are gathered not so much to 'spy' as to facilitate 
commerce. 
He identifies four ŵodes of ƌegulatioŶ, ǁhiĐh he uses to ŵeaŶ ͞ĐoŶstƌaiŶt͟ as ƌespoŶses to 
these risks: 
Against these two different risks, we can imagine four types of responses, each 
mapping one of the modalities […]: 
Law … 
Norms … 
Markets … 
Architecture/Code … 
These models of regulation can be consolidated into a single model (discussed in Chapter 6), 
which form the basis for this research: 
1. Legislation  
2. Self-regulation 
3. Code 
4. Norms 
LEG I SL ATI ON  
A review of legislation and the resulting statutory regulation must take into account the nature 
of the UK constitution which governs the role of the different branches of government, 
including the legislature and the judiciary.  Bogdanor (2009) argues that the current round of 
constitutional reform started in 1997 and the UK's entry into the Common Market in 1973 has 
effectively replaced one constitution with another.  He also argues that this is an on-going 
process. Recent changes include: devolution; home country legislatures and the London 
Assembly; PR in devolved administrations; and European elections.  Other significant 
developments that affect the regulation of access to personal data include: Human Rights Act 
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1998, reform of the House of Lords, Freedom of Information Act 2000, the regulation of 
political parties and electoral expenditure, and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 which 
makes the Lord Chief Justice (not the Lord Chancellor) the head of the judiciary.  Bogdanor 
argues that Britain has an uncodified constitution making it more difficult to follow changes to 
the constitutional order: 
A society is distinguished from a mere conglomeration of individuals in that it 
comprises a group of people bound together by rules; and a constitution is 
nothing more than a collection of the most important rules prescribing the 
distribution of power between the institutions of government - legislature, 
executive and judiciary - and between the individuals and the state. 
He suggests that under the Human Rights Act 1998 judges are likely to play a more important 
role in defining rights (Bogdanor 2009).  One purpose of a constitution is to protect 
minorities, which is what the Human Rights Act 1998 does.  It is based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights and is part of the package of membership of the EU. Formerly 
sovereignty of parliament was the dominating principle in the UK's constitution; and hence a 
written constitution was deemed unnecessary.  Now other factors are important and 
sovereignty of parliament is not the only consideration. Although Bogdanor argues in favour of 
a codified constitution, he advocates this as a process.   
The Human Rights Act 1998 enshrines ͞the right to respect for private and family life͟.  The 
other relevant piece of legislation is the Data Protection Act 1998 and Statutory Instruments 
under the Act and derived from the equivalent European Directives.  These two pieces of 
legislation are described in Chapter 7. 
Commentators such as Clarke (1999) advocated legislation in the US to protect personal 
privacy in the internet age.  Oppenheim (2001) gives an early account of legislation relating 
to the internet and other electronic environments.  In his chapter on Conflict of Laws he asks 
which law applies to a service based in one country but delivered to a user in another.  He 
puts forward the idea that cyberspace should have its own jurisdiction and that its laws would 
apply to any transactions that took place in that space.  Lessig͛s (2006, p.298) argument 
develops this theme to suggest that the norms and laws of both physical and cyberspace 
apply:  
We have this desire to pick: We want to say that they are either in cyberspace 
or in real space.  We have this desire because we want to know which space is 
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responsible.  Which space has jurisdiction over them?  Which space rules?  
The answer is both.  Whenever anyone is in cyberspace, she is also here, in 
real space.  Whenever one is subject to the norms of a cyberspace 
community, one is also living within a community in real space.  You are 
always in both places if you are there and the norms of both places apply.  
The problem for law is to work out how the norms of the two communities are 
to apply given that the subject to whom they apply may be in both places at 
once. 
A comparative review of legislation in the EU, the United States, Australia and New Zealand 
suggests that a principles-based approach is likely to offer the key to international 
interoperability of regulation (Toy 2013).  It is also considered to be more flexible and 
therefore better able to accommodate future changes in technology.  Lozada et al (2013, 
p.60) describe the technology used by marketers to gather personal data and the push by 
European and US authorities to protect consumer online privacy.  The authors conclude: 
Presently, there are no uniform international laws to deal with violations to 
online privacy. Thus, we are confronted with the dilemma of having no one 
specifically monitoring for potential violatioŶs to ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ ƌights to pƌiǀaĐǇ 
online. Last, it is becoming critical to ascertain the effectiveness of opt out 
options and their impact on alleviating consumer skepticism. 
At the time of writing the EU͛s GeŶeƌal Data Protection Regulation 2012 had been passed by 
the European Parliament and was in the process of revision prior to publication of a final 
version.  A number of commentators have examined the draft Regulation to consider how it 
might develop taking into account differences in approach between the EU and the United 
States, for instance (Schwartz 2013; Svantesson 2014). 
SE LF-RE GU LAT IO N  
Self-regulation by users of their use of the internet falls within the scope of user behaviour, 
which is considered later in this chapter (LaRose et al. 2003).  Haufler (2001) has a useful 
definition: 
Self-regulation occurs when those regulated design and enforce the rules 
themselves.  
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One of the most prominent self-regulatory regimes affecting the social media services used in 
the UK is the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor arrangements with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  
Although this is based on an agreement between the European Commission and the US 
authorities, it is a voluntary arrangement with no external verification of registrations 
required. This has been reviewed previously and many concerns were raised about 
inconsistent and inaccurate registrations, as well as the very loose compliance requirements 
(Connolly 2008). 
There has been some reaction against self-regulation following the financial crisis of 2008 and 
its aftermath, which was widely perceived as a failure of self-regulation (Slattery & Nellis 
2011).  Even before the crisis some commentators were suggesting that self-regulation is 
ineffective on its own (Collins 2006). 
Cannataci and Bonnici (2003) examine self-regulation by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and 
point out that self-regulatory approaches are constrained to some degree by national 
boundaries.  
In the United States the role and actions of the FTC have been reviewed and it was found that 
the FTC has in effect codified certain norms and privacy best practices but that there has been 
a failure of self-regulation that has resulted in settlements with Facebook, Google and Twitter 
among others (Solove & Hartzog 2014; Hans 2012).  The FTC operates through a number of 
divisions including the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, a part of the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection.  Under the Federal Trade Commission Act 2006, the FTC regulates 
unfair practices and has used this to make cases against SNS providers for misleading privacy 
policies, and gathering and distribution of personal data to other suppliers. 
The European Union has seen a move to co-regulation, where the responsibility for regulation 
is placed on the regulated industry, but with supervision by the state.  This is sometimes 
ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚ƌegulated self-ƌegulatioŶ͛ and can be characterised as a combination of 
law-base or state regulation and measures taken by industry (self-regulation) (Hans-Bredow 
Institut 2006). 
Privacy policies are another manifestation of self-regulation by industry.  An initial 
investigation of the privacy policies of the largest SNS providers is described in Chapter 8. 
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CODE  
Reidenberg (1998) fiƌst put foƌǁaƌd the idea of ͚Leǆ iŶfoƌŵatiĐa͛ ǁheƌe the stƌuĐtuƌe aŶd 
architecture of cyberspace became a means of regulating it.  In Code 2.0 Lessig (2006, p.5) 
states: 
In real space, we recognize how laws regulate – through constitutions, 
statutes, and other legal codes.  In cyberspace we must understand how a 
diffeƌeŶt ͞Đode͟ ƌegulates – hoǁ the softǁaƌe aŶd haƌdǁaƌe ;i.e., the ͞Đode͟ of 
cyberspace) that make cyberspace what it is also regulate cyberspace as it is. 
In other words: ͞Code is laǁ͟, iŶ Lessig͛s ĐatĐh-phrase.  He goes on to argue that it is possible 
to build systems to reflect the values that are considered important or fundamental.  Indeed 
it is impossible to avoid reflecting some values in the build, architecture or coding of 
ĐǇďeƌspaĐe.  Lateƌ he saǇs: ͞There is regulation of behaviour on the internet and in 
cyberspace, but that regulation is imposed primarily through code.͟  Foƌ eǆaŵple, ͞code that 
encrypts regulates to protect privacy͟.  The code itself can be regulated (e.g. the US 
government requirement that it should have access to encryption codes built into any system) 
as well as being an agent of regulation.  Lessig terms these East Coast code (e.g. laws enacted 
in Washington DC) and West Coast code (system design and architecture based in Silicon 
Valley). 
Lessig goes on to look at the way in which code regulates privacy on the internet.  Zittrain 
(2008) talks about loss of control over personal data.  Lessig argues that the interests 
threatened by breach of privacy are diffuse and disorganised (unlike the copyright interests 
that are also affected by the internet).  There are compelling interests arrayed against privacy 
interests, namely national security.  Zittrain argues that this is reason why privacy legislation 
in the US is relatively neglected compared to copyright legislation.  One solution might be 
Lessig͛s (2006, p.129) ǀieǁ that ͞the protection of privacy would be stronger if people 
conceived of the right as a property right.͟  This would mean that individuals would have 
control over the distribution and use of their personal information and they would attract 
payment for its use.  A royalty system might need to be established to achieve this and the 
current economic model of free consumer use of social media may have to be reconsidered. 
Recognition of the importance of system architecture in regulation is seen in the Information 
CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe͛s (2008) ͚PƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ DesigŶ͛ initiative, an example of regulation by code.  
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The principle is that any system or service that is established should consider privacy issues 
from the initial design stage onwards, rather than being tacked on as an afterthought. 
OŶe ǁaǇ that ͚Đode͛ is eǆpƌessed is iŶ the default pƌiǀaĐǇ settiŶgs aŶd the optioŶs that useƌs 
are given for adjusting the level of disclosure that they are comfortable with.  Willis (2014) 
questions the effectiveness of default positions (Track-Me / Do-Not-Track) as a way of 
regulating privacy on the internet.  If rules (regulations) are imposed to mandate a 
Do-Not-Track default, for instance ͞a fiƌŵ͛s thƌee ŵaiŶ aǀeŶues foƌ eŶsuƌiŶg the failuƌe of a 
default [are]: (1) utilizing transaction barriers, (2) harnessing judgment and decision biases, 
aŶd ;ϯͿ iŶflueŶĐiŶg pƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌŵatioŶ effeĐts͟ (Willis 2014, p.112).  She also considers it 
unlikely that competition between firms will lead to greater privacy.  The implication of her 
work is that greater user awareness and education is the way forward. 
NOR M S  
User behaviour is expressed collectively in societal norms and in market behaviour, as well as 
individually.  Norms regulate services by creating default ways of working.  For instance, 
there is a developing norm that users should be able to opt in to sharing their personal details 
with advertisers, rather than having to opt out.  Instead of regulation Tene and Polonetsky 
(2012, p.66) aƌgue that ͞Policymakers should engage with this normative question, consider 
which activities are socially acceptable, and spell out the default norms accordingly͟.  They go 
on to suggest that risk analysis is a more rational basis for data protection than data 
minimisation (i.e. only collecting that data that is directly necessary for the original purpose it 
was gathered for).   
Solove (2007, p.179) describes privacy in terms of social network theory and the norms that 
apply: 
Social network theory often focuses primarily on connections, but networks 
involve more than nodes and links.  There are norms about information 
sharing that are held within certain groups, such as norms of confidentiality. 
Regulation by the market (e.g. demand by consumers) is affected by privacy concerns as has 
been seen in the responses over changes to the privacy settings on Facebook (Helft & 
Wortham 2010).  However some of this change may be due to pressure from regulators such 
as the Canadian Privacy Commissioner (Denham 2009).  
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Lessig (2006) dismisses the idea of the market as a means of protecting personal privacy on the 
internet.  Other commentators have suggested that a market for personal data is beginning 
to develop (Yassine et al. 2012).  This could in future become an effective means of regulating 
access to personal data, or a means of protecting personal privacy on social networks.  Boyd 
(2012) asks about the degree of control users have to develop their own social norms.  She 
identifies the use of real names as a norm on Facebook, which she attributes to FaĐeďook͛s 
origins as a campus-based service.  When the service expanded beyond the campus not all 
users adopted this norm.  When Google+ attempted to force users to register with their real 
names, there was a consumer backlash, which suggests that there may be a different norm for 
Google+ users (Boyd 2012).  
Is some form of feedback mechanism possible so that systems regulate themselves?  Parallels 
can be seen in biological regulation where for instance increased blood sugar leads to a rise in 
insulin production which lowers the blood sugar level, which in turn is detected by the body 
which responds by reducing the production of insulin.  An auto-regulatory system (not to be 
confused with self-regulation) might be an interesting avenue to explore and may be one of 
the characteristics of regulation by the market (Lessig 2006). 
The Information Commissioner͛s OffiĐe (2014) in the UK has actively educated users to take 
responsibility for protecting their own privacy.  User education was also seen as one strand of 
an effective strategy for avoiding some of the risks associated with online SNSs.  This is a 
reflection of Dry͛s (2007) historical analysis of risk and regulation and the benefits of 
individuals taking greater responsibility for risk assessment.  This could be seen as a possible 
ŵeĐhaŶisŵ foƌ ƌegulatioŶ ďǇ the ŵaƌket.  Useƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ is modified in response to 
perceived risk, affecting the demand for SNSs.  Nosko et al (2012) found that user disclosure 
behaviour changed in response to exposure to stories about data misuse and this might be an 
avenue for future user training. 
Social norms can act against prudent behaviour as shown in a study where a fictional Facebook 
aĐĐouŶt ǁas estaďlished.  The ƌeseaƌĐh shoǁed that people ǁeƌe ǁilliŶg to ͚fƌieŶd͛ the 
fictional account and speculated that this might be due to norms of reciprocity (Lemieux 2012).  
However Hooper and Kalidas (2012) found that there were clear views about unacceptable 
behaviour among a sample of youths (18-20 years old) on Facebook.  Their evidence suggests 
that acceptable behaviour (about which there is less clarity) may be subject to herding, so that 
what is considered acceptable is more dependent on the context.  Martin (2012) tries to 
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quantify social norms by examining user responses to a series of vignettes and concluded that 
norms depend on context.  
Nunan and Yenicioglu (2013) in their examination of social media in market research (and 
advertising) highlighted the problem of lack of informed user consent and the ethical problems 
that this presents.  They point out that regulation lags too far behind technology changes and 
that there is a danger of alienating users.  They suggest that users need to be more involved 
in the research process and that protecting them from harm is a major consideration. 
M IX ED AP PR OA CH E S TO  REGU LA TI ON  
Lessig (2006, p.267) argues that combinations of the four modalities protects the individual: 
͞Here again, then, the solution is a mixed modality strategy.  As LAW creates the incentive for 
a certain change in the CODE of spam (it now comes labelled). That law is enforced through a 
complex set of MARKET and NORM-based incentives͟. 
Solove (2007, pp.190, 191) draws parallels between privacy and copyright and suggests that 
there has to be a balance between freedom and control of information.  He concludes that 
͞We are witnessing a clash between privacy and free speech͟ aŶd suggests that ;iŶ the United 
“tatesͿ ͞we can rework the law to make it a useful instrument in balancing privacy and free 
speech͟.  He suggests that laǁsuits pƌoǀide a ŵiddle gƌouŶd ďetǁeeŶ a liďeƌtaƌiaŶ appƌoaĐh 
;leaǀiŶg laǁ out of ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs of pƌiǀaĐǇͿ aŶd ͞An authoritarian approach which involved 
direct restrictions on internet expression͟.  IŶ his ǀieǁ the laǁ should ƌeĐogŶise the ǀaƌietǇ of 
situatioŶs ǁheƌe pƌiǀaĐǇ is a ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ aŶd it ͞should also increase its recognition of duties 
of confidentiality͟.  Social norms are a powerful means of regulating behaviour and can be a 
strong alternative to resorting to legal remedies.  To some extent social norms also drive 
legislation by placing pressure on law-makers as well as on those administering the law.  
Finally Solove advocates parties working out disputes between themselves without resorting 
to the law and refers to Lessig and Reidenbeƌg͛s view that technical architecture can be used 
to protect privacy (Solove 2007; Weber 2002).  
Spinello (2006) takes up Lessig͛s theme of modes of regulation and questions whether special 
ƌegulatioŶ is Ŷeeded foƌ the iŶteƌŶet, the so Đalled ͚laǁ of the hoƌse͛ (i.e. if special laws are not 
required for horses, why is one needed for the internet?).  Spinello concludes that special 
legislation is not required in this case.  
Schmidt and Cohen (2013, p.66) in their forward view of humans and technology talk about 
different modes of regulation (͞ĐopiŶg stƌategies: Đoƌpoƌate, legal, soĐietal aŶd peƌsoŶal͟).  
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Although theǇ do Ŷot ŵap ŶeatlǇ oŶto Lessig͛s ƌegulatoƌǇ ŵodes, theƌe is a ĐoƌƌelatioŶ 
between their categories and the model used in this research. 
So what of the United Kingdom?  Buckley Owen et al (2012) point out that the lack of a 
national information policy in the UK means that responsibility for regulating information and 
communication services falls across several different agencies.  The one most directly 
concerned with regulating access to personal data on social networks is the Information 
CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe, uŶdeƌ the teƌŵs of the Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ and discussed in detail 
in Chapter 7.  
Lofstedt et al (2011) argue that the relationship between public and regulators has changed 
over the last 20 years.  Several major scandals have led to greater public distrust.  This has 
resulted in a shift from a consensual style of regulation to a model based on public 
participation, transparency, and more powerful non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
Lessig͛s (2006, p.232) view is that a combination of law, norms and architecture/code is the 
most effective means of regulation of privacy on the internet.  He does not believe the 
market is an effective regulator in this instance and concludes: 
Collective action must be taken to bend the architectures towards this goal 
[protecting privacy], and collective action is just what politics is for.  
Laissez-faire will not cut it.  
This view is open to challenge, especially in light of emerging views about a market for 
tradeable personal data.  However it is difficult to evaluate these different approaches 
without some way of measuring their effects.  The purpose of this research is to develop a 
methodology, or at least an approach based on risk analysis to compare these modes of 
regulation. 
MEA SUR IN G RE GUL ATO R Y EF F ECT IV ENE S S  
A starting point for a review of regulatory effectiveness might be to look at its effect on risk.  
Hutter (2005) documents the move towards risk-based regulation in the UK and Europe but 
points out that risk is often subjective and therefore difficult to define precisely.  The author 
goes on to talk about the use of impact and probability estimates as a basis for prioritising risk. 
This research uses the measurement of risk as a tool for evaluating regulatory effectiveness.  
This is based on the premise that one of the purposes of regulation is to manage risk.  One of 
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the problems with this is that there are different views of what risk is.  Aven and Renn (2009) 
discuss risk in terms of something of human value and suggest that both uncertain events 
(likelihood) and outcome (impact) need to be taken into account in assessing risk.  Different 
methods of assessing regulatory impact were introduced to improve the reputation (and 
effectiveness) of EU regulation (Torriti 2007).   
The idea of using risk measurement for assessing regulatory impact has been around for some 
time.  This research is based on the premise that risk assessment provides the foundations 
for evaluating regulatory effectiveness.  The British Computer Society described compliance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998 in terms of risk management (Room 2007).  However not 
all commentators are convinced about the value of risk-based legislation.  Haythornthwaite 
(2006) takes the view that where the risk is confined to an individual and does not harm wider 
society, it should become their individual responsibility, for instance by taking out insurance. 
Heyvaert (2011) goes further in suggesting a shift in risk regulation (based on work on climate 
change) and a move to integration and orchestration and away from individualisation and 
compartmentalisation.  Rather than looking at the risks associated with use of online SNSs, 
we may need to consider wider risks associated with internet use.  For instance, the risks 
associated with gathering and exploitation of behavioural data or the inadvertent download of 
malware are systemic risks of internet usage.  Risks associated with making personal data 
available to a range of providers (not just SNSs) leave the door open to abuse of that data. 
Liu and Terzi (2010) have developed a ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ sĐoƌe͛ that ͞ŵeasuƌes the useƌ͛s poteŶtial 
privacy risk due to his or her online information sharing behaviour͟.  Their mathematical 
models are intended to estimate the sensitivity and visibility of personal information.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ the ŵodels applǇ to iŶdiǀiduals͛ attitudes to seŶsitiǀitǇ of diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of peƌsoŶal 
data, the nature of the network, and the size of individual personal networks online.  It is 
difficult to see how different regulatory modes would affect the scores that are derived from 
this model. 
Swedelow et al (2009) have constructed a universe of almost 3,000 risks over a 35-year period 
to create a means of evaluating European and US regulation.  This provides a resource for 
theory testing and theory building and serves as a potential test-bed for analysing risks 
associated with use of online SNSs.  
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CON CLU SION  
The literature survey focused on: risks associated with personal data on SNSs; ways in which 
access to personal data is regulated; and on assessment of regulatory effectiveness. 
There is a well-developed literature on general risks and descriptions of specific risks faced by 
users of social media, but no systematic analysis of the ranges of risk associated with SNSs.  
Perceptions of internet risks are covered by the OXIS longitudinal surveys (Blank 2010; Dutton 
& Blank 2011; Dutton & Blank 2013).  However they do not present a systematic classification 
of risk and there is a need for a typology of risks associated specifically with SNSs. 
The literature has established that one of the purposes of regulation is to manage risk.  
Lessig͛s (2006) model of regulation is a starting point for the regulation of SNSs, although this 
predates the emergence and rapid expansion of social media.  Wu (2010) provides a good 
historical analysis of regulation of digital and electronic communications services in the United 
States and Zittrain (2008) provides a forward view of regulation of the Internet.  There is also 
considerable literature on statutory regulation particularly around data protection in Europe, 
although ǀeƌǇ little oŶ its appliĐatioŶ to “N“s.  PƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ ;aŶ aspeĐt of Lessig͛s ͚Đode͛Ϳ 
is also well covered.  Norms have been considered by US-based researchers such as Boyd 
(2010) and UK researchers such as Miller (2011).  However there has been relatively little on 
UK regulation since Cooke (2004) and Oppenheim (2001) both of whose published work in this 
area predates SNSs.  The Lessig (2006) model deserves further scrutiny to assess its suitability 
for the current social media landscape and applicability to SNSs. 
The literature on regulatory effectiveness tends to consider its effects on the markets or on 
businesses.  The link between risk and regulation is well established, but there is no 
systematic research on the use of risk measurement to evaluate regulatory effectiveness.  
This research aims to fill the gap by: identifying and categorising the risks associated with 
social media; refining the model of regulation that can be applied to SNSs; and developing a 
method in which risk concepts can be used to compare and evaluate the relative effectiveness 
of different regulatory modes. 
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CHAPTER 3  –  METHODOLOGY  
MET HODS  IN  IN FOR MATION SCI EN CE RES EAR CH  
͞The pƌiŵaƌǇ goal of ƌeseaƌĐh is to liŶk the eŵpiƌiĐal aŶd the theoƌetiĐal͟.  (Ragin 1994) 
This review of regulation calls on a variety of methods from sociology, economics and legal 
studies.  The emphasis is on qualitative methods to identify issues and argumentation 
supported by quantitative studies of behaviour and attitudes.  Textual analysis is particularly 
relevant in exploring privacy policies of online SNS providers.  This research is intended to 
influence information policy relating to personal data and is informed by the range of research 
methods used in information science. 
Hjørland (2002) uses domain analysis to define the scope of information science.  Specifically 
he identifies eleven domains of which two are of direct relevance to this study: ͞eŵpiƌiĐal useƌ 
studies͟; and ͞studies of stƌuĐtuƌes aŶd iŶstitutioŶs iŶ sĐieŶtifiĐ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͟.  However he 
concludes that: 
… empirical studies of users may represent an important approach to domain 
analysis in IS if they are informed by proper theory.  They may, for example, 
provide information about differences in information needs in different 
communities.  They should be combined with other approaches, including: 
 bibliometric studies; 
 epistemological and critical studies; and 
 studies of structures and institutions in scientific communication. 
(Hjørland 2002, p.432) 
The last of these headings makes uncomfortable reading because of the emphasis on 
͞scientific communication͟.  He ďases this oŶ the UNI“I“T ŵodel of the ŵaiŶ Đategoƌies of 
information sources and the key players in this.  The model breaks down when applied to 
online SNSs, where one of the characteristics of these services is user-generated content.  
The agencies that are responsible for managing and distributing this information do not fit 
easily into the categories of: publishers; abstracting and indexing services; libraries; 
Information centres; and clearing houses, although data centres could apply.  Therefore a 
new model is needed if this research is to be considered a part of the domain of information 
science. 
 44 
Robinson (2009) iŶ settiŶg out ͞to derive a conceptual model for information science, which is 
both academically sound and practically useful͟ eǆteŶds HjøƌlaŶd͛s ŵodel of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
science to a wider-ranging definitioŶ: ͞Information science can be understood as a field of 
study, with human recorded information as its concern, focusing on the components of the 
information chain, studied through the perspective of domain analysis, and in specific or 
general contexts.͟  Personal data on online SNSs can be taken to be human recorded 
information (including behavioural data from tracking cookies and web beacons).  
Components in the information chain include SNS stakeholders: users; service providers; and 
regulators.  Although the primary focus of this work is on risks to users, the roles of the other 
actors (or components) in the information chain are also considered. 
Rowlands, Eisenschitz and Bawden (2002) consider the limitations of the political economy 
frame for the study of information policy and suggest that it is inadequate in light of 
non-market conceptions of information and the emergence of human rights legislation.  They 
suggest that the study of information policy fragments into: laws, regulation, IM practices, and 
iŶstitutioŶal Đultuƌes.  TheǇ suggest that ͞inquiry into the political realm can never be 
value-free͟ aŶd that theƌe aƌe Ŷo oďjeĐtiǀe tƌuths iŶ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ poliĐǇ.  The fƌaŵe used to 
analyse information policy is a set of values and concepts people use to make sense of the 
world around them. 
The research sets out to test the hypothesis that risk can be used as a means of evaluating the 
relative effectiveness of different modes of regulating access to personal data on SNSs.  This 
in turn will help to throw light on question of whether legislation alone is the best way of 
regulating access to personal data on online SNSs accessed by users in the United Kingdom.   
APP ROACH  
An initial view of user risk would suggest that an empirical approach to measuring risk should 
form the basis for comparison of different regulatory modes.  However many of the risks 
identified are difficult to measure objectively, despite attempts in this research to do so.  The 
research may be limited to a qualitative evaluation of perceptions of risk or a quantitatively 
indicative approach.  So, for example, regulatory effects can be described in terms of their 
tendency to increase or decrease the probability of a risk occurring and their tendency to 
increase or decrease the impact of the risk event if it occurs. 
Another avenue to explore would be the effect of regulation on perceptions of risk by users 
and the response of different stakeholders to regulation or potential regulation.  These 
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approaches call on well-established social science research methods including ethnography, 
case studies and attitudinal surveys.  Outhwaite and Turner (2007) suggest that social science 
methodology has two meanings: 
methodological issues arising from and related to theoretical perspectives, as 
in Marxist, functionalist or feminist methodology 
and  
issues of specific research techniques, concepts and methods.  
This research focuses on the second of the two definitions. 
McNeill (2005) maps the development of social science research from thinkers such as Marx, 
Durkheim and Weber as well as the early social research of Charles Booth in London in the late 
19th and early 20th Centuries (Charles Booth Online Archive 2013).  He goes on to describe the 
Chicago School which pioneered anthropological research, through to the research by feminist 
scholars in the 1980s.   
The methods adopted for this policy research were largely qualitative.  A particular challenge 
of social research is combining the insight provided by qualitative research with the 
generalizability of results that comes from statistically significant quantitative work.  Much of 
the discourse on research methods attempts to reconcile these two approaches (Niglas 2010; 
Turrow 2004).  
In his chapter on bridging the quantitative and qualitative divide Turrow (2004) describes 
process tracing that uses qualitative analysis focused on processes of change within cases to 
uncover causal relationships.  Underlying quantitative findings focus on tipping points – 
explaining points in time-series data where changes occur.  He suggests that sequencing 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single study allows triangulation of results and 
provides better insights into the phenomenon being investigated. 
Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used for this research.  The qualitative 
results (e.g. from semi-structured interviews and examination of legislation) are based on 
textual analysis to identify themes and topics which were then further explored.  The data 
provided material for development of a working hypotheses about the relative effectiveness of 
different types of regulation.   
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Whilst it is important to acknowledge any assumptions or starting points for the research, an 
appƌoaĐh ďased oŶ Glaseƌ aŶd “tƌauss͛s GƌouŶded TheoƌǇ seeŵs ŵoƌe appealing, where an 
initial hypothesis is generated from a pilot study and this is further investigated using empirical 
data to test the hypothesis.  This method is described in detail by Charmaz (2006) who states 
that ͞theoretical sampling is less of an explicit procedure than a strategy that you invoke and 
fit to your specific study͟. 
This thesis also examines other empirical data such as records of court cases to test the 
working hypotheses.  This works on the principle of falsifiability of an hypothesis (Popper 
1959).  In other words, the research questions are framed in such a way that it is possible to 
disprove the hypothesis with empirical data if it turned out to be false. 
Ragin (2000) ĐoŵďiŶes Ƌualitatiǀe aŶd ƋuaŶtitatiǀe teĐhŶiƋues iŶ ͚fuzzǇ sets͛ ǁheƌe iŶdiǀidual 
entities have varying degrees of membership of a set.  So for example, one could study 
varying degrees of risk associated with personal data or applying to users.  He goes on to 
suggest that if Theory 1 proposes cause and effect and Theory 2 proposes multiple causes of 
the saŵe effeĐt, TheoƌǇ ϭ ŵaǇ still ďe ǀalid.  ApplǇiŶg ‘agiŶ͛s pƌiŶĐiple to this research one 
could posit that data protection legislation will result in lowered risk to users of SNSs.  This 
hypothesis is not necessarily undermined by the view that several different modes of 
regulation working in concert may be even more effective in lowering the risk to users. 
MET HODS  USED  
The research methods used can be broken down into a series of distinct areas of activity 
designed to throw light on specific aspects of risk and regulation in SNSs: 
 Survey of attitudes to risk  Review of legislation  Investigation of privacy policies  Interviews with stakeholders  Identification and measurement of risk  Case studies of SNSs  Assessment of regulatory modes 
SUR V E Y O F ATT ITUD E S TO R I SK  
A preliminary qualitative survey of individual users (Appendix B) and professionals responsible 
for data protection identified the following issues: 
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1. Mixed views about the efficacy of data protection legislation as a means of regulating 
access to personal data 
2. Concern about lack of enforcement or difficulty of enforcement of data protection 
legislation across national boundaries 
3. The need for SNS providers to be more open about what they do with personal data, 
and defaulting to more secure settings 
4. The need for greater education and awareness of the risks associated with posting 
personal data on social networks 
5. View that better encryption standards will help to protect personal data 
These themes were followed up in an online survey of LIS professionals in the UK (Appendix C).  
This particular group was selected for the following reasons: the investigation is focused on 
ƌegulatioŶ that applies to UK useƌs of “N“s; LI“ pƌofessioŶals͛ kŶoǁledge aŶd use of “N“s as 
intermediaries, to communicate with their customers, and to educate; and knowledge of this 
group by the researcher.  The survey used convenience sampling and therefore cannot be 
extrapolated to represent the entire group.  However the 222 responses allowed a 
quantitative analysis of the survey results to gain insight into perceptions of risk and priorities.  
SurveyGizmo was used to deliver the survey and gather the results for analysis.  The data 
analysis was primarily conducted using Microsoft Excel spreadsheet software for the numerical 
data and QSR NVivo 10 for content analysis of the responses to the open questions. 
REV I EW OF L EG I SL ATI O N  
A key component of this research was a systematic study (Chapter 7) of the legislation that 
applies in the UK to protect users against the risks associated with putting personal data up on 
SNSs.  This examined: the Data Protection Act 1998; the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC); 
the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework and the EU General Data Protection Regulation 2012.  
The research also identified relevant secondary legislation including statutory instruments and 
European Commission opinions and statements. 
This investigation is ďased oŶ ͚ďlaĐk letteƌ laǁ͛ ƌeseaƌĐh methodology.  This involves 
reviewing legal sources and related material to address the following questions: 
1. What are the rules governing access to personal data on social networks 
2. How did the rules come about? 
3. What is their effect? 
4. What can be changed? 
 48 
Another avenue explored was court cases related to release of personal data on online SNSs.  
However there was not a sufficiently large body of cases to estimate economic costs in the UK 
or even across the whole EU.  However the small number of cases that do exist provided 
additional insights into the risks and issues that arise.  
The IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe was approached for guidance on work that they may 
have commissioned in this area which has not already been published.  Existing and proposed 
EU legislation was analysed and regulators and legal experts were interviewed to ascertain 
whether there had been any relevant work done on quantification of risk. 
INV E ST I GAT IO N O F PR I V ACY PO LI CI E S  
The privacy policies of the largest, English-language SNSs available to UK users were reviewed 
(Chapter 8).  The policies of eleven major service providers were included.  Each of the 
selected SNSs was thought to have more than 10 million registered users globally (Wikipedia 
2014). 
Q“‘͛s NViǀoϭϬ, a content analysis tool, was used to mark up, code and analyse the text of the 
privacy policies and to identify common themes.  Rather than starting with a pre-set coding 
frame, the coding was developed from an analysis of the text, a method known as ͚literary 
warrant͛.  Once the coding frame had been developed this was applied to all the policies.  
As new themes emerged they were back-indexed.  The research questions were also revisited 
to ensure that the coding reflected the scope of this research. 
INT ER V I EW S W IT H  STA KE HO LD ER S  
Data protection experts including regulators, representatives of the online advertising industry 
and privacy campaigners were interviewed (Appendix D).  This strand of the research 
provided an opportunity to explore specific aspects of regulation.  
A series of semi-structured interviews was undertaken, with the aim of eliciting responses 
from a diverse group of respondents.  The following topics were explored:  
 Attitudes to risk associated with social networks, usage of social media and view on 
effectiveness of different types of regulation of access to personal data  Users of personal data (e.g. advertisers) and the extent to which their behaviour is 
affected by UK legislation – in comparison with other modes of regulation  Views of social network service providers on effectiveness of legislation in the UK and 
other forms of regulation 
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 View of regulators and what they perceive to be the challenges for future regulation of 
access to personal data 
Semi-structured interviews were recorded, transcribed and sent to the interviewees for 
checking.  In all but one case permission was given to provide attributable quotes.  A set of 
open questions was devised to tease out the issues surrounding the development of data 
protection legislation, shortcomings and ways in which it might develop in future.  Active 
note-taking was also used to supplement the audio recordings.  The content of the interviews 
was coded and analysed using NVivo10.  
IDE NTI F ICAT IO N AND MEA SUR E M ENT OF R I SK  
The first part of this research was to identify risks starting from the universe of general risks 
compiled by Swedlow and associates (2009).  The research also considered specific risks 
associated with SNS use and reported in the literature.  This was enriched with additional 
analysis of risks identified during the main online survey and developed further during 
interviews with regulators and other stakeholder representatives (Appendix D).  These fed 
into the development a risk model based on a typology of risk developed specifically from the 
perspective of individual users of SNSs.  
Two dimensions of risk were considered when attempting to measure or quantify risk: 
1. the probability of occurrence; and 
2. the impact that risk has if it comes to fruition. 
Some methodologies combine these into a single risk value – this is often possible where the 
risk impact can be measured in terms of numbers of occurrences, or numerical values such as 
economic cost or benefit.  One of the challenges of this stage of the research was to 
determine whether it was possible to assign a numerical value to the impact of allowing access 
to personal data on online SNSs.   
SNS  VI GN ET TE S  
The final stage of the data gathering involved investigation of three online SNS services to 
consider the ways in which ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ͛ is iŵpleŵeŶted aŶd the ĐhoiĐes offeƌed to 
users.  These were intended to provide an in-depth view of the factors that underpin the 
privacy policies of SNS providers.  The SNS vignettes used case study methods and were 
based on participaŶt oďseƌǀatioŶ, ǁheƌe the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s oǁŶ “N“ pƌofiles ǁeƌe used to 
identify user choices and their effects on visibility of personal data.  The results of this 
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investigation are discussed in Chapter 10.  Case study methods call on hermeneutics, which 
involves a deep uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ;kŶoǁŶ as ͚verstehen͛) of the context of the situation or 
phenomenon being studied (Brady & Collier 2004).  
Ragin and Becker (1992) identify four types of case study: 
1. Cases are found – empirically real and bounded, but specific. Identified and 
established as cases in the course of the research process 
2. Cases are objects – Cases are real and bounded but general and 
conventionalized. Cases defined by the literature – e.g. nation-states  
3. Cases are made – ͞theoƌetiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐts that ĐoalesĐe iŶ the Đouƌse of the 
ƌeseaƌĐh͟ - see emerging patterns and construct theories around them  
4. Cases are conventions – ͞geŶeƌal theoƌetiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐts, [...] as products of 
collective scholarly work and interaction...external to any particular research 
effort 
The investigations of privacy policies of SNSs aŶd of ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ͛ fall iŶto the first 
category of case study – ͞empirically real and bounded but specific͟.  The research used 
participant observation (ethnography), which is seen as an appropriate methodology for 
studǇiŶg ͞complex social relations and organisational processes͟ (Delbridge & Kirkpatrick 
1994). 
Miller (2011) uses local ethnography and comparative anthropology for his study of Facebook 
based on case studies conducted in Trinidad. His starting point was that each experience of 
FaĐeďook is uŶiƋue.  He sets this iŶ the Đultuƌal ĐoŶteǆt ͞but what any given population 
actually uses, based on that facility, quickly develops its own local cultural genre and 
expectations which will differ from others͟.  He goes oŶ to saǇ that ͞there is no such thing as 
Facebook from the perspective of cultural relativity.  Facebook is only the aggregate of its 
regional and particular usage͟.  He posits fifteeŶ theses oŶ ǁhat FaĐeďook ŵight ďe ;ďased 
on user experiences) and this in turn may affect attitudes to personal data and who should 
have access to it under what conditions.  These are themes that were explored in this study. 
A protocol for the online case studies was developed in order to systematically investigate the 
privacy settings of three SNSs (Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter.  Although these vignettes are 
not full case studies, this approach draws on case study methods (Appendix E).  The online 
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sessions were recorded by means of screen capture (using the Windows Snipping Tool) and by 
making notes as a commentary about the actions taken.  In the case of Facebook, NCapture 
for NVivo was used with the MS Internet Explorer software to record the metadata associated 
with postings on a Facebook site. 
AS SE S S M ENT O F REGU L ATOR Y MOD E S  
The effectiveness of the four regulatory modes for reducing risks was assessed by looking at 
how regulation affects useƌs.  The fouƌ ƌegulatoƌǇ ŵodes aƌe ďased oŶ Lessig͛s (2006) model 
of regulation of the Internet, and adapted to encompass the range of regulatory approaches 
used for SNSs (discussed more fully in Chapter 6): 
1. Legislation 
2. Self-regulation 
3. Code 
4. Norms 
The potential parameters for comparison of the regulatory modes are: 
 Adaptability to changing technology  Comprehensiveness  Which risks addressed  Effects on risk  Impact on stakeholders  Cost of enforcement  Benefits (savings) from enforcement (i.e. consequence of not regulating)  Alternatives available 
Legislation was used as the point of reference for comparison with other regulatory modes.  
This refers back to the original question: Is UK law-based regulation the most effective way of 
protecting users against the risks associated with use of SNSs?  In the UK, the Data Protection 
Act 1998 (DPA) is the main instrument for legislative regulation of access to personal data and 
is the most visible and widely-applied regulatory approach to protection of personal data in 
the UK.   
A detailed textual analysis of existing primary and secondary legislation in the UK informed the 
choice of respondents and questions for discussion with the regulators and legislators.  The 
interviews explored the issues that specifically relate to SNSs.  Interviews with legislators and 
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regulators considered possible future intentions and directions for regulation.  The question 
areas were: 
What measures are in place to deal with social network providers/services? 
What are the required measures to effectively regulate this area? 
What approaches might be adopted by the regulators in future? 
This is a form of socio-legal research, distinct from the scientific research method.  Feldman 
(1989) iŶ ͚The Nature of Legal Scholarship͛ states that ͞scholarship is related to the good of 
knowledge͟.  He suggests that the sĐieŶtifiĐ ŵethod is Ŷot appƌopƌiate foƌ legal sĐholaƌship 
for the following reasons: 
 The limitations of the scientific method – observation may change the thing being 
observed, difficulty in constructing a null hypothesis when there are many possible 
hypotheses to test. The inappropriateness of the falsifiability rather than verifiability of 
hypotheses because of the impossibility of constructing a null hypothesis for most 
social science questions.   His seĐoŶd oďjeĐtioŶ is that ͞claims to scientific objectivity are often inflated͟.  BǇ this 
he means that study of law and legal systems is not value free and that objectivity is 
therefore difficult to attain in legal studies.  Thirdly, he states ͞In refusing to use legal techniques, either to investigate that claim or 
to discover the state of the law, one discards analytical tools of some interpretative 
value.͟  IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds he is suggesting that legal research methods may be more 
appropriate than scientific methodologies for research in this domain. 
Feldman (1989, p.503) goes oŶ to suggest that sĐholaƌship ĐaŶ ďe eǀaluated ͞as being more or 
less in tune with certain formal values which are integral to a serious search for truth.  These 
include: 
(1) a commitment to employing methods of investigation and analysis best 
suited to satisfying that curiosity; (2) self-conscious and reflective 
open-mindedness...; and (3) the desire to publish the work for the illumination 
of students, fellow scholars or the general public and to enable others to 
evaluate and criticise it.͟ 
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RES EAR CH ET HI CS AN D PRO J ECT  R I SK S  
The main ethical issues are associated with surveying individual attitudes and perceptions.  
Data gathered was kept securely and the results were anonymised to prevent the possibility of 
identification of an individual based on their reported profile.  Data that identifies individuals 
has been removed from the questionnaire survey results.  Interviews with legislators and 
regulators are difficult to anonymise, so respondents were given the opportunity to review the 
interview notes and any quotes proposed before they were analysed. 
There were a number of project risks associated with this research that had to be taken into 
account (Table 2): 
TABLE 2  -  PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT  
Risk Response Result 
Lack of access to the right 
people – especially service 
providers and legislators, 
undermining the validity of 
the findings 
Minimise probability: Early 
identification of targets.  
Establish contact at 
conferences and meetings 
Get into diaries of busy and 
difficult to access people 
Establish alternative, 
authoritative contact points 
Difficulty in constructing a 
representative sample of 
stakeholders for survey, 
making it difficult to draw 
conclusions about attitudes 
in the general population 
Avoid: construct a qualitative 
survey that obtains a wide 
range of views 
Provides a qualitative 
response, which may not be 
regarded as well as a 
quantitative survey 
Difficulty reconciling 
different models of risk, 
makes it difficult to establish 
a testable proposition for 
this research 
Minimise probability: 
Evaluation of different models 
before picking one or 
developing a new one.  
Concentrate on testing the 
selected model 
New model of risk developed.  
Greater focus for the research 
by having a single testable 
model to work with 
Difficulty finding a means of 
quantifying risk making it 
difficult to test the relative 
effectiveness of different 
modes of regulation 
Minimise impact: use 
qualitative measures of effect 
on risk to evaluate different 
regulatory modes 
Development of a new method 
of assessing regulatory 
effectiveness 
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Risk Response Result 
Inconclusive results make it 
difficult to make positive 
assertions 
Minimise probability by 
framing questions in such a 
way that it is possible to make 
a positive assertion whether 
the results are positive or 
negative 
Conclusions expressed in such 
a way that it is possible to 
publish the results 
 
CON CLU SION  
This research calls on a variety of methods from sociology, economics and legal studies.  It 
falls within the domain of information science research, which has adopted many of the 
methods used in sociology and ethnography.  This study has mostly used sociological 
ƌeseaƌĐh ŵethods ďased oŶ aŶ iŶduĐtiǀe appƌoaĐh.  This is iŶfoƌŵed ďǇ Weďeƌ͛s ƌespoŶse to 
the limitations of logical positivism (Outhwaite & Turner 2007).  Instead he bases his new 
approach on human cultural values and norms.  Popper (1959) and Kuhn (1970) also 
proposed a post-positivist approach which codifies observations.  Throughout this research a 
data-driven approach was adopted.  Examination of data from the preliminary phase of the 
research allowed construction of hypotheses using an approach based on Grounded Theory 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967).  The main phase of the research gathered new sets of data (an 
empirical approach) to test these hypotheses. 
The context of social networking services is important to get a fuller understanding of 
ƌegulatioŶ aŶd alloǁs aŶ ͚iŶteƌpƌetiǀist͛ appƌoaĐh as suggested by Weber and others (Gerth & 
Mills 1970; Outhwaite & Turner 2007).  This was particularly relevant for the semi-structured 
interviews with industry experts and the qualitative survey of LIS professionals to identify risks 
and potential responses.  These research methods were used to see what emerged.  The 
findings were analysed to identify patterns and to construct models that could be used in the 
evaluation of different regulatory modes, a classic inductivist approach. 
The socio-legal aspects of this research also focus on: formal values; the subjective nature of 
law; and the use of the interpretivist tools that have been developed in legal research. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the research methods adopted for this study.  
During the initial phase, a preliminary survey yielded several lines of investigation.  The three 
research lines were supported by the literature survey and provided data for the formulation 
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of the hypotheses, and the construction of some outline conceptual models for use in the main 
research phase. 
Eventually five different research lines were established for the main phase of research, three 
being carried forward from the pƌeliŵiŶaƌǇ phase.  This ͚tƌiaŶgulatioŶ͛ alloǁed a deepeƌ 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ;oƌ ͚ǀeƌsteheŶ͛Ϳ of ƌegulatioŶ aŶd “N“s.   
 
 
FIGURE 4  -  RESEARCH METHODS USED  
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SECTION II. RISK 
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CHAPTER 4  –  PERSONAL DATA ,  PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
This chapter sets out to identify personal data in the context of SNSs and to explain why it is 
different to other classes of data.  It considers different types of personal data and how it is 
used in SNSs.  This chapter also discusses the concept of data protection and draws 
distinctions between it and information privacy. 
WHAT  IS  PERSO NAL DATA? 
Article 2(a) of the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) defines personal data in the 
following terms: 
 (a) 'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity; 
Section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 uses a more useful definition in that it is driven by 
purpose rather than trying to enumerate the different types of personal data that exist: 
peƌsoŶal data͟ ŵeaŶs data ǁhiĐh ƌelate to a liǀiŶg iŶdiǀidual ǁho ĐaŶ ďe 
identified— 
(a) from those data, or 
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is 
likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes any 
expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions 
of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual 
Milliard and Hon (2012) discuss the potential problems that arise from the discrepancies 
ďetǁeeŶ the UK͛s aŶd the EC͛s defiŶitioŶs of ͚peƌsoŶal data͛.  There is a concern among other 
EU states that the UK͛s defiŶitioŶ of peƌsoŶal data is too Ŷaƌƌoǁ, ǁheƌeas the UK ĐoŶĐeƌŶ is 
that the EU definition is too prescriptive and insufficiently flexible to deal adequately with new 
cases or technologies that arise.  For the purposes of this study it will be necessary to take 
both definitions into account, because they both affect the practices of the SNSs that are used 
by UK residents. 
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Schneier (2010) suggests that different types of personal data on social networks (described in 
Chapter 2) will require different measures to protect them.  Section 2 of the Data Protection 
Act does identify some data as being sensitive and therefore warranting greater protection: 
IŶ this AĐt ͞seŶsitiǀe peƌsoŶal data͟ ŵeaŶs peƌsoŶal data ĐoŶsistiŶg of 
information as to— 
(a) the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject, 
(b) his political opinions, 
(c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, 
(d) whether he is a member of a trade union (within the meaning of the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992), 
(e) his physical or mental health or condition, 
(f) his sexual life, 
(g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or 
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been 
committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any 
court in such proceedings. 
BEHAV IOUR AL DA TA  
A great deal of recent attention in the press has been devoted to behavioural data, which 
users may not have provided explicit, informed consent for SNS providers to use.  The 
permission may be hidden in the terms of service that a user signs up to in order to gain access 
to the service.  This information may then form the basis for intrusive advertising directed at 
the user when they open their browser.  A series of articles in the Wall Street Journal by Julia 
Angwin and colleagues describes tracking technologies and some of the issues that arise, 
including privacy concerns (Angwin & Mcginty 2010).  There is a view in the advertising 
industry that this is not personal data, because an individual cannot be identified – particularly 
for aggregated data.  However other researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to 
de-anonymise data to identify individuals (Narayanan & Shmatikov 2009; Federal Trade 
Commission 2010).  Therefore the view has been taken that behavioural data is personal data 
and is included in the scope of this study. 
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IP  ADDR E S SE S  
Defining personal data may appear to be straightforward initially, but has resulted in 
discussion about what is personally identifiable information (Millard & Hon 2012; Gilbert 2014; 
Krishnamurthy & Wills 2009; Boyd 2012).  For instance, an IP address is regarded in some 
quarters as personal information, because it is data that is often associated with an individual 
user and can in some instances be used as a proxy identifier.  The Advertising Standards 
Authority suggests that online behavioural advertising (OBA) does not use personal data and 
that therefore some of the complaints it receives are outside its remit (ASA 2013): 
Some complainants believed that OBA used personal data and that OBA 
infringed their rights to privacy and basic human rights. 
However there has been ample demonstration of the fact that cookies can be combined with 
other publicly available data to reveal information about individual online activity (Information 
CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ϮϬϭϮ; NaƌaǇaŶaŶ & “hŵatikoǀ ϮϬϬϵͿ.  For these reasons cookies and 
IP addresses are included in the scope of this chapter.  
THE IDEA O F PRIV ACY  
Central to the discussion about regulating personal data is a question about what is privacy.  
Habermas and Burger (1989, pp.43–46) suggest that the distinction between public and 
private spheres arose from the development of an affluent, educated urban class from the 
mid-eighteenth century onwards.  Habermas and Burger (1989, p.159) go on to talk about 
the ͞Mutual infiltration of public and private spheres͟ aŶd oďseƌǀe: 
The shrinking of the private sphere into the inner areas of a conjugal family 
largely relieved of function and weakened in authority – the quiet bliss of 
homeyness [sic] – provided only the illusion of a perfectly private personal 
sphere; for to the extent that private people withdrew from their socially 
ĐoŶtƌolled ƌoles as pƌopeƌtǇ oǁŶeƌs iŶto the puƌelǇ ͞peƌsoŶal͟ oŶes of theiƌ 
noncommittal use of leisure time, they came directly under the influence of 
semipublic authorities, without the protection of an institutionally protected 
domestic domain. 
In defining privacy Warren and Brandeis (1890) quoted from Judge Cooley, who spoke about 
privacǇ as:  ͞the right to be let alone͟ iŶ ƌespoŶse to the gƌoǁth of photo-journalism in the 
United States.  Their argument was that common law provides a basis for protection of 
peƌsoŶal pƌiǀaĐǇ.  TheǇ stated ͞The common law secures to each individual the right of 
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determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others͟.  TheǇ ǁeŶt oŶ to state that ͞...the individual is entitled to decide 
whether that which is his should be given to the public͟.   
In Warren aŶd BƌaŶdeis͛s (1890) view there are limitations to the right to privacy, particularly 
iŶ ƌelatioŶ to puďliĐ good aŶd theǇ aĐkŶoǁledge that ͞To determine in advance of experience 
the exact line at which the dignity and convenience of the individual must yield to the demands 
of the public welfare or of private justice would be a difficult task͟.  TheǇ aƌgue that ŵaŶǇ of 
the laws already then available afford degrees of protection against invasion of privacy – such 
as copyright law for publication of photographs or literary works, or the tort of breach of trust 
by publishing confidential information, or breach of implied contract where private 
information made available in the course of delivering a service is then made public.   They 
enumerate some useful principles that help to define the scope of what they mean by ͚the 
right to privacy͛: 
The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of the matter which is of 
public or general interest. 
The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter, 
though in its nature private, when the publication is made under circumstances 
which would render it a privileged communication according to the law of 
slander and libel. 
The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by 
oral publication in the absence of special damage. 
The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, 
or with his consent. 
The truth of the matter published does not afford a defence. 
The aďseŶĐe of ͞ŵaliĐe͟ iŶ the puďlisher does not afford a defence. 
One of the earliest privacy cases in England and Wales was Prince Albert v Strange, where the 
Prince Consort sought to prevent the publication of a catalogue of etchings made by him and 
the Queen.  The High Court found: 
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The question here is, how far the publication of this Catalogue is in violation of 
the law? That there is property in the ideas which pass in a man's mind is 
consistent with all the authorities in English law. Incidental to that right is the 
right of deciding when and how they shall first be made known to the public.  
Privacy is a part, and an essential part, of this species of property. In Millar v. 
Taylor, the property which a man had in his unpublished ideas was admitted by 
all the Judges: Donaldson v. Beckett. 
Since the Prince Albert v. Strange case some commentators have distinguished between 
͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌiǀaĐǇ͛ and wider definitions of privacy.  For example Westin (2003) includes in 
his definition of pƌiǀaĐǇ: ͞the claim of an individual to determine what information about 
himself or herself should be known to others͟. 
There have not been many cases in the UK courts about breaches of privacy or other damages 
resulting from disclosure of personal data on SNSs.  In Applause Store Production Ltd & Anor v 
Raphael, where the defendant had created a personal profile of the claimant on Facebook 
containing some true information and some defamatory material the court found: 
It is reasonably clear that damages in cases of misuse of private information 
are awarded to compensate the claimant for the hurt feelings and distress 
caused by the misuse of their information: see for instance McKennitt v Ash 
[2006] EMLR 178 [162]. 
Malhotra et al (2004) lookiŶg at iŶteƌŶet useƌs͛ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌiǀaĐǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs deǀeloped a 
multi-dimensional grid of privacy, following surveys of internet users, based on: 
 Collection of data – gathering of individual specific data by sites  Control – whether users have the choice of opting out, for instance  Awareness of privacy practices – knowing how the data will be used 
An IP address, which can be attributed to an individual, can be regarded as personal data: 
If one considers the definition of personal data provided in Article 2 of Directive 
9ϱ/ϰϲ/EC, ͚aŶǇ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ƌelatiŶg to aŶ ideŶtified oƌ ideŶtifiaďle Ŷatuƌal 
person (data subject); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifiĐatioŶ Ŷuŵďeƌ͛, it is 
only possible to conclude that IP addresses and the information about the 
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activities linked to such addresses constitutes personal data in all cases 
relevant here. 
(Hustinx 2010) 
Westin (2003) suggests that privacy issues are different in democratic and authoritarian 
societies.  It is not clear whether this is a qualitative difference or a matter of degree.  It 
could be argued that in both types of society there is a balance between individual autonomy 
and public good.  If the UK is assumed to be a broadly democratic society, then the balance 
ǁould teŶd toǁaƌds iŶdiǀidual autoŶoŵǇ.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, the UK͛s Draft Communications Data Bill 
2012 (Cm 8350) is perhaps a reflection of the move towards a more authoritarian society with 
greater emphasis placed on security at the expense of individual privacy.  The Bill makes 
provision for monitoring of social networking activity as well as other telecommunications 
traffic that can be used to counter terrorist plots. 
According to Lessig (2006) there are three different concepts of privacy that affect any 
considerations of regulation in this area: 
 Preserving dignity  Minimising intrusion  Constraining the power of the state to regulate 
Solove (2007) argues that information confined to a group should be considered private, even 
if that group is quite large.  This could also apply to groups on the internet.  In his view if a 
member of the group makes the information available beyond the group that is a breach of 
pƌiǀaĐǇ: ͞when information is contained within a particular group and a person causes it to 
leap the boundary, then this is a privacy violation even if the original group is large.͟  
An alternative view suggests that too much privacy is a bad thing because it inhibits delivery of 
free services to users.  Hammock and Rubin (2011) argue that the benefits of free services 
outweigh the costs of identity theft and other risks to which users might be exposed.  In their 
view there is no economic argument based on data for increased privacy.  The cost of 
internet fraud is estimated at $28bn per annum in the US and Europe, but the benefit of free 
services based on provision of personal data is estimated at $100bn, a substantial economic 
surplus. 
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This approach reduces privacy and access concerns to a simple economic argument and 
requires a lot of assumptions to be made on the value of economic benefit or loss associated 
with use of personal data.  It does not take into account the potential loss of income 
associated with personal ownership of data.  Tene and Polonetsky (2012) focus on data that 
has been aggregated and anonymised.  They argue that the cost of protecting personal data 
to prevent re-ideŶtifiĐatioŶ ǁould ŵeaŶ that ͞many beneficial uses of data would be severely 
curtailed͟.  TheǇ suggest fuƌtheƌ ƌeseaƌĐh foƌ oŶe stƌaŶd of this iŶǀestigatioŶ: ͞We call for the 
development of a model where the benefits of data for businesses and researchers are 
balanced against individual privacy rights͟. 
DAT A PR OT ECTION  
Data protection is a complex concept whose meaning and scope continue to evolve.  There 
are differences in scope between the concept as applied in UK͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ and 
the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which are discussed in Chapter 7.  The concept 
continues to evolve with the General Data Protection Regulation 2012.  Data protection is 
essentially a legislative response to the need for privacy and the need to protect individuals 
against abuse of personal data.  Abuse or misuse of personal data does not necessarily mean 
that privacy is breached.  For instance, if personal data gathered for one purpose is used for 
another, there may be no breach of privacy, but it could still adversely affect the individual 
concerned.  An example would be where one government agency gathers data in order to 
assess aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ƌight to ďeŶefits, and another government agency used that data to 
prosecute the individual.  Automated processing of data and large-scale collection of 
personal data increase the risk of misuse, because of potentially widening access to that data 
and re-use of that data for purposes beyond those for which it was collected.  
Another concern is the introduction of technologies such as flash cookies which regenerate 
http cookies if they are deleted by the user.  This effectivelǇ takes aǁaǇ useƌs͛ ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ 
whether to be tracked or not (Mendel et al. 2012; Sipior et al. 2011).  Consent is most 
commonly manifest as an opt-out, or less commonly, an opt-in feature for tracking and use of 
personal data with features such as the Netǁoƌk AdǀeƌtisiŶg IŶitiatiǀe͛s opt-out cookie (Wills & 
Zeljkovic 2011).  If a service changes the defaults, this can cause problems.  For instance, 
when Facebook changed its beacon feature from opt-in to opt-out there was a major outcry 
and user rebellion which forced Facebook to restore the original opt-in condition (Brunger 
2010).  The adǀeƌtisiŶg iŶdustƌǇ͛s oǁŶ guideliŶes ƌeĐoŵŵeŶd that useƌs should giǀe eǆpliĐit 
consent before personal data is passed on to third parties (Gray & Mills-Wade 2011). 
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Ownership and control of personal data is also one of the underpinning principles of the 
Privacy by Design (PbD) approach ;IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ϮϬϬϴͿ. 
The concept of control or self-determination of personal information has been incorporated 
into the data protection legislation (Wacks 2010, p.111).  The idea of consent has been 
further developed in the General Data Protection Regulation 2012 to ͚iŶfoƌŵed ĐoŶseŶt͛.  
This means that an individual has to consent to the uses to which his or her personal data 
might be put.  This particularly applies where there is a change of purpose. 
DAT A HANDLI NG  BY  SO CI AL NETWO RK SERVI C ES  
WHO AR E T HE PL AY ER S? 
In order to understand how personal data is used in the context of SNSs, it is necessary to 
identify the players or agents involved in gathering, distributing and processing that data.  
Figure 5 shows how personal data and advertising data flows between the different agents. 
Users and their contacts (other users) are grouped together as the advertisers may not 
necessarily distinguish between them.  Users provide personal data to their SNS provider via 
an ISP (Internet Service Provider).  The ISP is included because as an agent it may be subject 
to regulation or to legal action by other agents.  The SNS provider may make personal data 
available to associates and affiliates or to advertisers, who may be affiliated organisations or 
third parties.  The privacy policies of many SNS providers (Chapter 8) refer specifically to 
sharing personal data with third parties (usually anonymised) or else with affiliates.  Previous 
studies have shown that affiliates can number in the hundreds or even thousands, depending 
on what definition of affiliate is used. An investigation of the top 50 internet services showed 
that some providers were part of groups with up to 2,300 subsidiaries (Gomez et al. 2009).   
PeƌsoŶal data is also ƌelaǇed to otheƌ useƌs as aŶ aĐtiǀitǇ log ;͚X has just updated theiƌ pƌofile͛, 
or ͚X has just made friends ǁith Y͛Ϳ, eitheƌ diƌeĐtlǇ oƌ ǀia gƌoups that theǇ haǀe iŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ.  
This may be seen as less of a problem because by becoming a friend or connection with 
someone there is an implied expectation that personal details will be shared with them and 
among the groups they belong to. 
It becomes more relevant when the SNS provider shares personal data with third parties or 
with associates and affiliates (in some cases contractors are claimed as affiliates).  This may 
be anonymised data – many SNS privacy policies make reference to this, or it may be 
identifiable personal data.  For this reason they have been grouped together.  The 
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advertisers then push tailored advertisements to targeted users.  In doing so they may use 
tracking technologies to monitor internet behaviour and to build up profiles of individual 
users.  This can be used with a registration system or login to a service provided by the 
advertising company to create identifiable (i.e. not anonymised) personal data. 
 
FIGURE 5  -  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT AGENTS IN AN SNS 
INF OR MAT ION MA DE AV AIL ABL E T O THIR D PA R TIE S  
The concept of third parties appears in the literature and in commentaries on the use of 
personal data in SNSs (Wills & Zeljkovic 2011).  This is seen as one of the major risks 
associated with personal data and is reviewed further in the chapters on risk (Chapter 5) and 
on privacy policies (Chapter 8).  For the purposes of this study, the EASA definition is used.  
It says that a third party is an organisation that engages in online behavioural advertising on 
websites that it does not own or operate (Gray & Mills-Wade 2011).  This definition is also 
used in the CAP Code (Committee of Advertising Practice 2014), representing the regulators.   
Third parties mostly access personal data by means of tracking technologies such as cookies or 
web beacons (Pierson & Heyman 2011).  Smit, Van Noort and Voorveld (2014) define cookies 
as ͞sŵall teǆt ﬁles that aƌe put oŶ useƌs͛ deǀiĐes, suĐh as Ŷoteďooks oƌ sŵaƌt phoŶes, to 
facilitate the funĐtioŶalitǇ of a ǁeďsite ;ﬁƌst-party, session or functional cookies) or to collect 
pƌoﬁle iŶfoƌŵatioŶ foƌ taƌgeted adǀeƌtisiŶg ;thiƌd-paƌtǇ oƌ tƌaĐkiŶg ĐookiesͿ.͟ Gomez, Pinnick 
and Soltani (2009) have already pointed out the contradiction between a commitment to not 
share personal data with third parties whilst still allowing the use of web beacons.  Some 
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services such as Google have identifiers that are used on mobile devices instead of cookies to 
track users (CNIL 2012).  Other techniques are scraping personal data from discussion forums 
and device fingerprinting (Christiansen 2011). 
Even where there is a commitment not to share personally identifiable data with third parties, 
it is possible for third party cookies to masquerade as first-party cookies (Krishnamurthy & 
Wills 2009).  This means that personal data is still available to third parties, despite 
assurances of SNSs. 
Many of the SNSs provide varying amounts of metadata about personal profiles and data from 
those profiles via APIs provided by the SNSs.  An apps (applications) developer can create 
APIs to request standard sets of metadata from SNSs during social login (where an individual 
uses their social profile username and password to validate their identity and log into a third 
party website) and can request additional information.  For example, JanRain, one of the 
major commercial providers of identity services offers social login to more than 30 social 
networks.  Facebook provides the following basic personal information to their clients (the 
third-party website oƌ Apps oǁŶeƌͿ ǀia JaŶ‘aiŶ͛s soĐial logiŶ seƌǀiĐe: 
 Address   Birthday   Email   Profile Photo   Verified Email   Display Name   Gender   Homepage   Identifier   Name   Preferred Username   UTC Offset 
Additional personal information can also be accessed during social login, including personal 
data about contacts (such as Facebook Friends). 
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CON CLU SION  
Privacy is not co-terminous with data protection.  Misuse of personal data (which data 
protection legislation is meant to prevent) is distinct from, although related to, privacy.  
Nevertheless it is necessary to consider what is meant by privacy.  The literature review 
covered the origin of some definitions of privacy.  For instance, Westin (2003) ideŶtifies ͞four 
psychological conditions or states of individual privacy—solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and 
reserve͟.  Hoǁeǀeƌ lateƌ ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs haǀe ŵade the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
privacy and other types of privacy such as that related to personal space (Smith et al. 2011).  
Is privacy necessarily a good thing?  The starting point for many studies is that personal 
privacy has to be preserved and that any failures in the regulation of access to personal data is 
necessarily a bad thing.  However some commentators caution against blanket application of 
privacy laws to aŶoŶǇŵised ;aŶd ĐoŶsolidatedͿ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ďeĐause ͞many beneficial uses of 
data would be severely curtailed͟ (Tene & Polonetsky 2012).  The benefits of exchange of 
personal data, include: improved services to users; cheaper delivery; and better security and 
protection. 
Some research suggests that despite stated concerns about privacy, people often reveal 
considerable personal data when they start to interact with an online service.  This is known 
as ͚the pƌiǀaĐǇ paƌadoǆ͛ (Sobel 2007; Bonneau & Preibusch 2009). 
Although the concepts of privacy and data protection are closely allied, they are not the same.  
Privacy is a right identified in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
However a more sophisticated treatment of privacy is needed beyond WarƌeŶ aŶd BƌaŶdeis͛s 
(1890) ͞ƌight to ďe let aloŶe͟.  The definitions of privacy covered in this chapter this showed 
that there was not a single consistent view of privacy.  Information privacy has gained ground 
as a concept and has been found to be a useful focus for attention when considering SNSs.  
Privacy is bound up with data protection, but it is important to make the distinction between 
these two concepts.  Defining privacy and the limits to this concept is a starting point.  For 
instance, distinctions can be made between privacy and: non-intrusion, seclusion, secrecy, and 
autonomy (Tavani 2000).  Other commentators have made a distinction betǁeeŶ ͚peƌsoŶal͛ 
aŶd ͚pƌiǀate͛ ǁhiĐh haǀe distiŶĐt ŵeaŶiŶgs iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of data protection (McCullagh 2009).  
Data protection includes commitments to controlling access to personal data and therefore 
some aspects of information privacy.  It also encompasses issues about use of personal data 
as well as information quality (data accuracy) and appropriateness (relevance to the stated 
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purpose).  Data protection is also one mode of regulation whereas information privacy is an 
outcome or an objective of this type of regulation. 
Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009) discuss personally identifiable information at length and 
suggest that much of the data gathered from SNSs by advertising aggregators can in fact be 
͚ƌeǀeƌse eŶgiŶeeƌed͛ to ideŶtifǇ aŶd assoĐiate speĐifiĐ iŶdiǀiduals ǁith this tǇpe of data.  This 
throws into question the assertion of some of the SNS providers that this type of information is 
Ŷot ͚peƌsoŶal iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ aŶd therefore not subject to the same controls and protections as 
other categories of personal information. 
For the purposes of this study the definition of personal data incorporates behavioural data 
and aggregated personal data, especially that which is gathered by tracking technologies.  
Despite attempts by SNS providers to make the case for excluding these types of data from 
data protection considerations, there is a strong case for this to be regulated along with other 
types of personal data, because ultimately it is possible to identify individuals. 
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CHAPTER 5  –RISK  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
The content of this chapter has been published as a peer-reviewed paper (Haynes & Robinson 
2015). 
BACK GR OU ND AND CON TE X T  
Users of SNSs make personal information available to social network providers in exchange for 
͚fƌee at the poiŶt of use͛ seƌǀiĐes.  This peƌsoŶal iŶfoƌŵatioŶ is ǀoluŶtaƌilǇ pƌoǀided ďǇ useƌs, 
and is usually covered in the Terms and Conditions of Service or is gathered by service 
pƌoǀideƌs ǁho tƌaĐk oŶliŶe ďehaǀiouƌ usiŶg ageŶts suĐh as ͚Đookies͛.  MakiŶg peƌsoŶal data 
available to a wide audience exposes users to risk.  Although there have been attempts to 
enumerate some of these risks, which are described below, there has not been a 
comprehensive review of the risks or any attempt to develop a model of user risk in the 
context of SNSs.  There is a tension about the relative importance of individual and social 
factors in the study of information behaviour (Bawden & Robinson 2013).  This is apparent in 
the individual response to social media and the way in which different interest groups regulate 
access to personal data. 
An Oxis survey suggested that contrary to popular perceptions, users are becoming more 
aware of privacy as a concern on the Internet, especially when it comes to using social media 
(Dutton & Blank 2013).  A comprehensive review of Facebook research in the social sciences 
recognised the need for researchers to analyse the risks associated with Facebook use (Wilson 
et al. 2012, p.216): 
By better understanding the threats to privacy, researchers and developers can 
construct countermeasures to mitigate the risks, and users can take informed 
steps towards protection their personal information 
This chapter sets out to identify the risks to individual SNS users and to develop a model of risk 
that can be applied more widely to internet use and social media as they continue to evolve.  
The following research questions are explored in this chapter: 
 What are the risks to individuals that are associated with personal data on SNSs?  Is there an existing typology of individual risk that adequately covers SNSs?  Can a model of risks to users be used to differentiate between possible regulatory 
responses? 
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Regulation is one area where an up-to-date and relevant model of risk could contribute to 
improved protection of users.  Risk-based regulation has emerged as a dominant approach in 
Europe and the UK in the last few decades.  Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, p.83) suggest 
that ͞‘egulatioŶ ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ as ďeiŶg iŶheƌeŶtlǇ aďout the ĐoŶtƌol of ƌisks…͟.  This is a view 
supported by Hutter (2006, p.205): "...regulation has come to be defined as controlling and 
also as a way of managing risks͟.  
METH ODO L OG Y  
In order to address these questions, this research was based on a systematic review of the 
literature, and a survey of information professionals in the UK.  Modelling techniques were 
used to develop a concept of risk that is relevant to internet use and, more specifically, to 
SNSs.  The literature review identified general risk typologies which were analysed in terms 
of: their applicability to SNSs; their focus on risk to individuals; and their ability to distinguish 
between types of risk to individuals.  
A survey of library and information service (LIS) professionals in 2014 provided insight into the 
perceived importance of different risk categories (Appendix C).  This sector was chosen 
because it is a well-developed professional group representing users (many LIS staff act as 
intermediaries), and who are information literate and are therefore likely to be exposed to a 
wide range of online scenarios.  It is also a cohesive group with a track record of active use of 
social media (Cooke & Hall 2013).  The survey was directed at UK users of SNSs using a filter 
question at the start of the survey to exclude non-UK users.  This was cross-checked against 
the location of the IP Address of the device accessing the survey and logged by SurveyGizmo.  
The survey objective was to identify the range of risks to which users are exposed and to gain 
some insight into the perceptions of risk and priorities for managing risk.  The survey was 
based on purposive sampling directed at LIS professionals in the UK, using a variety of forums 
(listed in Appendix C) to generate a snowball effect (David & Sutton 2011, p.232).  
Participants were encouraged to publicise the survey through their own professional and 
personal networks.  
A model of risks was developed from an analysis of the consolidated lists of risks identified in 
the survey and the literature.  A typology was developed which formed the basis of a model 
of personal risk in SNSs.  The event and consequence of each risk was analysed to identify the 
relationship between the risks and to develop a definitive set of outcomes which might have 
the potential as a tool to evaluate different regulatory approaches. 
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PR IV A CY A ND R I SK  
Information privacy is an important aspect of any discussion about personal data on SNSs.  
The volume of personal data available on SNSs puts it fiƌŵlǇ iŶ the ĐategoƌǇ of ͚ďig data͛.  It 
has been suggested that when dealing with big data ͞the ĐhaŶge of sĐale leads to a ĐhaŶge of 
state͟ and that ͞this tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ Ŷot oŶlǇ ŵakes pƌoteĐting privacy much harder, but also 
pƌeseŶts aŶ eŶtiƌelǇ Ŷeǁ ŵeŶaĐe: peŶalties ďased oŶ pƌopeŶsities͟ (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier 2013, p.151).  For instance, where security agencies try to prevent terrorist acts by 
pre-empting them, individuals are targeted and may be arrested or have their movements 
restricted without being convicted of any crime.  Another problem is ͚fetishiziŶg͛.  This is a 
common fallacy identified elsewhere (Hansson 2004), where because the picture provided by 
big data is so compelling, it becomes the over-riding factor in making a decision or judgement. 
A Unesco report identified a range of privacy issues associated with the Internet.  While these 
are not expressed as risks they could lead to users being exposed to risks.  The issues 
identified are: 
 User identification – unique identifiers, cookies and other forms of user identification  Adware, spyware and malware conduct covert data logging and surveillance  Deep packet inspection (DPI)  Pervasive geo-location technology: an emerging threat to Internet privacy  Data processing and facial recognition  Internet surveillance technology 
(Mendel et al. 2012, pp.39–49) 
Anderson (2013) talks aďout the diffiĐultǇ of applǇiŶg teĐhŶiĐal ͚ƋuiĐk fiǆes͛ to Đoŵpleǆ soĐial 
sǇsteŵs.  This ĐaŶ lead to ŵisŵatĐhes ďetǁeeŶ useƌs͛ eǆpeĐtatioŶs aŶd the ďehaǀiouƌ of 
SNSs.  He identifies a number of scenarios to illustrate this: 
 Attacker re-posted private entries which included sensitive information in a more 
public forum  Permissive default privacy settings  Changes to privacy settings by SNS provider without consent of users.  This means 
that formerly private friends lists are exposed to public view  Apps developers harvesting personal data to third-party advertisers and data 
aggregators (in breach of terms of reference) 
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 Cautious users unwilling to expose themselves to risk and thus being severely limited 
in what they can do 
He goes on to point out that the big differences in power between service providers and users, 
effectively mean that users have little choice or control over their own data once they sign up 
to SNSs. 
Nissenbaum (2010) identifies three types of privacy issue in social media:  
1. Individuals post information about themselves, which later gets them into trouble, 
with an employer, for instance  
2. Posting information about other people, often without their explicit permission can 
cause problems. Even where there are remedies, such as removing tags from photos, 
the photos may still remain on the system 
3. Harvesting and use of personal data on social networks by advertisers 
DEFINI NG  RISK  
Risk is an elusive concept based on the notion of uncertainty sometimes expressed in terms of 
the probability of an adverse event occurring.  Commonly-used definitions of risk as ͞a 
situatioŶ iŶǀolǀiŶg eǆposuƌe to daŶgeƌ͟ or ͞the possiďilitǇ that soŵethiŶg uŶpleasaŶt oƌ 
uŶǁelĐoŵe ǁill happeŶ͟ are not very specific and need to be pinned down (Pearsall & Hanks 
1999, p.1602).  The international standard on risk management, ISO 31000:2009 (British 
Standards Institution 2010), starts with an even more general definition ͞effeĐt of uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ 
oŶ oďjeĐtiǀes͟ and goes on to say that ͞AŶ effect is a deviation from the expected – positive 
aŶd/oƌ Ŷegatiǀe͟.  The Standard does eventually provide a more specific definition: ͞‘isk is 
often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (including changes 
in circumstances) aŶd the assoĐiated likelihood of oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐe͟.  However risk is more widely 
uŶdeƌstood to ďe aŶ eǀeŶt ǁith a Ŷegatiǀe outĐoŵe, iŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, a thƌeat: ͞Risk refers to 
uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity 
with respect to something that humans value͟ (Aven & Renn 2009, p.2).  From the regulatory 
sphere a working definition is: ͞…ƌisk is usuallǇ defiŶed as the pƌoďaďilitǇ of a paƌtiĐulaƌ eǀeŶt 
(or hazard) occurring and the conseƋueŶt seǀeƌitǇ of the iŵpaĐt of that eǀeŶt͟ (Baldwin et al. 
2012, p.82). 
For the purposes of this research risk is defined as an uncertain event which has an adverse 
impact on an activity or outcome.  Applied here, risk is an event of unknown probability of 
occurrence involving personal data on an SNS that has a negative impact on that person.  For 
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iŶstaŶĐe, aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s data ŵight ďe Đopied foƌ the puƌposes of fƌaud, ƌesultiŶg iŶ that 
individual suffering financial loss. 
TYPO LO GI ES O F R I SK  I N T HE L IT ER AT UR E  
A  GEN ER A L TY PO LO G Y OF R IS K  
Some early commentators have attempted to identify risks associated with the use of SNSs 
(Rosenblum 2007).  However going back to more general approaches to risk identification 
provides a wider picture.  There can be a distinction between physical and social risks which 
can be integrated (Macgill & Siu 2005, pp.1108–1110).  Tulloch (2006, pp.132–133) adopts a 
social approach to risk:  
Thus, it seems clear that current research is positively engaged with the 
construction of self-identities in conditions of risk that these frequently take 
account of the reflexive concern for dialogic negotiation within and between 
everyday 'lay voices' and professionals, and that by and large this work [...] 
embeds 'wider social understanding' analysis in quite traditional 
understandings of the 'otherness' of age, gender, sexual preference, class, and 
(dis)ability. 
“ǁedloǁ aŶd assoĐiates͛ (2009, p.237) research into risk and regulation is based on the 
͞ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of a uŶiǀeƌse of ŶeaƌlǇ ϯ,000 ƌisks […] over a thirty-fiǀe Ǉeaƌ peƌiod͟.  This 
provides a comprehensive view of the types of risk that exist generally and is used as a starting 
point for identifying and categorising the risks faced by SNS users.  Some of these risks would 
arise directly from misuse of data; others are related to the data held about individual history, 
behaviour and preferences. The following categories fƌoŵ this ͚uŶiǀeƌse͛ of ƌisks might be 
applicable to social media and specifically to SNSs: 
Crime and violence – There have been a number of court cases where revealing 
personal data of individuals on social media has exposed them to threats of violence or 
to harassment (Agate & Ledward 2013) 
Recreation – A great deal of use of social networks is for recreation rather than 
professional purposes and it could be argued that the other risks associated with social 
media fall into this category 
War, security and terrorism – With the WikiLeaks revelations starting in 2010 and the 
NSA scandal in 2013 the press has paid particular attention to the security aspects of 
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personal information (Leigh & Harding 2011; BBC News 2012; Greenwald 2013).  The 
risks to users are two-fold.  The first is that identifying information on social networks 
may be used to victimise or persecute an individual by a state or terrorist organisation.  
The seĐoŶd is that aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ideŶtitǇ ŵaǇ ďe stoleŶ foƌ use ďǇ teƌƌoƌists oƌ ďǇ 
state security agencies and this could expose them to harm 
Political, social and financial – Political, social and financial harm can arise from 
ideŶtitǇ theft.  Foƌ eǆaŵple, if suffiĐieŶt ďioŵetƌiĐ data is aǀailaďle oŶ a useƌs͛ pƌofile 
it may be possible to set up a false identity to gain access to credit or to purchase 
products with no intention of paying.  The individual whose identity has been stolen 
may be pursued for payment and may even be liable for debts and costs incurred 
through the fraud 
Social risks may include ostracism because of private information being made 
available inadvertently to a wider audience than intended.  For example expression 
of ǀieǁs that aƌe Ŷot Đoŵpatiďle ǁith a ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s ŵoƌes ;ǁhetheƌ it ďe a ƌeligious 
group, a political party or an ethnically-based group) may lead to some kind of 
sanction or even expulsion from that group 
Human disease / health – Mental health falls under this category.  Cases where 
vulnerable young people have been driven to suicide because of harassment and 
bullying are an extreme example of this (Wakefield 2014).  Less extreme, but 
nonetheless distressing, may be social isolation and associated depression.  Even an 
affƌoŶt to aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s self-esteem and confidence is a potential threat to mental 
well-being 
Occupational – Some employers admit that they search the social media profiles of 
potential employees and take the results into account in their recruitment decisions 
(Rosenblum 2007, p.46).  It is also an issue for employees who use social media in 
their private lives to express their views.  If an employer deems this to be detrimental 
to their business or incompatible with their views, it could result in disciplinary action 
or even dismissal 
Consumer products – Consumer products are associated with advertising and this is 
one of the major areas of concern of many users (Rosenblum 2007, pp.46–47).  
Behavioural advertising depends on tracking online browsing behaviour and sites 
visited in order to deduce the interests of the user and target them with advertising 
 75 
for products that they are likely to be interested in.  The impact on users could be 
described in terms of nuisance caused or possible social isolation 
Related risks – A number of the general risks identified are not core to SNS use but 
may be associated with it in some way.  For example, the following would also affect 
the political, social and financial risks faced by individual users:  
 Alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs  Medication and medical treatment  Toxic substances  Human disease / health 
In all of these cases the risk is associated with information about these activities being 
available on personal profiles via social networks.  So, for instance, an indication of previous 
problems with drug abuse may prejudice employment prospects, and health problems 
revealed online may affect insurance premiums. 
OTHER  R I SK T YPO L OG I ES  
Other researchers looking at the Internet have provided more relevant categories of risks that 
might be associated with use of social media (McDonald 2013; Farr 2013; Solovic 2013; Mann 
2009).  These can be broken down into risk events and associated consequences.  Table 3 
shows these risks grouped into nine main headings. 
TABLE 3  -  PERSONAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SNSS 
Risk title  Description 
EXTERNAL THREATS  
Identity theft Includes tax-related identity theft. This risk may lead to other 
consequences such as wrongful arrest or financial loss 
Phishing Fraudulent link or site entices personal information from the user 
Malware link Link to malware (may be embedded in a direct message or 
attachment) which may result in external monitoring of passwords, 
or disruption to computer operations 
Hijacking of profile Hijacking of personal site, profile or page could cause 
embarrassment or inconvenience.  Could be a form of bullying as 
well. 
TARGETTING BY OFFICIAL BODIES 
Loss of liberty Arrest and prosecution for a crime that the user did not commit 
(identity theft) 
Prosecution and 
recrimination 
Prosecution or recrimination for posting offensive comments on 
social media.  Offender’s personal data becomes available to the 
authorities 
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Risk title  Description 
PHYSICAL HARM  
Kidnapping and extortion Personal information revealing whereabouts, regular travel routes, 
or activities that leave users open to extortion 
Domestic violence Abusive individuals pursuing former partners 
STALKING, HARASSMENT AND CYBERBULLYING 
Cyber-bullying and 
trolling  
Offensive comments made by colleagues – cyber-bullying and 
victimisation, ostracism, denigration, flaming, trolling 
Inappropriate comments 
by colleagues  
Sexual harassment, sexual solicitation 
Harassment Unwanted attention from other users, cyber-stalking, offensive 
comments, hate campaigns, silent calls, threats from another user 
TARGETTING BY CRIMINALS 
Picture of home and 
possessions shared  
Making the user a target for burglars 
Home address published  Making the user a target for home invasion 
Financial loss Liability for bills incurred by fraudster (identity theft) 
Scams Often a form of phishing, where the user is required to provide 
additional personal information (such as bank account details) or 
where the user is encouraged to send money to the fraudster. This 
category includes the following scams: dating, work at home, 
investment, utility, money transfer, weight loss, fake cheques, 
mystery shopper, debt relief, pay-in-advance credit, lotteries and 
sweepstakes, miracle cures, imposter, penny auctions, technical 
support 
DISCRIMINATION  
Sharing genetic 
information 
Denial of health or life insurance, Discrimination during 
recruitment 
Loss of opportunities Refusal of a job or a place at university because of material on a 
personal profile page 
Loss of financial facilities Refusal of credit or benefits because of information revealed on 
personal profile. Bad credit rating 
WORK RELATED 
RISKS 
 
Contravening company 
policy  
Leading to disciplinary action or dismissal 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
HARM 
 
Financial records shared  Causing embarrassment with work colleagues and friends 
Sharing of genetic 
information  
Invasion of privacy of blood relatives 
Release of account details 
to relatives or executors  
Loss of dignity in death. Distress caused to relatives when details 
not revealed 
Loss of privacy Disclosure of private information 
High school pictures 
shared  
Causing embarrassment, doxing, outing 
ADVERTISING  
Persistent advertising Continual, persistent advertising causing nuisance 
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Risk title  Description 
Spam Unwanted marketing, junk mail, sales calls, text messages, 
invitations to connect that contain spam pointed on someone’s 
network update, discussion group spam 
R IS K S ID ENT I FI ED I N EUR OP EAN UN I ON LE G IS LAT ION  
The European Economic and Social Committee (2010) issued an opinion on social networking 
services, which particularly highlights the ƌisks to ĐhildƌeŶ aŶd ͞those with poor digital 
literacy͟. It ideŶtified the ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout ͞the risks of the illegal and abusive use of SNS, which 
rides roughshod over a number of basic human rights.͟  It ideŶtified thƌeats to iŶdiǀiduals aŶd 
more generic risks that happen to users of SNSs.  Risks that might be relevant in the 
workplace include: 
Cyber-bullying 
Privacy breaches 
Reputational damage 
Assault on personal dignity 
R IS K S AS S OC IAT ED W IT H GEO-L OCAT IO N DATA  
Geo-location data is an increasingly important part of the delivery of SNSs.  By allowing their 
location to be uploaded by mobile service providers and applications providers, users benefit 
from enhanced services such as location of nearby restaurants, identification of friends in the 
vicinity and local maps.  However there are also concerns about the risks that users are 
exposed to when their location data is available.  This is a problem that the European 
Commission is well aware of (Article 29 Data Protection WP 2013). 
A number of mechanisms by which geo-location data is gathered or can be reconstructed have 
been identified.  These raise some concerns about the resulting loss of privacy (Andrienko & 
Andrienko 2012).  Andrienko and colleagues (2013) go on to enumerate the ways in which 
geo-location data is gathered: 
 Whenever a mobile device is in use it sends a signal to the service provider.  However 
the provider can send a silent text message to force active communication without 
alerting the user    Call data records are another source of geo-location data, which came to prominence 
in the NSA revelations in 2013 and these can give time-based data on movements 
(Greenwald 2013)   Signal strength data can be used to triangulate the position of a mobile device   
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 Users often consent (not always in an informed way) to their location being identified 
by apps providers or the mobile service provider for enhanced services.  This data 
might be associated with the user ID which has obvious privacy implications    Anonymous location data seems to provide better protection, although the authors 
show how identity and even time-based movement data can be reconstructed   Some non-location data such as accelerometer data, which is freely available from 
some devices, can be used to deduce the location with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy 
The description of these mechanisms helps to highlight how easy it is for geo-location data to 
be gathered without the knowledge or understanding of the user, and how this information is 
available to service providers, mobile operators and apps providers. 
R ISK S  IDENTI FI ED IN  T HE SUR VEY  
The survey of UK-based LIS professionals (Appendix C) ranked risks to provide an indication of 
priorities.  The score is a weighted calculation. In Table 4 the item with the highest score is 
ranked first.  In each case the score is the sum of all weighted rank counts: 
TABLE 4  -  RANKING OF RISKS BY LIS PROFESSIONALS  
Item Score Overall 
Rank 
Identity theft 1934 1 
Strangers able to see sensitive personal details 1841 2 
Targeting by advertisers 1575 3 
Victim of fraud 1531 4 
Discrimination by employer or potential employer 1443 5 
Targeting by criminals (e.g. so that they can burgle your home 
while you are away) 
1411 6 
Friends, family or colleagues able to see sensitive personal 
details 
1297 7 
Cyber-bullying or harassment (including stalking) 1288 8 
Targeting by official bodies or security agencies 980 9 
Extortion or blackmail 628 10 
Prosecution by authorities because of crime allegations 590 11 
Physical violence or kidnapping 451 12 
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͚IdeŶtitǇ theft͛ aŶd ͚“tƌaŶgeƌs ďeiŶg aďle to see seŶsitiǀe peƌsoŶal details͛ ďoth had high sĐoƌes 
in the ranking.  Identity theft can itself expose users to other risks such as fraud (ranked 4) 
aŶd oŶe of the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes ĐaŶ ďe fiŶaŶĐial loss.  Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, if a useƌ͛s ideŶtitǇ is used to 
apply for a loan or credit facilities, the victim may be left with the liability to pay back the loan. 
'Strangers being able to see sensitive personal details' ranked much more highly than 'Friends, 
family and colleagues being able to see sensitive details'.  There is a dual risk of strangers 
seeing personal details – firstly as a means to commit fraud, and secondly because it exposes 
users to discrimination by potential or actual employers, for instance.  Additional comments 
from users were concerns about reputational damage and loss of face.  Personal information 
may be exposed by the actions of others, such as when friends mention an individual or tag 
photographs or other entries with their names (Thomas et al. 2010). 
Some of the risks may have consequences that are more to do with social awkwardness or 
annoyance rather than loss of money or physical threat.  For instance, targeting by 
advertisers may be irritating rather than life-threatening.  Potentially there is the loss of face 
if another person makes assumptions about an individual on the basis of advertising that 
appears on a screen.  There is also the inconvenience of screen clutter and slowing down of 
browsers if there are a lot of graphics or moving images to download.  
A  CON SO LIDAT ED MODEL OF R ISK  
DEV E LO PIN G A T YP OL O GY O F R I SK  
Consolidation of these risk categories yields a typology of risk related to use of SNSs.  
However not all these risks are related to access to personal data, but relate to intellectual 
property, security and organisational issues.  Three approaches to devising a typology of risk 
for this domain were considered.  Risks can be categorised by: 
Risk event 
Stakeholder affected 
Consequence 
R IS K EV ENT  
A risk consists of an event, for which there is a degree of uncertainty about whether it will 
occur AND the consequence or outcome should it occur.  The first part of this definition is the 
͚ƌisk eǀeŶt͛.  ‘isks associated with the use of SNSs can be categorized according to a general 
set of risks such as those identified by researchers at Duke University and Northern Illinois 
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University (Swedlow et al. 2009).  These are based on risk events or threats.  This 
categorisation does not take into account severity, or impact, or which stakeholders are 
affected.   
Some threats or risks could fall under more than one heading.  For instance, identity theft 
Đould ďe uŶdeƌ ͚Cƌiŵe aŶd VioleŶĐe͛, if it leads to fƌaud aŶd eǀeŶtual fiŶaŶĐial loss to the 
iŶdiǀidual ǁhose data ǁas ͚stoleŶ͛.  It Đould also ďe uŶdeƌ ͚Waƌ “eĐuƌitǇ aŶd Teƌƌoƌisŵ͛, 
where identity theft (the same event) results in a different outcome – a terrorist using an alias 
to escape detection, for instance.  It could be argued that this might expose an individual to 
even greater harm such as the loss of liberty or even loss of life.   
STAK EH O LDER  AF FE CT ED  
Risks can be analysed in terms of the stakeholders.  In a pilot investigation (Appendix B) prior 
to the survey the SNS stakeholders were identified as: users, service providers, advertisers, 
employers, and government.  However because this study considers the risks associated with 
allowing access to personal data on SNSs, it is not surprising that the majority of risks will 
primarily affect users.  Indeed a preliminary analysis of the risks identified to date (Table 3) 
bears this out.  Apart from work-related risks which primarily affect employers, the remaining 
risks all have some direct impact on users. 
Although the main risks are faced by users, release of personal data can have a negative 
impact on employers by damaging reputations or exposing them to legal action or prosecution.  
There might be wider risks to government or society if personal data is misappropriated and 
used for terrorist activities or economic sabotage, for instance.  Many of the risks to 
employers of using SNSs in the workplace are not related to access to personal data.  They 
include issues such as:  time wasting, security breaches, copyright, and libel where staff 
members post inappropriate materials on an SNS site during work hours or on a site with a 
strong presence by or association with the employer. 
The other side of the argument is determining who benefits from access to personal data.  
Advertisers, and those that pay them or whom they pay, benefit directly from accessing 
personal data, consolidated or not.  Indirectly government benefits because of increased tax 
revenue from the resulting economic activity.  Potentially users also benefit – because of 
more tailored experience of services and targeted advertising – presumably some value is 
perceived otherwise no-one would follow the links and there would be no point in advertisers 
using this as a method of gaining new custom. 
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CONS E QUE NC E  
The risks identified when the EU͛s Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) was being developed 
can be divided into two categories: tangible risks; and intangible risks (Lynskey 2012): 
Tangible risks 
 Discrimination  Identity theft  Abuse of power by the state  Physical harm 
Intangible risks 
 The chilling effect  The feeling of helplessness  The apprehension of future harm 
This grouping moves towards the idea of categorising risks by their consequences rather than 
by the nature of the risk event.  This can be further refined by concentrating on 
consequences to users specifically (see Table 5).  This provides a means of quantifying the 
risks, banding them in risk severity categories, or at least a relative ranking. 
TABLE 5  -  R ISK BY CONSEQUENCE T O USER  
Consequence Risk events or threats that leads to the consequence 
Self-harm Cyber bullying 
Exposure of sensitive personal data to wider view 
Inappropriate advertising to susceptible individuals or 
groups 
Loss of self-esteem Cyber bullying 
Exposure of sensitive personal data to wider view 
Social isolation Cyber bullying 
Exposure of sensitive personal data to wider view 
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Consequence Risk events or threats that leads to the consequence 
Financial loss (e.g. job or 
insurance costs) 
ID theft leading to fraud and financial loss 
Discrimination in employment or during recruitment 
because of content of SNS profile (e.g. activities, views or 
past history – membership of a particular group, or health) 
Higher insurance premiums because of perception of 
greater risk based on SNS profile (Health, exposure to 
hazards, risky behaviour) 
Use of personal data to target for crime – e.g. burglary 
during holidays or robbery based on recent purchases 
Cost of inappropriate purchases made under advertising 
pressure 
Loss of liberty – e.g. injustices 
because of mistaken identity 
ID theft leading to mistaken identification as a terrorist 
Inappropriate use of personal data by security services to 
profile and target potential terrorists 
Violence against the person Targeting individuals for stalking 
Using personal data to get at a target for revenge, robbery, 
stalking (Rosenblum 2007, p.47) 
Nuisance Appropriation of personal data (aggregated or identifiable) 
by advertisers 
 
Although this is a useful model, one event could lead to several different consequences.  For 
instance, loss of personal data (an event) could lead to harassment (consequence) or fraud 
(consequence).  One consequence could also have several different causes. For example, 
financial loss could be as a result of following up inappropriate advertising, or it could be 
because of identity theft, or because of discrimination by prospective employers who have 
gained access to personal profiles. 
A further complication is that a consequence such as cyber-bullying arising from exposure of 
sensitive data to an inappropriately wide group, could itself lead to further consequences such 
as self-harm, loss of self-esteem and social isolation. 
From the early days of SNSs researchers have identified different standards of behaviour on 
the iŶteƌŶet as a poteŶtial souƌĐe of ƌisk: ͞This artificial sense of the anonymity of Net 
communications leads people to actually lower their inhibitions, and to feel protected from the 
consequences of their speech͟ (Rosenblum 2007, p.45). 
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D IS CUS SION  
A  R IS K MOD E L F OR  SNSS  
Any categorisation is to some extent arbitrary and so it is necessary to identify what criteria 
are used to select an appropriate approach.  Very few commentators in this area have 
explicitly selected one or other of the three approaches discussed in this paper – analysis by: 
risk event; stakeholder; or consequence.  For the purposes of this study the key consideration 
is whether this allows differentiation of risks in terms of possible regulatory responses. 
Swedlow and colleagues (2009) analysed by risk event using categories that are too general for 
this study.  The majority of relevant risks that they have identified, fall into a single category – 
Political, social and financial risks.  The categories defined do not deal very well with the 
consequences of risk events such as: harassment; nuisance; loss of dignity; or invasion of 
privacy.   
The stakeholder approach is used by other researchers focusing on risks specifically associated 
ǁith “N“ use fƌoŵ aŶ eŵploǇeƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe (Langheinrich & Karjoth 2010).  They go beyond 
the scope of this study by including risks associated with company information as well as 
general exposure on social networks.  However they identify many relevant risks and this 
coupled with other analyses that focus on the user perspective, results in a list of risks based 
on stakeholder groups.  This offers a method for investigating the effects of regulation 
(Ellison & Boyd 2013).  The same event (e.g. sharing personal data with advertisers) may have 
quite different effects on each group.  For instance, making personal data available to the 
partners of an SNS provider may be good for advertisers and some consumers, and bad for 
other users (especially those not looking to purchase).   
There are two main problems with the stakeholder approach.  The first is that the majority of 
risks associated with inappropriate access to personal data will directly affect the user.  As 
this study is concerned with risks to individuals, this is not a good way of distinguishing 
between risks.  The other problem is that the list is long and un-differentiated within these 
two main categories, with overlap and potential gaps in coverage. 
The third approach analyses risk in terms of its consequences and this provides a smaller 
number of main headings under which risks can be grouped (see Table 5). This approach also 
allows addition of a stakeholder aspect so that analysis by this criterion is also possible. 
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The survey brought in wider perspectives on what the risks to individuals were and how those 
risks interacted.  Analysis of the risks identified and the relationships between those risks 
provides a clear distinction between risk events and their consequences. A map of the 
relationships between risks categories was developed (Figure 6) from the typology based on 
consequences of risks events (Table 5). This allows the development of a model of risk 
relationships.  The model emphasises the difficulty of defining limits around the definitions of 
each risk category, a pre-requisite for measuring or quantifying risk. 
The analysis of consequences produces a more complex picture than a simple listing (Table 3) 
can reveal.  One of the challenges of trying to analyse risk is that some consequences may 
themselves expose individual to new risks and therefore to other types of harm.  The figure 
uses red arrows to point to the risk consequences and labelled black arrows to look at the 
relationship between underlying risks. 
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Loss of Control
Hacking and 
Malware
Criminal Targeting
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FIGURE 6  -  RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RISKS AND CONSEQUENCES 
This grouping of risks has allowed an inductive derivation of five categories of consequences to 
users.  Within each category, the contributing risks events are described.   
Nuisance includes being bombarded with advertisements or users being inconvenienced by 
having to go through extra steps to preserve their privacy.  This could also include intrusion 
into private lives by strangers, where no other direct harm is felt. 
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Psychological harm can result from exposure of private information and also from harassment 
and cyberbullying.  This can range from mild social embarrassment when personal 
information is circulated to those that the data subject would not be comfortable with, 
through to victimisation and threats.  It can also result from a feeling of helplessness 
engendered by loss of control over who has access to personal data. 
Financial and material loss can arise from criminal targeting through or from fraud as a result 
of ID theft.  Active discrimination in the job market – for instance by religion, race, trade 
union activity or sexuality, all of which may be inadvertently revealed on SNS profiles.  Theft 
of intellectual property via SNSs – especially where users are encouraged to post pictures, 
videos etc. could result in loss of revenue (Rosenblum 2007, p.46).  There have also been 
cases reported in the press of people inadvertently advertising when they are away, making 
them targets for burglary or home invasions (Roberts 2010; BBC News 2013a). 
Loss of liberty is a dramatic consequence of personal data being made available on SNSs.  
This could be either as a result of exposure of criminal activity or being mistakenly identified as 
a criminal or terrorist (Strauß & Nentwich 2013).  Boasts about drug-taking on SNSs or 
postings about location could be used as evidence of criminal activity.  Profiling by security 
services and police are approximate tools that have led to targeting of innocent people with 
consequent loss of liberty, political persecution and financial loss.  
Physical harm can be a consequence of criminal targeting – for instance during a robbery or a 
kidnapping.  Personal data can reveal information about movements, routines and intent and 
therefore make it easier for criminals to target the individual.  There are also concerns about 
personal information revealing the location of shelters for those escaping domestic abuse. 
CON CLU SION  
This research has identified risks that individual users of SNSs face as a result of revealing 
personal data on their profiles or through their online behaviour.  Previous attempts to 
categorise risk have been too general to adequately describe the risk exposure of SNS users.  
Where there has been a focus on the risks associated with use of the internet or social media, 
they have tended to focus on a few specific aspects that were topical at the time.  A 
consolidated list of risks reflected the perceptions of risk among a group of library and 
information professionals surveyed in the UK. 
A list of risks does not, however, describe the relationship between different risk categories.  
This is important because of the strong interdependence between them.   
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A risk model that more accurately represents the potential threats to users and the 
consequences can be used as a tool for investigating different modalities of regulation.  As 
much of current regulatory activity is risk-based, this approach could provide a means of 
evaluating different regulatory approaches.  For example, it might be possible to consider 
whether proposed changes in legislation tend to increase or reduce each of the risk categories 
in terms of probability of occurrence and severity of impact. 
This up-to-date perspective on user risk is of potential utility to policy makers and decision 
makers.  Legislators need a more nuanced tool than currently exists for evaluating proposed 
new laws or regulations.  Service providers can consider the effect of different privacy 
settings and proposed new services on users, and systems designers have a tool that they can 
adopt to demonstrate that they are folloǁiŶg ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ-by-desigŶ͛ pƌiŶĐiples. 
The risk model also provides a conceptual framework for trainers, educators and information 
intermediaries.  These are all roles that are increasingly forming a part of the role of library 
and information service (LIS) professionals.  Their role in modifying user behaviour by 
example and by user education could have a significant effect in helping users to derive the 
greatest benefit safely from SNSs and from social media generally. 
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SECTION III. REGULATION 
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CHAPTER 6  –  A  REGULATORY MODEL  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
This Đhapteƌ sets out to ƌeǀieǁ Lessig͛s ŵodel of iŶteƌŶet ƌegulatioŶ aŶd to see hoǁ it might 
apply to regulation of access to personal data on social networking services (SNSs).  The 
shortcomings in the Lessig (2006) model are addressed by developing a modified model of 
regulation that incorporates self-regulation, one of the main ways of regulating SNSs. 
BaldǁiŶ, Caǀe aŶd Lodge͛s (2012, pp.2–3) definition of regulation is significant in 
acknowledging that it goes beyond ͞ĐoŶtƌol eǆeƌĐised ďǇ a puďliĐ ageŶĐǇ oǀeƌ aĐtiǀities that aƌe 
ǀalued ďǇ a ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͟.  In the last of the three definitions below Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 
state ͞that ƌegulatioŶ ŵaǇ ďe Đaƌƌied out Ŷot ŵeƌelǇ ďǇ state iŶstitutioŶs ďut ďǇ a host of otheƌ 
bodies, including corporations, self-regulators, professional or trade bodies, and voluntary 
organizations.͟  ‘egulatioŶ ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ: 
As a specific set of commands … 
As deliberate state influence … 
As all forms of social or economic influence … 
This research started by considering the interaction between risk and regulation.  In order to 
do this a conceptual model has been proposed to describe this interaction.  It can be argued 
that regulation has three main purposes: 
 To reduce risk  To minimise market inefficiencies  To create opportunities for service innovation 
This research focuses on the first of these and proposes to use risk assessment as a means of 
evaluating the relative effectiveness of different modes of regulation.  The model focuses 
specifically on reduction of risk to users and looks at the nature of the risks that users face.  
This can be characterised by the degree of personalisation of the data and its sensitivity in 
terms of perceived or actual harm that might arise from misuse. 
A number of fundamental issues have been identified when it comes to risk regulation 
͞ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ the defiŶitioŶ aŶd ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of ƌisk, ĐƌitiĐal deďates about the principles 
inherent in any regulatory activity, to fundamental questions on the appropriate institutions for 
ƌisk ƌegulatioŶ͟ (Baldwin et al. 2012, p.102).  Given the complex nature of risk regulation, it is 
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important that: ͞…aŶǇ atteŵpt at ƌegulatiŶg ƌisks should involve the pluralization of analytical 
peƌspeĐtiǀes, ƌatheƌ thaŶ the ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ aŶǇ oŶe aŶalǇtiĐal deǀiĐe aloŶe͟ (Baldwin et al. 2012, 
p.102). 
R IS K TO US ER S  
Other aspects of protection of personal data, apart from privacy, are protection from abuses 
such as: fraud, bullying, and harassment.  Some of these could be seen as aspects of privacy 
͞the right to be let alone͟, oƌ opeŶiŶg people up to ƌisks suĐh as fiŶaŶĐial loss thƌough fƌaud 
(Warren & Brandeis 1890).  This study also includes exposure to risk when personal data is 
shared with advertisers. 
Personal data can be described in terms of proximity and sensitivity of data.  Different modes 
of regulation could be evaluated in terms of its effect on each category of personal data.  
Chapter 5 suggested that risks associated with personal data can be described in terms of: 
Risk event 
Stakeholder affected 
Consequence 
So, for instance, a risk might be the following event: non-attributable personal data is made 
available to advertisers via a web beacon or browser cookie.  The consequence of this is 
intrusive advertising, but there may also be a problem of loss of dignity (as when colleagues 
have sight of advertisements for personal products) or breach of confidentiality (e.g. when 
buying a present for a friend or relative in the same household or workplace, and they see the 
ad). 
Harassment, bullying and the associated loss of dignity is a significant risk faced by users or by 
the suďjeĐts of useƌs͛ postiŶgs oŶ theiƌ pƌofiles.  IŶ Teggart v TeleTech UK Ltd an industrial 
tribunal found in favour of the respondent defending their dismissal of an employee for gross 
misconduct after he posted salacious and damaging allegations about a co-worker on his 
Facebook profile.  Interestingly the tribunal also referred to Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 
1998: 
͞WheŶ the Đlaimant put his comments on his Facebook pages, to which 
members of the public could have access, he abandoned any right to consider 
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his comments as being private and therefore he cannot seek to rely on Article 8 
to protect his right to make those comments.͟ 
MODE L O F PER SO NAL DATA  
In the review of the privacy policies of eleven leading SNSs (Chapter 8), the following types of 
personal data were identified: 
TABLE 6  -  TYPES OF PERSONAL DATA 
Type of personal data Data elements 
Identity Name 
[IDs such as passport number, driving licence number, National 
Insurance number, NHS Number, Pupil Number] 
Gender 
Sexuality 
Race / ethnic origin 
Place of birth 
Nationality 
Age 
Location Address 
Current location 
IP Address 
Security Username 
User login / password 
Attitudes and interests Interests 
Religion 
Political affiliation 
Holidays / places visited 
Education and 
employment 
Occupation / employment status 
Education 
Criminal history 
Schooling / education 
Scholastic achievement grades 
Employment history 
Finance Banking details 
Income 
Home ownership 
Health Health status 
Medical history 
Personal network Marital status 
Family status 
Personal details of associates (colleagues, friends, household 
members, relatives) 
Behaviour Activities (browsing history - sites visited, groups joined, services / 
products purchased) 
Device information IP Address 
Browser type and version 
Device ID 
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These categories of information can be grouped in different ways.  For instance the Data 
Protection Act 1998 makes the distinction between personal data and sensitive personal data.  
This is primarily so that sensitive personal data can have additional protections. 
WHAT I S BE IN G REGU L ATED?  
Regulation can be viewed in terms of who is being regulated.  For instance, is it the industry, 
their agents, or the consumers that are being regulated?  The Data Protection Act 1998 
focuses on the responsibilities of the data controller who can in some cases be seen as 
representing the SNS provider (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the legislation).  
Part of the problem arises in the definition of data controller.  Self-regulation is focused on 
the SNS providers and to some extent the ISPs as manifest in their privacy policies and End 
User Licence Agreements (EULAs). 
Code is normally enacted by SNS providers and their agents when setting up and modifying 
their services.  They can build privacy into the design of their systems so that they default to 
non-disclosure.  However this may be seen as being in conflict with their desire to extend 
their membership and the range of services available to members. 
Mode is where users regulate their behaviour either collectively (as in market demand) or 
individually by the way in which they interact with services and the degree to which they 
reveal personal data.  User education is seen as one way to improve individual security. 
It could also be argued that activities are being regulated rather than individuals and 
organisations.  For instance, exchange and use of personal data could be subject to 
self-regulation (in privacy policies), legislation (as with the Data Protection Act 1998) or by 
code (as with data encryption to protect against unauthorised access to personal data). 
THE NAT UR E O F REGU LATION  
The emphasis of privacy regulation in Europe has moved towards a risk-based approach 
(Chapter 5).  However there are countervailing views that must be considered: 
"Risk management is in many respects contrary to the essence of capitalist 
accumulation, which intrinsically encompasses risk-taking. Risk management 
and risk regulation can be seen as ways of diverting attention from system 
weaknesses and reducing the status of regulatory activities to little more than 
'blaming mechanisms'. The over-emphasis on regulation and risk management 
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can make regulatory systems unwieldy and ultimately self-defeating." (Beck 
1992, p.156) 
If the sole consideration of regulation is to enhance and protect capitalist endeavour, then 
regulation can be seen as counter-productive.  However most societies subscribe to other 
values such as communal or societal good as well as individual human rights. 
LES SI G ǯS  MODEL O F IN TERN ET  REGU LATION  
Lessig (2006, p.123) has identified four modalities of regulation that affect the internet (Figure 
7).   
 
FIGURE 7  -  LESSIG'S MODALITIES OF INTERNET REGULATION  
Although Lessig͛s ŵodel has ďeĐoŵe a ŵajoƌ ƌefeƌeŶĐe poiŶt of aŶalǇsis of diffeƌeŶt ƌegulatoƌǇ 
modes, other technology commentators such as Schmidt and Cohen (2013, p.66) have 
described alternatives based on: corporate, legal, societal and personal responses to privacy 
aŶd seĐuƌitǇ Ŷeeds.  EaĐh of Lessig͛s ƌegulatoƌǇ ŵodes is ĐoŶsideƌed iŶ tuƌŶ ďefoƌe a Ŷeǁ 
model is proposed. 
LAW  
A review of the legislation in the UK as it applies to use of personal data on SNSs suggests that 
the Data Protection 1998 is the main focus for legislative regulation.  This in turn is based on 
the EU͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ DiƌeĐtiǀe (95/46/EC) and associated legislation. It is also dependent 
on the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires the right to privacy (Figure 8) and the 
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Communications Act 2003, which regulates some aspects of data communications via the 
internet. 
 
FIGURE 8  -  LEGISLATIVE REGULATION IN THE UK 
One objection to the application of the Data Protection Act 1998 to SNS providers based in the 
United States is that they are covered by the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework.  As far back as 
2002 commentators were concerned about the fundamental differences in approach to data 
protection in Europe and the United States (Muir & Oppenheim 2002).  Safe Harbor, as a 
self-regulatory scheme has been considered weak and with many loopholes that has not been 
rigorously enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (Connolly 2008; Reay et al. 2009).  
However a recent study by Solove and Hartzog (2014, p.679) suggest that: 
Through a gradual process akin to that of common law, the FTC has developed 
a federal body of privacy law, the closest thing the United States has to 
omnibus privacy regulation. 
Lessig (2006) does not make the distinction between law and self-regulation.  Even when 
considering legislative frameworks such as the data protection act or advertising and 
consumer law in the UK, it is difficult to avoid self-regulation as a major component of the 
regulatory landscape.  It also does not take account of the self-imposed commitments that 
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SNS providers make in their privacy agreements and terms and conditions of service.  It could 
ďe aƌgued that pƌiǀaĐǇ poliĐies aƌe a tǇpe of ͚Đode͛ iŶ that theǇ ƌefleĐt the aƌĐhiteĐtuƌe of a 
system, however they are also an agreement between user and provider, and may be partially 
covered by contract law. 
NOR M S  
Lessig (2006) describes situations where users contravene accepted behaviour standards and 
aƌe ostƌaĐised oŶliŶe.  Useƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ aŶd eǆpeĐtatioŶs ĐaŶ seƌǀe as a poǁeƌful ƌegulatoƌǇ 
force.  This can be applied to SNS and specifically to regulation of access to personal data on 
SNSs.  As part of this research a survey of LIS professionals in the UK suggested that users 
should have some responsibility for their own online safety (Appendix C).  This is a theme 
that has been picked up by the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe.  ‘epoƌts iŶ the pƌess 
iŶdiĐated that useƌs͛ eǆpeĐtatioŶs haǀe a powerful effect on SNS providers.  Cases such as the 
Facebook beacon device led to a strong reaction from users that resulted in the withdrawal of 
the beacon feature because of its intrusive nature (Story & Stone 2007).  The feature 
automatically tracked purchases made online and effectively publicised this information.  
Boyd (2010) also suggests that norms operate within groups of connected individuals and that 
certain types of personal information are not revealed beyond the group.  Wider social norms 
about abuse on social media have been covered prominently in the press and this suggests 
that there are implied standards of acceptable behaviour which when contravened elicit a 
strong response beyond that of the law (BBC News 2013b). 
All this points to the idea that social norms are an important factor in regulating SNSs.  The 
effects of individual behaviour may be governed by collectively-held views of acceptable 
behaviour, but is only noticed at a market level when large numbers of users respond to 
breaches of norms. 
AR CHI TE CTUR E OR  ǮCO DE ǯ  
The way in which systems are designed and the options presented to users are an expression 
of ͚Đode͛.  This is aďout the sǇsteŵs aƌĐhiteĐtuƌe aŶd the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh it ĐoŶtƌols aĐĐess to 
personal data.  At the first level is the amount of personal data gathered by SNSs.  This 
varies significantly – SNSs such as Facebook and LinkedIn offer the opportunity to share very 
detailed personal information whereas services such as Twitter work on the basis of a minimal 
profile (up to 160 characters long).  The SNSs also vary in the minimum amount of personal 
data required to register and whether real names or aliases are acceptable.  This has led to 
controversy (described in Chapter 2) where networks such as Google+ have tried to impose the 
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͚ƌeal Ŷaŵes͛ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts oŶ useƌs oƌ where Facebook initially refused to accept preferred 
names for transvestites or transitioning transsexuals (Boyd 2012; Lee 2014).  At the third 
level is the range of privacy options or settings offered by SNSs.  An exploration of privacy 
policies (Chapter 8) reveals considerable variation in approach.  Most operate an opt-out 
approach, because they want the default to be for greater disclosure – this facilitates 
connections and provides richer data to sell to advertisers.  There is also an argument that it 
is difficult for users to exercise informed consent in such a complex area and so they will tend 
to keep the default.  However privacy policies may not be an entirely reliable indicator of 
what options are delivered to users.  Firstly, there may be a time-lag between a change to the 
privacy settings and the published privacy policy.  Secondly, the SNS may not keep track of 
the promises that it makes in its policies and so be out of step with the actuality.  This is 
difficult to verify because these discrepancies may not be immediately apparent.   
The idea of privacy by design is intended to encourage developers to consider privacy as a key 
consideration when designing systems and developing new features.  Some regulators have 
taken this on board and this has become a feature of the proposed European Data Protection 
Regulation.  
Lessig͛s (2006) ŵodel of ͚Code͛ ĐaŶ ďe eǆteŶded to iŶĐlude the aƌĐhiteĐture of the networks 
and communications services as well as the electronic ecosystem within which they exist.  
This means that technology-based privacy and identity protection software as well as 
anti-spyware software are part of regulation by code.  As well as the SNSs themselves, there 
are independent solutions that are available as add-ins to browsers, for instance, to supress 
cookies and to isolate Trojans and other software designed to capture sensitive data such as 
passwords and account details.  This wider view of code as a regulatory instrument is 
important when considering the different agents involved. 
MAR KET S  
While there is considerable literature about regulation of the markets, there is little said about 
the use of markets to regulate an industry.  Market effects are recognised, but the emphasis 
of regulatory bodies is to introduce rules that make the markets operate in a way that the 
regulators consider desirable.  
The growth of internet communities and interactions has allowed the effective development 
market-driven regulation.  This can be seen in social pressure on providers to comply with 
market expectations.  For instance recent changes in the Facebook privacy settings without 
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full consultation with users led to an outcry and pressure to retract (BBC News 2011).  
However, this may be because of the implicit threat that legislators may respond with new 
regulations to address the concerns of their voters.   Lessig͛s (2006) treatment of the market 
can be seen as a manifestation of user norms.  If a sufficient number of users feel strongly 
about a service and they respond, they operate as a market.  It is logical therefore to treat 
norms and market forces as part of the same regulatory mode which differ primarily in scale. 
A  REVIS ED MODEL O F REG ULATIO N OF PERSO NAL DAT A O N SNSS  
A preliminary survey of users and data protection officers (Appendix B) suggested that there is 
some scepticism about the effectiveness of the Data Protection Act as a means of regulating 
access to personal data on social networks.  This was borne out by interviews with regulators 
and industry experts (Appendix D).  Although some respondents found it to be effective, 
many considered that the legislation alone was insufficient.  Several respondents saw other 
modes such as self-regulation, user education, and technology as important elements in the 
protection of personal data.  This can be represented by a model comprising four different 
modes of regulation: 
1. Legislation 
2. Self-regulation 
3. Code 
4. Norms 
The validity of this model was tested in consultation with industry experts and through a 
survey of LIS professionals.  It has been developed in the context of SNSs. 
LEG I SL ATI ON  
LegislatioŶ ĐoƌƌespoŶds to Lessig͛s (2006) ͚Law͛.  This includes rules with statutory weight 
behind them and often involves a national or regional authority which enforces the rules.  In 
the UK the main legislation that regulates access to personal data is the Data Protection Act 
1998 and associated statutory instruments.  It is based on EU legislation, specifically the Data 
Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which at the time of writing was due to be superseded by the 
General Data Protection Regulation 2012.  The other significant area of legislation is the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 which establishes a self-regulating framework for the 
advertising industry and affects the digital advertising companies that operate in association 
with SNSs. 
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SE LF-RE GU LAT IO N  
The Lessig (2006) model does not specifically include self-regulation, and it has been left to 
others to suggest that self-ƌegulatioŶ of the iŶteƌŶet is a foƌŵ of ͚Ŷoƌŵ-ďased goǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛ 
(Cooke 2004, p.36).  Self-regulation by an industry can apply if there are suitable sanctions for 
non-compliance such as expulsion from a group with consequent loss of credibility and market 
share.  
Surrogate regulation, where the responsibility for regulating a professional group or industry is 
vested in a professional or trade body, can also be effective.  Membership of the body 
becomes a condition of being allowed to trade.  This can be seen with the established 
professions and some sectors in the UK (such as civil engineers, lawyers, doctors and 
architects).  This approach takes the burden of regulation away from the state and the costs 
of regulation are borne by the regulated individuals or industry. 
CODE  
Lessig (2006) deals with technical architecture as an instrument of regulation.  This is an 
approach that has been taken up by a number of regulatory authorities, initially in Canada and 
latterly in the UK and the EU.  Code also includes other technology based solutions for 
managing user identities online or for blocking ads and cookies so that online behaviour is not 
actively tracked by someone else. 
NOR M S  
This category covers both individual behaviour and attitudes and collective behaviour as seen 
in markets and covered by the ͚markets͛ category in Lessig (2006).  The justification for 
merging these categories is that regulation by the market is a manifestation of Norms 
expressed collectively.  
CONC LU SI ON  
Figure 9 shows how these different modes of regulation interact with each other and with 
access to personal data on SNSs. 
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FIGURE 9  -  REGULATING ACCESS TO PERSONAL DATA -  NEW MODEL  
This pƌoposed ŵodel of ƌegulatioŶ ďuilds oŶ Lessig͛s (2006) idea that there are four modalities 
for regulating the Internet.  It attempts to cover a major omission in the lack of a category for 
self-regulation.  The model also makes a stronger connection between ͚Norms͛ aŶd ĐolleĐtiǀe 
useƌ ďehaǀiouƌ ǁhiĐh Lessig tƌeats sepaƌatelǇ iŶ ͚Maƌkets͛.  This new model also recognises 
that legislation affects self-regulation which is usually manifest in privacy policies and in 
industry codes of practice.  These codes of practice may themselves by governed by 
legislation or they may be industry-driven.  The way in which enterprises design and deliver 
SNSs (Code) is itself a form of self-regulation. 
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CHAPTER 7  –  LEGISLATION  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
Legislation is one of the modes of regulation previously defined (Lessig 2006).  In the UK the 
legislative framework is dominated by the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).  However other 
primary legislation and statutory instruments also regulate use of personal data in SNSs.  As a 
member state, the United Kingdom is subject to European Union legislation, which is explored 
in this chapter.  The current legislation is reviewed and this provides a basis for the discussion 
of the data protection principles.  Development of a draft EU Regulation and its implications 
for future protection of personal data in the UK is also discussed. 
THE RU LES  AN D THEI R  ORI GIN S  
EUR OP EAN L EG I S LAT IO N  
UK legislation is governed by the Treaty on European Union 1992 and the EC Accession Treaty 
1972.  Treaty-based law does not require additional domestic legislation.  Voluntary 
participation by states usually involves the following steps: negotiation, signature, ratification, 
adhesion, accession.  However states can record reservations.  Article 21 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 allows states to make reservations (i.e. exemptions to 
parts of a treaty).  Other bodies have their own regulations such as European law originating 
from the European Union.  The EU tends not to allow reservations and Article 288 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2007 defines what is binding under EU law.  
The principle of subsidiarity means that dualist member states such as the UK enact their own 
legislation within a framework determined by the European Union.  European Directives are 
incorporated into UK national law by means of new legislation, such as the Data Protection Act 
1998, or by means of statutory instruments such as the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
(EC Directive) Regulations issued in 2003, 2004 and 2011 and based on the Directive on Privacy 
and Electronic Communications (2002/58/EC), also known as the ePrivacy Directive. 
European Regulations, as opposed to European Directives, are directly applicable to all 
member states and are not legislated for nationally.  Existing regulations governing 
competition, discrimination and free movement are examples of this and the General Data 
Protection Regulation 2012 will fall into this category when it has been finalised. 
Laws derived from the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 affect data protection.  
Unlike the EU, the Council of Europe (a non-EU body) allows reservations (Article 57 of the 
Convention). 
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The European Economic and Social Committee (2010) opinion identified risks to users of SNS, 
referred to in Chapter 6.  As well as hazards associated with geo-tagging, and facial 
recognition technologies, spreading of viruses via SNS was also identified.  The Opinion goes 
on to recommend measures to improve digital literacy. It suggests that SNS providers should 
self-regulate or participate in co-regulation at Community or national level.  This would allow 
operators to sign up voluntarily to a code of practice that would be monitored and enforced by 
the regulatory authorities.  It also recommends the appointment of:  
a community-level Ombudsman responsible for all issues relating to the 
protection of human dignity, privacy and data protection in the electronic 
communications and audiovisual sectors, with specific responsibility for SNS.   
DATA PR OTE CT ION D IR ECT IV E  (DPD) 
The EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) is binding on the United Kingdom under the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union 1992 (also known as the Maastricht Treaty). The 
DPD is iŶteŶded to alloǁ ͞the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital͟ ďetǁeeŶ 
Meŵďeƌ “tates aŶd ͞also that the fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌights of iŶdiǀiduals should ďe safeguaƌded.͟  
The Directive ƌefeƌs iŶ seǀeƌal plaĐes to ͞the right to privacy͟ as oŶe of the ƌights aŶd fƌeedoŵs 
of individuals. 
DATA PR OTE CT ION ACT  1998  (DPA) 
The DPA sets up the ͞provision for the regulation of the processing of information relating to 
individuals͟ aŶd eŶĐoŵpasses the eight Data PƌoteĐtioŶ PƌiŶĐiples desĐƌiďed iŶ the Directive.  
These in turn are derived from the OECD Guidelines (OECD 1980).  These Guidelines arose 
from a concern about discrepancies between the privacy laws of different OECD countries 
which could act as a potential trade barrier by inhibiting the exchange of data between 
countries.  The rapid growth of databanks containing personal data was a particular concern.   
Section 6 of the DPA defines the role of the Information Commissioner, appointed by Her 
Majesty and gives him or her specific powers under the Act.  Section 6 also makes provision 
for appointment of members of an Information Tribunal to hear and determine appeals 
against a notice from the Information Commissioner.  Since 2010 the Information Tribunal 
has become the Information Rights Tribunal in the General Regulatory Chamber of the First 
Tier Tribunal.  This was formed from the incorporation of a number of tribunals into a 
centralised tribunal system under the Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order (SI 2010/22). 
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Secondary legislation arising from the DPA includes statutory instruments and case law that 
sets precedents in the way in which the law is interpreted.  In addition the Information 
CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ;ICO) from time to time issues regulations and guidelines which are 
available on the ICO website. 
COM MUN ICA TI ON S ACT 2003 
The Office of Communications (Ofcom), set up by the Communications Act 2003, does not 
have a specific interest in regulating privacy, but does have a role in licensing communications 
service providers.  It also has an interest in attitudes to social media which has been the 
subject of its own research (Ofcom 2008).  Section 127 of the Act prohibits use of public 
electronic communications networks for sending a message: 
that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character 
or 
for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to 
another 
This could cover use of SNSs to bully or harass users or for persistent advertising. 
REG ULA TI ON O F INV E S TI GAT OR Y PO WER S AC T 2000  AND TH E CO MP UTER  M I SU S E 
ACT 1990 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 prohibits unlawful interception of 
communications including electronic communications: 
(1)It shall be an offence for a person intentionally and without lawful authority 
to intercept, at any place in the United Kingdom, any communication in the 
course of its transmission by means of: (a) a public postal service; or (b) a 
public telecommunication system. 
This could be applied to personal data on social networks where there is an intent to gain 
unauthorised access.  This is also covered by Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990: 
 (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a) he causes a computer to perform 
any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any 
computer; (b) the access he intends to secure is unauthorised; and (c) he knows 
at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is 
the case. 
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Effectively this outlaws hacking into user accounts on social media.  However, it could be 
argued that by signing up to a service and voluntarily putting personal data on an SNS site a 
user is allowing the SNS provider to pass on personal data to third parties and that this 
therefore does not constitute computer misuse within the terms of the Act.  The applicability 
of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 depeŶds oŶ ͚uŶauthoƌised aĐĐess͛.  If a data subject gives 
consent for his or her personal data to be made available via the SNS, it is effectively 
authorised by them.  Many of the concerns that do arise with personal data are about misuse 
of the data, not misuse of the computer to gain access to the data. 
HUM AN R I G HT S ACT 1998  (HRA) 
Schedule 1, Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 identifies that:  
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
The UK ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
in 1951 and enacted the Human Rights Act in 1998, which came into force in October 2000.  
It ͞gives effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on 
Human Rights͟. 
A Court (defined in the Act) may make a Declaration of Incompatibility if any provisions of a 
piece of primary legislation are incompatible with any rights under the Convention.  This 
constitutional role means that any primary legislation (whether it has already been enacted or 
is proposed in a bill) must observe the right to respect for private and family life.  The HRA 
allows individuals to refer their cases to the European Court of Human Rights once all appeals 
are exhausted in the UK Court system. 
As well as the constitutional role of the HRA, there is the right to privacy which underpins 
much of the DPA and the presumed rights of UK residents using social media.  However the 
HRA also enshrines the right to freedom of expression.  This could apply to online 
behavioural advertising as well as self-promotion. 
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SEC OND AR Y L EG I SL ATI ON  
In the UK statutory instruments are the main source of secondary legislation.  These take the 
form of regulations2 or statutory instruments.  The Privacy and Electronic Communications 
(EC Directive) Regulations are based on the European ePrivacy Directives. 
In addition to the directives the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) issues Notices 
and Opinions, which provide additional guidance to European Union institutions, national 
governments of member countries and citizens of Europe.  
 
FIGURE 10  -  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EU  AND UK  DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION  
Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between European Union and UK legislation.  Statutory 
instruments that have come into effect since the DPA can be applied directly to SNS providers.  
The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulations (SI 2011 
                                                          
2 UK regulations are not to be confused with European Union Regulations which apply directly 
to all member states 
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/1208) giǀes a Ŷeǁ defiŶitioŶ of ͞personal data breaches͟ aŶd plaĐes the oďligatioŶ oŶ data 
controllers to notify the Information Commissioner of any data breaches. The Statutory 
Instrument makes provision for penalties for failure to do so and specifies that the Information 
Commissioner should be notified in the event of a personal data breach.  It is an amendment 
of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations (SI 2003/2426) and 
implements Articles 2 and 3 of Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 
(2009/136/EC). 
The other relevant development for SNS providers is the rationalisation of registration fees for 
data controllers into two tiers.  The Data Protection (Notification and Notification Fees) 
(Amendment) Regulations (SI 2009/1677) sets the fees payable by data controllers for 
registration under the DPA at £35 for all charities, companies with a turnover of less than 
£25.9m and fewer than 250 staff, and for public authorities with fewer than 250 staff.  The 
remainder (so-Đalled ͞tieƌ Ϯ͟ data ĐoŶtƌolleƌsͿ paǇ a fee of £ϱϬϬ.  This might have an effect if 
any of the SNS providers decide to submit to UK law. 
GE NER A L DAT A PR O TE CTI ON RE GU LAT IO N  2012  (DPR) 
The European Parliament (2009) has made a recommendation on strengthening security and 
fundamental freedoms on the internet.  This includes: 
 Full and safe access to the internet for all  Strong commitment to combating cybercrime  Constant attention to the absolute protection and enhanced promotion of 
fundamental freedoms on the internet; and  International undertakings 
Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) makes provision for the establishment of 
a Working Party, with representatives of the national data protection authorities of Member 
States, plus the EU Data Protection Officer and a representative of the European Commission.  
As well as an annual report it commissions its own research and consultations and advises the 
Commission on legislative and other measures that can be taken to improve the data 
protection framework.  The proposed DPR will replace the Article 29 Working Party with the 
European Data Protection Board. 
In 2010 the Article 29 Working Party reviewed the framework for data protection in light of 
changes in technology and emerging practice internationally.  The European Commission 
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(2010) issued a communication that encompasses legislative and non-legislative measures for 
data protection.  It signals specific intended actions by the EC in a number of areas including: 
 Notification of breaches  Data minimisation  Consent  Measures for self-regulation and other non-legislative approaches  Harmonisation of rules and processes 
Of particular note are the areas where individual rights could be improved: 
The Commission will therefore examine ways of: 
- strengthening the principle of data minimisation; 
- improving the modalities for the actual exercise of the rights of access, 
rectification, erasure or blocking of data (e.g., by introducing deadlines for 
responding to individuals' requests, by allowing the exercise of rights by 
electronic means or by providing that right of access should be ensured free of 
charge as a principle); 
- clarifying the so-Đalled ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛, i.e. the right of individuals to 
have their data no longer processed and deleted when they are no longer 
needed for legitimate purposes. This is the case, for example, when processing 
is based on the person's consent and when he or she withdraws consent or 
when the storage period has expired; 
- ĐoŵpleŵeŶtiŶg the ƌights of data suďjeĐts ďǇ eŶsuƌiŶg ͛data poƌtaďilitǇ͛, i.e., 
providing the explicit right for an individual to withdraw his/her own data (e.g., 
his/her photos or a list of friends) from an application or service so that the 
withdrawn data can be transferred into another application or service, as far 
as technically feasible, without hindrance from the data controllers. 
The General Data Protection Regulation 2012 was voted for in the European Parliament in 
March 2014.  At the time of writing (February 2015) it was due to be put before the Council 
of Ministers.  To become law it has to be adopted by the Council following three-way 
discussions between the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament to develop a consolidated version of the DPR.  Article 88 of the Regulation repeals 
 106 
the Data Protection Directive.  The Regulation will be directly implemented and will be 
binding on all member states. 
The DPR has two stated purposes: 
To protect the fundamental right to data protection and to guarantee the 
free flow of personal data between Member States 
In its introduction the Regulation refers to the Stockholm Programme which states that: 
͞…ĐitizeŶs͛ pƌiǀaĐǇ ŵust ďe pƌeseƌǀed ďeǇoŶd ŶatioŶal ďoƌdeƌs, espeĐiallǇ ďǇ pƌoteĐtiŶg 
peƌsoŶal data͟ (European Council 2010).  The free flow of information is seen as a 
pre-requisite for an open market within the EU.  Lynskey (2012, pp.169–177) identified 
individual control over personal data as another unstated but implied purpose of the proposed 
DPR.  The introduction to the Regulation indicates that the intention is to build trust and 
facilitate (online) economic activity. 
DAT A PR OT ECTION  PRI NCIP LES  
The data protection principles enshrined in the DPA have a pedigree reaching back to the 
OECD Guidelines (OECD 1980).  These principles have been carried forward in the DPR.  
Table 7 shows the relationship between the data protection principles laid out in these three 
documents.  The eight principles laid out in the DPA provide a good starting point for 
analysing the applicability of legislation to regulation of access to personal data.   
The DPR embodies six ͞PƌiŶĐiples ƌelatiŶg to peƌsoŶal data pƌoĐessiŶg͟ which are described in 
Article 5 of the Regulation.  They correspond broadly to the first six of the eight principles in 
the Data PƌoteĐtioŶ DiƌeĐtiǀe ;aŶd iŶĐoƌpoƌated iŶto the UK͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ Act).  
The DPR makes provision for implementation across the European Union including the setting 
up of institutions and administrative structures to facilitate consistency in ͚Chapter VII – 
Co-operation and Consistency͛.  The Regulation, which is directly binding on member states, 
will replace the current Directive.  This provides ͞a haƌŵoŶised set of Đoƌe ƌules͟.   
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TABLE 7  -  COMPARISON OF DATA P ROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
OECD Guidelines UK Data Protection Act 1998 Data Protection Regulation 
Collection Limitation Principle 
There should be limits to the 
collection of personal data and 
any such data should be 
obtained by lawful and fair 
means and, where appropriate, 
with the knowledge or consent 
of the data subject. 
Principle 1 
Personal data shall be 
processed fairly and lawfully 
and, in particular, shall not be 
processed unless— 
(a) at least one of the 
conditions in Schedule 
2 is met, and 
(b) in the case of sensitive 
personal data, at least 
one of the conditions 
in Schedule 3 is also 
met. 
(a) 
Personal data must be: 
processed lawfully, fairly and 
in a transparent manner in 
relation to the data subject 
Data Quality Principle 
Personal data should be 
relevant to the purposes for 
which they are to be used, and, 
to the extent necessary for 
those purposes, should be 
accurate, complete and kept 
up-to-date. 
Principle 3 
Personal data shall be 
adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the 
purpose or purposes for which 
they are processed. 
Principle 4 
Personal data shall be accurate 
and, where necessary, kept up 
to date. 
(c)  
Personal data must be 
adequate, relevant, and limited 
to the minimum necessary in 
relation to the purposes for 
which they are processed; they 
shall only be processed if, and 
as long as, the purposes could 
not be fulfilled by processing 
information that does not 
involve personal data 
(d)  
Personal data must be accurate 
and kept up to date; every 
reasonable step must be taken 
to ensure that personal data 
that are inaccurate, having 
regard to the purposes for 
which they are processed, are 
erased or rectified without 
delay 
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OECD Guidelines UK Data Protection Act 1998 Data Protection Regulation 
Purpose Specification Principle 
The purposes for which 
personal data are collected 
should be specified not later 
than at the time of data 
collection and the subsequent 
use limited to the fulfilment of 
those purposes or such others 
as are not incompatible with 
those purposes and as are 
specified on each occasion of 
change of purpose. 
Principle 2 
Personal data shall be obtained 
only for one or more specified 
and lawful purposes, and shall 
not be further processed in any 
manner incompatible with that 
purpose or those purposes. 
(b) 
Personal data must be 
collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and 
not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those 
purposes 
Use Limitation Principle 
Personal data should not be 
disclosed, made available or 
otherwise used for purposes 
other than those specified in 
accordance with Paragraph 9 
except:  a) with the consent of 
the data subject; or  b) by the authority of 
law. 
See Principle 2 above  
Security Safeguards Principle 
Personal data should be 
protected by reasonable 
security safeguards against 
such risks as loss or 
unauthorised access, 
destruction, use, modification 
or disclosure of data. 
Principle 7 
Appropriate technical and 
organisational measures shall 
be taken against unauthorised 
or unlawful processing of 
personal data and against 
accidental loss or destruction 
of, or damage to, personal data. 
 
 
The OECD (1980) principles include the following, which are covered in the main body of the 
DPA: 
Openness Principle – There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means 
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal 
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data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual 
residence of the data controller. 
The following additional principles have been incorporated into the DPA: 
Principle 5 – Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be 
kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
Whereas the draft Regulation states: 
Personal data must be: (e) kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal 
data are processed;  
The DPA also upholds the rights of individuals: 
Principle 6 – Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of 
data subjects under this Act. 
The Regulation͛s fiŶal pƌiŶĐiple ĐoŶtaiŶs a ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt ďǇ Data CoŶtƌolleƌs to uphold the 
provisions of the Regulation: 
Personal data must be (f) processed under the responsibility and liability of the 
controller, who shall ensure and demonstrate for each processing operation 
the compliance with the provisions of this Regulation. 
As expressed in the DPA, the applicability of each of the eight principles to SNSs is considered 
in turn. 
PR IN CI PL E 1  –  FA IR  AN D LAWFU L PR OC E SS IN G  
1 Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, 
shall not be processed unless— 
(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and 
(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in 
Schedule 3 is also met. 
It could be argued that the DPA does not apply to SNS providers because they are not data 
controllers, rather it is the users (data subjects) responsible for putting their personal data up 
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on SNS profiles who effectively are the data controllers.  However users alone do not 
͞determine the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to 
be, processed͟ ;Data Protection Act 1998 s.1(1)).  The service provider also processes 
personal data for the purposes of selling it to advertisers.  The DPR reinforces this with its 
definition: 
'controller' means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes, 
conditions and means of the processing of personal data; 
At least two of the conditions in Schedule 2 (para.1, and para.6) of the DPA (referred to in 
Principle 1) could be argued as being met by SNSs:  
The data subject has given his consent to the processing. 
and 
The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by 
the data ĐoŶtƌolleƌ… 
In order to gain access to a service, users normally sign up to Terms and Conditions, which 
make provision for the service provider to utilize and exploit data provided by the user.  This 
pƌoďaďlǇ Ƌualifies as ͚ĐoŶseŶt͛ ƌefeƌƌed to iŶ the DPA (sch.2, s.1).  This is reinforced by the 
privacy policies which are analysed in Chapter 8.  This not only applies (in many cases) to 
personal data on an individual profile, but also to information about the individual posted by 
other users of the service.  This could include photographs of individuals automatically 
tagged by the system or tagged directly by individuals. 
“Đhedule ϯ of the DPA ƌeƋuiƌes that ͞explicit consent͟ is giǀeŶ to the pƌoĐessiŶg of seŶsitiǀe 
personal data, which may be implied when the user signs up to the service.  However given 
the length and complexity of many terms of service and privacy policies, it is unlikely that 
many individuals would have read the conditions in detail, so would not be able to provide 
explicit (or informed) consent.  The DPD (para.33) also refers to this: 
͞Wheƌeas data ǁhiĐh aƌe Đapaďle ďǇ theiƌ Ŷatuƌe of iŶfƌiŶgiŶg fuŶdaŵeŶtal 
freedoms or privacy should not be processed unless the data subject gives his 
eǆpliĐit ĐoŶseŶt͟ 
 111 
The DPA (sch.2, s.6) makes provision foƌ the ͞legitimate interests pursued by the data 
controller͟ pƌoǀided it does Ŷot pƌejudiĐe the ƌights aŶd fƌeedoŵs of the data suďjeĐt.  As 
mentioned earlier, the HuŵaŶ ‘ights AĐt asseƌts ͞Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.͟  The ƋuestioŶ theŶ ďeĐoŵes: Is this 
right to a private life contravened by having his or her personal data passed on to third parties 
such as advertisers by SNS providers? 
The DPR also introduces the concept of explicit consent which requires that individuals are 
aware of when they are giving consent for their personal data to be processed.  It states that 
͞“ileŶĐe oƌ iŶaĐtiǀitǇ should theƌefoƌe Ŷot ĐoŶstitute ĐoŶseŶt͟. (para 25).  Article 7 clearly lays 
out the conditions for consent which stipulates that the burden of proof of consent lies with 
the data controller, which could be interpreted as being the SNS provider.  Data subjects also 
have the right to withdraw their consent at any time. 
PR IN CI PL E 2  –  EX TE NS I ON O F PU R PO S E  
2 Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and 
lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner 
incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. 
If data is gathered for the purposes of providing a social networking service to users of the 
service, it could be argued that selling on that data for financial gain to advertisers is in 
contravention of the second principle.  The next question has to be whether the data that is 
͚sold oŶ͛ to adǀeƌtiseƌs ĐoŶtaiŶs any personal data where a living person can be identified from 
the personal data or from that and other data in the possession of the data controller.   
The DPA (s.10) Đoǀeƌs the ͞Right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress͟ aŶd 
could cover, for example, malicious social network entries, hounding by advertisers and 
spammers and stalking.  Section 11 goes on to state the useƌ͛s right to prevent processing for 
purposes of direct marketing, although the onus is on the user to fiƌst pƌoǀide ͞notice in 
writing to a data controller͟ ďefoƌe the Đouƌts ǁill iŶteƌǀeŶe. 
The data portability theme in the Article 29 Working Party statement raises some of the same 
issues that ǁeƌe disĐussed iŶ the ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ proposal in the EU ePrivacy Directive 
2009.  Transfer of personal data from one service to another implies that it is removed from 
the source after it has been copied to the destination.  For the reasons described above, 
there is no absolute guarantee that the data can ever be totally removed from the source.  If 
the personal data has ever been transmitted via a satellite communications relay, signal 
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leakage means that extra-terrestrial measures (and faster than light travel) would be required 
to eliminate all copies of that personal data.  In other words it is impossible to guarantee the 
elimination of all data once it has been stored or transmitted (Vsauce 2013). 
Opinion 2/2010 of the European Commission on online behavioural advertising focuses 
specifically on the issue of cookies or other tracking devices placed in browsers to follow the 
behaviour of users online (Justice 2010).  The Opinion highlights the issue of informed 
ĐoŶseŶt aŶd ƌeĐoŵŵeŶds aŶ ͚opt-iŶ͛ pƌiŶĐiple should ďe iŵpleŵeŶted.  It also highlights the 
fact that ad network providers and website publishers effectively become data controllers and 
haǀe soŵe data pƌoteĐtioŶ ƌespoŶsiďilities.  It is of the ǀieǁ that ͞creation of very detailed 
user profiles [...] in most cases, will be deemed personal data͟.  It states that: 
͞Ad network providers should: i) limit in time the scope of the consent: ii) offer the 
possibility to revoke it easily and iii), create visible tools to be displayed where the 
monitoring takes place.͟ 
This reinforces the ͞right to refuse͟ ŵeŶtioŶed iŶ TestiŵoŶial 66 of the ePrivacy Directive 2009 
when discussing cookies. 
PR IN CI PL E 3  –  ADE QUA TE AND RE LEV A NT DAT A  
3 Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
Principle 3 is problematical because personal data is not clearly defined in the context of SNS 
providers.  Data put up on personal profiles in many social networks falls within the definition 
of sensitive personal data DPA (s.2) including: 
 Racial origin  Political opinions  Religious beliefs  Physical or mental health  Sexuality 
However a lot of the information put up is of a fanciful nature – and may not be accurate or 
necessarily true.  In these cases one might legitimately question whether it qualifies as 
personal data.  For example the Section 32 exemption for literary work might apply.  If this 
is the case, copyright law may also apply.  It also iŶtƌoduĐes the ƋuestioŶ: ͚Is the data subject 
under an obligation to provide accurate or truthful data in these services?͛  “oŵe of the 
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terms of service require accurate personal data, although there is often no easy way of policing 
this. 
Data minimisation is incorporated into the six principles in Article 5 of the General Data 
Protection Regulation 2012, which states: 
Personal data must be: adequate, relevant and limited to the minimum 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed 
PR IN CI PL E 4  –  ACCUR A TE AND UP-TO-DA TE DATA  
4 Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
Section 14 of the DPA oŶ ͞Rectification, blocking, erasure and destruction͟ pƌeseŶts diffiĐulties 
iŶ that a Đouƌt ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe aďle to ͞order the data controller to rectify, block, erase or destroy 
those data and any other personal data ... which appears...to be based on the inaccurate 
data.͟  For instance, if the data has been entered by the data subject and is (at least partly) 
based on fantasy, it would be difficult to apply this provision. 
PR IN CI PL E 5  –  RET ENT ION  
5 Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept 
for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
Although it is clear that personal data should not be kept longer than necessary, some SNSs 
make provision in their privacy policies for ongoing preservation of personal data for a variety 
of reasons including operational, backup and legal compliance purposes.  These are discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 8. 
The fifth principle in the proposed DPR (art.5) states that data must be kept ͞foƌ Ŷo loŶgeƌ thaŶ 
is ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ the puƌposes foƌ ǁhiĐh the peƌsoŶal data aƌe pƌoĐessed͟, although it does 
make provision for data ͞pƌoĐessed solelǇ foƌ histoƌiĐal, statistiĐal oƌ sĐieŶtifiĐ ƌeseaƌĐh 
puƌposes͟.  This implies that if an individual no longer wishes personal data to be kept on the 
social network, they can have it removed.  
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PR IN CI PL E 6  –  R I GHT S OF DAT A SUBJ ECT S  
6 Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data 
subjects under this Act. 
Principle 6 of the DPA reinforces the idea that the rights of users should be taken into account 
in the processing of personal data.  This is also addressed in Article 1 of the proposed 
Regulation: 
This Regulation protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, and in particular their right to the protection of personal data. 
PR IN CI PL E 7  –  UNAUT H OR I SE D ACC E S S  
7 Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken 
against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against 
accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
Recent European directives on electronic communications have modified the scope of the DPA 
to regulate electronic monitoring and advertising.  The ePrivacy Directive 2009 makes specific 
provision for regulating use of cookies and offering users the right to refuse them and a 
user-fƌieŶdlǇ ŵaŶŶeƌ ;‘eĐital ϲϲͿ.  The diƌeĐtiǀe also ƌefeƌs to ͞unsolicited commercial 
communications (spam)͟ to alloǁ iŶteƌŶet seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀideƌs to iŶitiate legal pƌoĐeediŶgs 
against spammers.  This has a direct impact on the majority of SNS providers. 
The DPR covers enforcement comprehensively in Chapter VIII – Remedies, Liability and 
Sanctions. 
PR IN CI PL E 8  –  TR A N SF ER  O F DATA BEY OND T HE EEA 
8 Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside 
the European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an 
adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in 
relation to the processing of personal data. 
There is a clear correlation between the OECD principles and those incorporated into the DPA 
and carried forward in the proposed Regulation.  However the DPA goes further in 
developing the concept of trans-border data flow and retention of personal data which are 
covered in Principle 8. 
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Principle 8 is iŶteŶded to pƌeǀeŶt tƌaŶsfeƌ of peƌsoŶal data outside the EEA uŶless theƌe is ͞an 
adequate level of protection ... of personal data͟.  Hoǁeǀeƌ if the soĐial Ŷetǁoƌk pƌoǀideƌ is 
based outside the EU, the question of transfer of personal data may be difficult to enforce. 
Section 5 deals with application of the DPA and states that: 
͞...this AĐt applies to a data ĐoŶtƌolleƌ iŶ ƌespeĐt of aŶǇ data oŶlǇ if – 
The data controller is established in the United Kingdom and the data are 
processed in the context of that establishment, or 
the data controller is established neither in the United Kingdom nor in any 
other EEA State but uses equipment in the United Kingdom for processing the 
data ...͟  
As many social network providers are not based in the UK and deliver their services via the 
internet, some take the view that the Act does not apply to their services.  In other words if 
the Data Controller is not in the UK or an EEA country, the Act does not apply to them.  
However paragraph 3 (d) states that the Act applies to: 
͞aŶǇ peƌsoŶ ǁho [...] maintains in the United Kingdom – 
An office, branch or agency through which he carries on any activity, or a 
ƌegulaƌ pƌaĐtiĐe͟ 
This ƌaises the ƋuestioŶ of ǁhat ĐoŶstitutes ͞an office, branch or agency͟ oƌ a ͞regular 
practice͟ aŶd whether provision of an internet service available within the UK falls within this 
definition.  
Some of the major SNS providers such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Google are based in the 
United States, although many also have offices in the European Union.  US operators are 
covered by the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework, which allows transfer of personal data to 
US-based organisations.  However its scope and mode of operation is significantly different 
from the workings of the DPD.  In particular there is a concern about its self-regulatory 
nature, the lack of active enforcement of its provisions, and the lack of any compulsion for 
independent certification of compliance.  The TRUSTe service is one of the main independent 
certifying bodies.   
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The principle of transfer of data to countries or territories outside the European Union is 
covered by the DRP in ͚Chapter V – Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries or 
International Organisations͛.  Article 3 clearly states that the Regulation applies to the 
personal data of EU residents where services are offered in the Union or their behaviour is 
monitored.  Chapter V deals with issues of territoriality, including a requirement that the 
third country or international organisation provides an adequate level of protection of 
personal data.  A list of complying countries will be published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union when the Regulation comes into effect. 
IS S UES  ARI SIN G FRO M THE GEN ER AL  DAT A PR OTECTIO N REG U LATION  
THE R I G HT TO BE FOR GO TT EN  
There is the wider issue of policing access to personal data and the fact that it is impossible to 
truly delete anything from the internet.  Once information is in the public domain on the 
internet or anywhere else, it would seem an insurmountable problem to identify every 
instance of that data and to require its deletion.  In addition there are back-ups to websites – 
required for operational purposes to which it would be impractical to retroactively apply a 
deletion and digital archiving projects where the internet or parts of the internet are being 
archived for study and as a primary resource for future researchers. 
The Opinion from the European Commission (2010) suggests that personal data is viewed in 
some respects like a physical entity that has a specific location and can consequently be 
transferred or destroyed (erased).   This belies the enduring nature of data on the internet 
and the nature of knowledge – that once discovered, it is impossible to deliberately 
͚uŶdisĐoǀeƌ͛ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ.  This ǁould ŵeaŶ that aŶǇ legislatioŶ ƌeƋuiƌiŶg data ĐoŶtƌolleƌs to 
eŶaĐt the ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ ǁill ďe iŵpossiďle, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of soĐial 
networks and other environments where personal data may be widely distributed. 
The ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ ŵaǇ ǁoƌk ďetteƌ iŶ a ĐoŶtƌolled eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt suĐh as ǁithiŶ a 
company dealing with employee or customer information.  Even then, with most data being 
held electronically, it would be very difficult to ensure that all copies, back-ups and versions of 
personal data had been removed.  The service providers will almost certainly have their own 
back-up and archiving procedures in place, so that even if data is removed at a useƌ͛s ƌeƋuest it 
will still persist (although it may not be available online and would effectively be inaccessible).  
This makes it very difficult to guarantee imposition of the teƌŵs of the ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛. 
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The ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ is eŶshƌiŶed in the DPR.  This has become a major point of 
discussion following the European Court of Justice Ruling in May 2014 upholding the Spanish 
Couƌt͛s ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt that Google “paiŶ ƌeŵoǀe liŶks to a Ŷeǁspapeƌ aƌtiĐle aďout a Ŷaŵed 
individual who objected to being associated with out of date information about him (Haynes 
2014a; Court of Justice of the European Union 2014).  Para 53 states ͞AŶǇ peƌson should have 
the right to have personal data ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg theŵ ƌeĐtified aŶd a ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛͟.  It 
does however make a number of exceptions such as retention for ͞histoƌiĐal, statistiĐal aŶd 
sĐieŶtifiĐ ƌeseaƌĐh puƌposes͟.  Article 17 of the DPR specifically states:  
The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the 
erasure of personal data relating to them and to the abstention from 
further dissemination of such data 
The ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ oŶlǇ applies to liǀiŶg iŶdiǀiduals and this can lead to problems 
getting the profiles of deceased users removed from SNSs. 
DATA POR TAB IL IT Y  
One of the most interesting provisions from the perspective of SNSs is the right of data 
portability.  In the introductory text of the DPR (para.55) social networks are specifically 
mentioned as an example of data portability.  This suggests that they are a particular target 
and will be actively monitored for compliance by the authorities when the Regulation comes 
into force.  Article 18 specifies: 
Where the data subject has provided the personal data and the processing 
is based on consent or on a contract, the data subject shall have the right 
to transmit those personal data and any other information provided by the 
data subject and retained by an automated processing system, into 
another one, in an electronic format which is commonly used, without 
hindrance from the controller from whom the personal data are 
withdrawn. 
ENF OR C EM EN T  
The Information Commissioner has powers under the DPA and related statutory instruments 
to enforce the principles of data protection in the UK.  The role of the Information 
CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe (2014) is ͞to uphold information rights in the public interest, promoting 
openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals͟.   
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The Information Commissioner has the power to impose a monetary penalty on a data 
controller if he or she deliberately contravenes the data protection principles.  It could be 
argued that selling personal data from profiles put up by users on SNSs would be such a 
contravention. 
The UK͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ ;MoŶetaƌǇ PeŶaltiesͿ ;Maǆiŵuŵ PeŶaltǇ aŶd NotiĐesͿ ‘egulations (SI 
2010/31) raised the maximum fine that the Information Commissioner could impose to 
£500,000 for breaches of the DPA.  UŶdeƌ the ‘egulatioŶ this ǁill iŶĐƌease to a fiŶe of €ϭ 
million or 2% of the annual worldwide turnover of an enterprise for the most serious 
infractions. 
The ICO has also ďeeŶ aĐtiǀe iŶ taƌgetiŶg seƌious ďƌeaĐhes foƌ puďliĐ saŶĐtioŶ ďǇ ͚ŶaŵiŶg aŶd 
shaŵiŶg͛ offeŶdeƌs through news releases and public notices on its website: 
www.ico.gov.uk/enforcement.  
Under Article 31 of the proposed Regulation, data controllers will be required to notify the 
supervisory authority about a personal data breach.  Article 32 specifies that data subject 
directly affected by a data breach should also be notified.  ͚Chapter VIII – Remedies, Liability 
aŶd “aŶĐtioŶs͛ giǀes data suďjeĐts the ƌight to lodge ĐoŵplaiŶts aŶd the ƌight to a judiĐial 
remedy.  
ADM INI S TR AT IV E BUR D EN  
Although there would no longer be a requirement to keep a data protection register, the 
Regulation is prescriptive in the way in which data controllers in companies and public sector 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs opeƌate.  TheǇ aƌe eǆpeĐted to ƌespoŶd to data suďjeĐt͛s Ŷeed to ďe iŶfoƌŵed.  
Under Article 15 they are required to provide information on ͞the storage periods, and of the 
ƌights to ƌeĐtifiĐatioŶ aŶd to eƌasuƌe aŶd to lodge a ĐoŵplaiŶt͟.  Chapter IV of the regulation 
goes on to set out the responsibilities of the data controller (Articles 22), the processor (Article 
26) and the data protection officer (Article 5, 35-37), which should be appointed by public 
sector bodies and large enterprises.  
Although it could be argued that individual members of an online SNS have a degree of control 
over the purposes of processing their own personal data, it is difficult to argue that they 
determine the ͞conditions or means of the processing͟.  This is a role for the SNS providers.  
This then introduces the next problem of who the provider actually is.  Where a company is 
headquartered outside the EU but provides services to EU residents, there is some 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ uŶdeƌ the ‘egulatioŶ to pƌoteĐt iŶdiǀiduals͛ peƌsoŶal data.  Wheƌe theƌe is a 
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subsidiary in the European Union, they may be treated as controllers of the personal data, 
even if the data is hosted on a seƌǀeƌ ďeǇoŶd the EU͛s phǇsiĐal ďouŶdaƌies. 
Concerns about administrative burdens on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are 
addressed in Article 22 which talks about proportionality of ͞ŵeasuƌes to eŶsuƌe aŶd ďe aďle 
to demonstrate that the processing of personal data is performed in compliance with this 
‘egulatioŶ.͟   
EX EM PT ION S  
Part IV of the DPA makes specific exemptions, two of which were highlighted in a telephone 
interview ǁith aŶ adǀisoƌ fƌoŵ the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe in 2011.  They are: 
SeĐtioŶ ϯϮ ͚JouƌŶalisŵ, liteƌatuƌe aŶd aƌt͛ aŶd “eĐtioŶ ϯϲ ͚DoŵestiĐ puƌposes͛. 
The seĐtioŶ ϯϮ eǆeŵptioŶ ƌelates to ͞processing ...undertaken with a view to the publication by 
any person of any journalistic, literary or artistic material͟.  It goes on to define ͚publish͛ as: 
͞make available to the public or any section of the public.͟  CleaƌlǇ puttiŶg up a peƌsoŶal 
profile on a social network would qualify under this definition, if it becomes visible either to 
the community of subscribers to that service, or to a wider internet audience through search 
engines such as Google.  Some social networks allow users to restrict the visibility of their 
profiles to a group selected by them, which could be argued as falling outside the exemption.   
The seĐoŶd aspeĐt of this is ǁhat ĐoŶstitutes ͞journalistic, literary or artistic material͟.  For 
instance, is it legitimate to use personal details on an SNS profile for an article published in a 
newspaper or magazine?  This may be an issue if the consent of the data subject has not 
been obtained.  It could also be seen as an additional purpose for which the data was not 
initially gathered. 
“eĐtioŶ ϯϲ ƌefeƌs to ͞Personal data processed by an individual only for the purposes of that 
iŶdiǀidual͛s peƌsoŶal, faŵilǇ oƌ household affaiƌs ;iŶĐludiŶg ƌeĐƌeatioŶal puƌposesͿ͟.  Heƌe the 
question is whether the data is solely processed by the individual user of the service (data 
subject), or whether it is also processed by the service provider and therefore whether it is 
exempt from the data protection principles.  Article 3 of the Directive states: 
This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data: […] -by a 
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. 
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Bond (2010) raises the issue of data ownership and, specifically, who the data controller is.  
He suggests that social network service providers as well as individual users of SNSs have 
obligations as data controllers.  He goes on to say:  
The fact that there is a business driver to the use of social media means […] 
that the household exemption does not apply and so the question arises as to 
whether or not the privacy policy notification and other practices of an 
organisation that is using a service such as LinkedIn for business development 
purposes are sufficient. 
“eĐtioŶ ϱϱ of the AĐt Đoǀeƌs ͞unlawful obtaining etc. of personal data͟ aŶd states: 
(1) A person must not knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the data 
controller- 
(a) obtain or disclose personal data or the information contained in personal 
data, or 
(b) procure the disclosure to another person of the information contained in 
personal data. 
However if the data controller is also the social network service provider, he or she is giving 
consent to pass on personal data to advertisers for the purposes of direct marketing. 
Many SNS providers include exceptions to their privacy policies (see Chapter 8) which to some 
extent accord with the proposed Regulation.  Article 21 of the DPR allows for restriction of 
the scope of specified rights and obligations to safeguard security or ͞the pƌeǀeŶtioŶ, 
iŶǀestigatioŶ, deteĐtioŶ aŶd pƌoseĐutioŶ of ĐƌiŵiŶal offeŶĐes͟.  The other exceptions are not 
usually cited in privacy policies.  The other major exemption is the processing for historical, 
statistical and scientific research purposes so long as the processing of the data ͞does Ŷot 
peƌŵit oƌ Ŷot aŶǇ loŶgeƌ peƌŵit the ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of the data suďjeĐt͟.  This is an important 
consideration for online behavioural advertising, where personal data is aggregated for the 
purposes of identifying target groups for advertisements.  As this is a major source of income 
for SNSs, this becomes a crucial issue for the continued viability of the dominant economic 
model for social media. 
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R IS K MANA G E ME NT  
In the introductory section of the DPR the role of risk management in protecting individuals is 
acknowledged by setting out some broad categories of risk and outlining risk management 
framework in very general terms.  Section 2, Chapter IV of the DPR deals with data security 
and specifies that ͞the pƌoĐessor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to eŶsuƌe a leǀel of seĐuƌitǇ appƌopƌiate to the ƌisks…͟.  It identifies specific risks 
that are discussed in Chapter 5 and requires consideration of the consequences and ways of 
mitigating the adverse effects of a personal data breach. 
PR IV A CY B Y DE S I GN AN D US ER  EDU CAT ION A S MEAN S O F RE GU LAT IO N  
Lessig (2006) suggests that legislation alone is insufficient to regulate the internet.  This 
principle also applies to the specific area of protecting personal data on SNSs and is 
acknowledged in Article23 and Article 52 of the DPR.  AƌtiĐle Ϯϯ deals ǁith ͚Data pƌoteĐtioŶ 
ďǇ desigŶ aŶd ďǇ default͛ aŶd ƌeƋuiƌes the data ĐoŶtƌolleƌ to ͞iŵpleŵeŶt appƌopƌiate teĐhŶiĐal 
aŶd oƌgaŶisatioŶ ŵeasuƌe aŶd pƌoĐeduƌes … [to] ensure the protection of the rights of the data 
suďjeĐt.͟  The DPR (art.52, para.2) goes on to say: 
Each supervisory authority shall promote the awareness of the public on 
risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to the processing of personal 
data.  
This means that national regulators such as the Information CommissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe iŶ the UK 
have a responsibility to educate the public about risks and online safety.  As well as 
monitoring compliance and taking action where there are breaches of the Act, the Information 
Commissioner provides advice and guidance.  The ICO also has an educative role offering 
guidelines for young people on protecting their personal data ;IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s 
Office 2009). 
The ICO publishes guidelines for organisations about specific data protection issues as well as 
guidelines targeted at different sectors, such as: business, finance, charities, health, education, 
local authorities, marketing, and MPs and political parties.   
The ĐoŶĐept of ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ͛ has ďeeŶ aƌouŶd foƌ a loŶg tiŵe, aŶd is iŵplied iŶ the DPD 
ǁhiĐh ƌefeƌs to: ͞appropriate technical and organizational measures […] at the time of the 
design of the processing system […] in order to maintain security and thereby to prevent any 
unauthorized processing͟ (para.46).  The ICO has issued guidelines, which do not have force 
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of law, but which are intended to represent good practice for service providers and systems 
developers.  Privacy should be one of the primary considerations when a new information 
system that handles personal data is being developed.  A review funded by the Information 
Commissioner concluded that privacy by design was increasingly being recognised by data 
protection authorities as a way of addressing growing concerns about privacy in information 
systems.  The approach seems to work best ͞When they are part of a system of incentives, 
sanctions and review͟ ;IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe 2008). 
CON CLU SION  
A review of the legislation in the UK as it applies to personal data on SNSs suggests that the 
Data Protection Act 1998 is the single most relevant piece of legislation.  This in turn is based 
oŶ the EU͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ DiƌeĐtiǀe (95/46/EC) and associated legislation.  It is also 
dependent on the Human Rights Act 1998 which requires the right to privacy.  The DPA is the 
UK implementation of the Directive which will be repealed by the General Data Protection 
Regulation 2012 when it comes into force.  The Regulation embodies several new principles 
that are likely to affect SNS operations in the EU: 
 Data minimisation  Data portability  Right to be forgotten 
There is a problem of interpretation of the DPA and whether it applies to social media 
providers.  Objections to application of the Act focus on the exemptions described in Article 
32 ͞puďliĐatioŶ…of aŶǇ jouƌŶalistiĐ, liteƌaƌǇ oƌ aƌtistiĐ ŵateƌial͟ and section 36 which refers to 
data processed ͞oŶlǇ foƌ the puƌposes of that iŶdiǀidual͛s peƌsoŶal, faŵilǇ oƌ household 
affaiƌs͟.  This research argues that the exemptions do not apply to SNSs, because it is not the 
intent of most users to publish their personal data.  Nor is the data being used solely for 
personal purposes, as clearly many social media providers are using the data for advertising 
and other purposes. 
Atteŵpts to defiŶe useƌs as ͚data ĐoŶtƌolleƌs͛ imply that users have complete control over the 
processing of the personal data.   This is not the case, because the SNS providers (who could 
be argued to be the true data controllers) are processing and using personal data in ways not 
envisaged by users.  Although users have access to privacy policies and have to sign up to the 
terms of service, it is difficult to argue that this qualifies as informed consent, as they are rarely 
read through and are often lengthy and difficult to absorb in one go. 
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Another objection to the application of the DPA to social media providers based in the United 
States, is that they are in theory covered by the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework.  This 
self-regulatory scheme is discussed in Chapter 8. 
Future developments in legislation are intended to cover novel uses of personal data such as 
use of internet cookies and sending unsolicited e-mails to individuals. While these cover some 
of the areas of potential misuse of personal data, the provisions as currently drafted are not 
realistic in their expectation that personal data can be deleted or ͚foƌgotteŶ͛. 
This leads to the conclusion that while there are important principles in the DPA, it is 
insufficient as a tool to effectively regulate access to personal data on SNSs.  At the very least 
it would have to be used in conjunction with other regulatory modes.   
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CHAPTER 8  –  SELF-REGULATION:  PRIVACY POLICIES  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
Brown and Marsden (2013, p.12) talk about self-regulation in terms of norms and code: 
͞“elf-regulation is defined broadly as a rule of the formation of norms: it exercises a function 
that shapes or controls the behaviour of actors in that environment, which may include 
softǁaƌe Đode.͟  However the privacy policies published by SNS providers represent a 
self-ƌegulatoƌǇ appƌoaĐh to pƌoteĐtiŶg useƌs͛ iŶterests and can be seen as an expression of 
both the code and the norms that shaped that code.  They are also subject to legislative 
ƌegulatioŶ as ŵaǇ ďe seeŶ ďǇ the ϮϬϭϮ fiŶdiŶgs ďǇ CNIL, the FƌeŶĐh ƌegulatoƌs, oŶ Google͛s 
consolidated privacy policy for all its public services (CNIL 2012; European Privacy Authorities 
2012). 
Boyd and Hargittai (2010) report on concerns about privacy settings on Facebook and suggest 
that contrary to many assumptions, users of Facebook are concerned about the risks 
associated with personal information on SNSs.  This reflects more general concern about 
what personal data is held by SNS providers and the way in which it is being used.  Access to 
personal data on social networks is regulated in a number of ways.  This chapter looks at one 
of these: self-regulation and its expression in the privacy policies of the main SNS providers.  
It goes on to consider the relationship between privacy policies and legislation. 
Jimenez (2009) identified the need for good privacy policies and some way of helping users to 
distinguish between the different levels of privacy protection available on social media, 
although he recognised the need for independent watchdogs to ensure that the self-regulation 
works. 
Even where privacy policies exist, there is no guarantee that users read them.  For instance, a 
suƌǀeǇ of studeŶts at oŶe Đollege iŶ the U“ fouŶd that ϰϳ% of useƌs had Ŷot ƌead FaĐeďook͛s 
privacy policy at all (Stutzman et al. 2011, p.592) and another college-based study found that 
41% had not read the privacy policy (Butler 2011, p.49).  This is in line with another study, 
which found that 45% of users had not read the privacy policies (Levin & Abril 2009).  The 
college study went on to find that reading privacy policies tended to reduce the levels of 
disclosure, but that this was more than offset by personalising privacy settings which increased 
disclosure.  Although the study was limited in extent and generalizability it does provide an 
interesting avenue for further investigation (Stutzman et al. 2011, pp.596–597). 
 125 
This investigation is based on a selection of privacy policies downloaded into NVivo10 in July 
2014, and converted to Word files for content analysis.  This follows an earlier study of 
policies in October 2011.  The content was coded using a combination of text searches and 
manual coding.  Some of the codes were identified directly from the text of the policies and 
others were applied based on the overall questions that this research set out to answer.  This 
provided a basis for collating policy extracts for comparison and analysis.  The review of 
privacy policies set out to answer the following questions: 
 To what extent do privacy policies regulate access to personal data?  What protections do privacy polices offer to UK users of SNSs?  How do privacy polices relate to other forms of regulation?  Is there a way of enforcing privacy policies? 
The privacy policies of the following SNSs were selected on the basis that they were: 
 Online social networking services (SNSs) with personal profiles and an ability to 
connect with other users  Not primarily media- or file-sharing sites that do not require membership (e.g. 
YouTube)  They were available in the English language and used by UK-based members  They were in the top ranked global websites as defined by the Alexa page rankings 
(Alexa 2014) 
The privacy policies of eleven widely-used, global SNSs available to English-speakers were 
reviewed in July 2014.  The rankings were initially identified by Wikipedia (2014) entry which 
referred to the Alexa page rankings.  Table 8 contains updated Alexa rankings from 2014. The 
actual ranking may not be too critical – as long as the major providers have been picked up in 
this way.  The numbers of registered users were mostly taken from the Wikipedia page, 
although where absent, the SNS website was consulted (this is indicated by an asterisk).  The 
method of ranking is more significant when smaller, more specialist social network services are 
involved.  
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TABLE 8  -  SIZES OF SNSS 
Site No. of registered users Alexa ranking 
2014 
Alexa ranking 
2011 
Badoo  219 million* 188 117 
Facebook  1.28 billion 2 2 
Google  1.6 billion 1  
hi5  80 million 1,379  
Instagram  150 million 30  
LinkedIn  255 million 12 13 
Myspace  30 million 1,080 131 
Ning 2 million communities* 622 273 
Snapchat3  70 million MAUs4 16,571  
Twitter  94 million 7 9 
WhatsApp  500 million MAUs* 2,658  
 
PRIVACY  PO LICI ES  
The privacy policies were downloaded in late July 2014.  Two of the eleven policies were 
more than a year old, five were between 6 and 12 months and four were less than 6 months 
old.  This suggests that privacy policies are still being actively updated and that they have not 
stabilised.  In some instances there were links back to previous versions of the privacy policy. 
Changes to privacy policy are a perennial problem and the cause of misunderstandings 
between users and providers (Kuzma 2011; Butler 2011).  There is often a discrepancy 
between the privacy protections that users believe they have and the actual protections stated 
in the privacy policy.  One possible explanation may be the rate at which the privacy policy 
changes, making it difficult for users to keep up (Butler 2011; McKeon 2010; Wilson et al. 
2012). 
Most SNSs made some commitment to notify users of changes to the privacy policy, in some 
cases if the changes resulted in reduced privacy.  The means of notification was not always 
specified and where it was, it was usually limited to a commitment to post the change on the 
privacy policy page.  Some, such as Myspace did undertake to notify users directly: 
                                                          
3
 (Edwards 2014) 
4
 Monthly Active Users 
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…if we make material changes to this Policy that expand our rights to use your 
Personal Information, we will notify you either through a Myspace message, e- 
mail, and/or a prominent notice at the Myspace Website. 
In the majority of cases, continued use after notification implied acceptance of the new privacy 
poliĐies.  Foƌ eǆaŵple, LiŶkedIŶ͛s poliĐǇ saǇs: ͞Using LinkedIn after a notice of changes has 
been communicated to you or published on our Services shall constitute consent to the changed 
terms or practices.͟  Only Facebook offered the opportunity to comment on proposed 
changes: ͞UŶless ǁe ŵake a ĐhaŶge foƌ legal oƌ adŵiŶistƌatiǀe ƌeasoŶs, oƌ to ĐoƌƌeĐt aŶ 
inaccurate statement, we will give you seven (7) days to provide us with comments on the 
ĐhaŶge.͟  
Change of ownership may also affect privacy policies and most SNSs were at pains to 
emphasise they had the right to transfer personal data to the new owners.  For example: 
In the event that Badoo or any of its affiliates undergoes a business transition 
or change of ownership, such as a merger, acquisition by another company, 
re-organisation, or sale of all or a portion of its assets, or in the event of 
insolvency or administration, we may be required to disclose your personal 
information. 
Myspace may disclose User information in the event we file for bankruptcy, or 
in connection with certain types of business transactions that result in 
corporate change. For example, if Myspace is or may be (or substantially all of 
its assets are or may be) acquired by a third party pursuant to an acquisition, 
merger, sale, reorganization, liquidation, or similar business transfer, we may 
disclose and transfer User information to the parties involved in the transaction 
(e.g., in connection with due diligence efforts or as a transferred asset). 
And some give a commitment to maintaining the protections offered by the privacy policy 
under the new ownership: 
If the ownership of our business [Facebook] changes, we may transfer your 
information to the new owner so they can continue to operate the service. But 
they will still have to honor the commitments we have made in this Data Use 
Policy. 
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If Google is involved in a merger, acquisition or asset sale, we will continue to 
ensure the confidentiality of any personal information and give affected users 
notice before personal information is transferred or becomes subject to a 
different privacy policy. 
The scope of the policies sometimes indicated that they were in conjunction with the general 
terms and conditions of use: ͞This PƌiǀaĐǇ PoliĐǇ is iŶĐoƌpoƌated iŶto aŶd is suďjeĐt to the NiŶg 
Teƌŵs of “eƌǀiĐe.͟  Many also stated that usage of the service implied acceptance of the 
terms of the privacy policy:  ͞WheŶ usiŶg aŶǇ of ouƌ “ervices you consent to the collection, 
transfer, manipulation, storage, disclosure and other uses of your information as described in 
this PƌiǀaĐǇ PoliĐǇ.͟ 
SNSs were also keen to show the exclusions: 
Our Privacy Policy does not apply to services offered by other companies or 
individuals, including products or sites that may be displayed to you in search 
results, sites that may include Google services, or other sites linked from our 
services. Our Privacy Policy does not cover the information practices of other 
companies and organizations who advertise our services, and who may use 
cookies, pixel tags and other technologies to serve and offer relevant ads. 
The activities of third parties or IMH affiliates that provide services (including 
advertising services) to Myspace, or that you link to from us, or that may 
collect information about you themselves or that we may share your 
information with, including our affiliates such as Specific Media LLC ("Specific 
Media"), are governed by the respective privacy policies of those third parties 
or IMH affiliates. 
This Privacy Policy does not apply to the practices of companies that WhatsApp 
does not own or control, or to individuals whom WhatsApp does not employ or 
manage, including any of the third parties to which WhatsApp may disclose 
user information as set forth in this Privacy Policy.  
Several services including Google and hi5 included definitions of some of the terms appearing 
in the privacy policies or included links to sites with fuller explanations of terms and concepts. 
 129 
Most provided contact details either as a link or with an e-mail address and often also a postal 
address. 
PERSON AL INFOR MATI ON  
The SNSs collect a variety of personal information and this can include transactional data and 
content associated with an individual profile.  Most of the privacy policies give examples of 
the types of data that they collect, but they are not necessarily exhaustive.  Nevertheless it is 
instructive to see where the similarities lie and to detect any patterns in the types of data 
gathered. Table 9 summarises the main data types identified.  There is some discussion about 
what constitutes personal data – discussed earlier, with some SNSs indicating that aggregated 
data and some transactions data does not (in their view) count as personal data.  Not all the 
information requested at registration (e.g. Google request for a photo, LinkedIn request for 
gender information) was mandatory. 
TABLE 9  -  MINIMUM REGISTRATION DATA GATHERED  
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Name            
E-mail            
Gender            
DoB/Birthday            
Location (GPS)            
Address            
Financial (payment card)            
IP Address            
Mobile/Telephone Number            
Photo            
Username            
Password            
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A lot of tracking and logging information is also recorded for a variety of purposes.  Table 10 
shows the types of information routinely gathered by SNSs.  Online behavioural advertising is 
ŵost ĐloselǇ assoĐiated ǁith the tƌaĐkiŶg data ǁheƌeas the loggiŶg data ;͞L͟ iŶ the taďleͿ is 
often used as part of service provision.  (Key T = Tracking and cookies, D = Device 
information, L = Logging/Transactional data) 
TABLE 10  -  TRACKING DATA GATHERED BY SNSS 
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DEVICE          
IP Address or Device ID T D/T D/L  D D D L L 
Computer  D D   D D   
Mobile Phone  D D      L 
Operating System  D/T D   D D  L 
Cookies  T L L/T  T T L L 
ACTIVITIES          
Messaging and Communications T L L L     L 
Add-ons     T     
Friends' Details T L  L      
Networking Groups         L 
Search / Online activity  L L T  L L  L 
Page Visits  D/T  T T   L L 
PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS          
User ID and Social log-in  T  L  L    
 
ANON Y MIS ED DAT A  
Many SNSs make the distinction between personal data and that which has been anonymised 
in some way (for instance by aggregating it and stripping out personal identifiers).  This 
particularly is applied to tracking information and device identifiers that some providers 
consider distinct from personal data.  The ICO provides extensive treatment of the risks of 
re-identification (de-anonymisation) from aggregated or otherwise anonymised personal data 
;IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ϮϬϭϮͿ. 
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Aggregated data consists of system and behavioural data gathered by the SNS providers, such 
as IP address, browser used, sites visited, options selected, as well as general categories 
(sometimes self-defined) and characteristics selected by advertisers such as: age, gender, 
occupation, location, and interests.  Privacy policies describe anonymised or aggregated data 
in terms of what is done with it: 
Badoo discloses aggregated non-personal data for marketing and promotional 
purposes. That means we do not disclose any information that could be used to 
identify you.  
We [Google] may share aggregated, non-personally identifiable information 
publicly and with our partners – like publishers, advertisers or connected sites.  
We may also produce reports for advertisers that aggregate, in an anonymous 
manner, information about your and other Site users͛ aĐtiǀitǇ oŶ hiϱ.  
LinkedIn may provide reports containing aggregated impression information to 
companies hosting LinkedIn plugins and similar technologies to help them 
measure LinkedIn-generated traffic to their websites. 
Please note that this Policy does not limit Myspace's use or sharing of aggregated, 
de-identified or other anonymized information that does not constitute Personal 
Information 
We [Snapchat] may also share aggregated or de-identified information, which 
cannot reasonably be used to identify you.  
Some privacy policies did define anonymised data in the following terms: 
We [Instagram] may remove parts of data that can identify you and share 
anonymized data with other parties. We may also combine your information 
with other information in a way that it is no longer associated with you and 
share that aggregated information. 
The term "Demographic Information" refers to information about groups or 
particular types of individuals that access the Myspace Services. Demographic 
Information does not directly identify you as a specific individual, and would 
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include information such as your age, gender, marital status, income level, and 
zip code. 
The information that we collect with these automated methods may include, 
for example, your IP address, Ning cookie information, a unique device or user 
ID, browser type, system type, the content and pages that you access on the 
NiŶg Platfoƌŵ, aŶd the ͞ƌefeƌƌiŶg U‘L͟ ;i.e., the page fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh Ǉou 
navigated to the Ning Platform) 
We may share or disclose your non-private, aggregated or otherwise 
non-personal information, such as your public user profile information, public 
Tweets, the people you follow or that follow you, or the number of users who 
clicked on a particular link (even if only one did). 
…ŶoŶ-personally-identifiable information (such as anonymous user usage data, 
cookies, IP addresses, browser type, clickstream data, etc.) [WhatsApp] 
TR ACKIN G  TECHNO LOG IES  
Tracking technology was mentioned in all of the privacy policies.  Increased awareness of this 
as an issue may be due in part to the ePrivacy Directive 2009, which was implemented in 2012.  
Table 11 shows which tracking technologies are mentioned in the privacy policies.  However 
the fact that a technology was not mentioned does not mean that the technology is not used. 
TABLE 11  -  TRACKING TECHNOLOGIES USED  
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Cookies            
Persistent Cookies            
Flash Cookies            
Web Beacons            
Log File            
Device identifiers            
Third Party Cookies            
Blocking Cookies mentioned            
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Although cookies were mentioned in all the privacy policies, the level of detail provided varied 
enormously.  They were variously described as session cookies, authentication cookies, ID 
cookies, web cookies and browser cookies.  They are used to authenticate users, ensure 
session continuity in case of interruption, and enable some of the interactive features of the 
site.  These session cookies do not persist beyond the end of the session. 
Persistent cookies were acknowledged in seven of the policies reviewed.  These are also 
kŶoǁŶ as ͚tƌaĐkiŶg Đookies͛ oƌ ͚loĐal stoƌage deǀiĐes͛.  These Đookies ƌeŵaiŶ oŶ the useƌ͛s 
browser and enable preferences to be remembered between sessions.  They may also be 
plaĐed oŶ a useƌ͛s ďƌoǁseƌ ďǇ a thiƌd paƌtǇ ;suĐh as aŶ adǀeƌtisiŶg paƌtŶeƌͿ iŶ oƌdeƌ to keep 
track of web pages a user is visiting.  Flash cookies were a particular type of persistent cookie 
that can re-estaďlish itself oŶ a useƌ͛s ďƌoǁseƌ afteƌ it has ďeeŶ deleted.  TheǇ haǀe ďeĐoŵe 
less popular as they have been perceived as being a nuisance by many users.  Only the 
Myspace privacy policy mentioned them. 
Web beacons, variously known as pixel tags, tracking pixels and clear gifs, were mentioned in 
five privacy policies.  They consist of a small (invisible) image file that can be used for tracking 
e-mail responses. 
Log files and clickstream may be used by SNS providers or third parties for advertising as well 
as analysis of site usage.  Five of the eleven privacy policies included statements about this 
type of tracking technology.  Six policies (including three of the above) mentioned device 
identifiers such as IP addresses or Unique Application Numbers. 
All the privacy policies except WhatsApp acknowledged the use of tracking information by 
third parties.  In most cases they warned that the use of data gathered by third parties was 
beyond the control of the SNS service and that users were advised to consult the privacy 
policies of the third parties.  The third parties might be companies within the same group as 
the SNS provider, advertisement networks, or advertisers themselves. 
All but two (Instagram and Ning) mentioned that cookies could be blocked or disabled.  Many 
were keen to point out that by doing so users may be depriving themselves of the full 
functionality of the SNS or access to all its features. 
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CONT ESTS ,  SURV EYS  AND PO LLS  
Contests, surveys and polls are also used as ways of enticing users to share more personal 
information.   
Surveys may ask for your contact, demographic or unique identifying 
information to increase the value of the results. Contests may require your 
contact information or other demographic or personal information to 
determine eligibility. [hi5] 
Polls and Surveys may be conducted by LinkedIn, Members, or third parties. 
Some third parties may target advertisements to you on the results page based 
on your answers in the poll. 
We may offer sweepstakes, contests, and other promotions (collectively, 
"Promotions") through the Myspace Services that may require registration. […] 
If you choose to enter a Promotion, Personal Information may be disclosed to 
third parties or the public in connection with the administration of such 
Promotion… 
THI R D PARTI ES  
Third parties play an important role in the delivery of SNSs to users and include advertising 
networks that provide the majority of income for many SNS providers.  This is openly 
acknowledged and bodies such as the Internet Advertising Bureau, UK (IABUK) provide 
consumer-oriented information that enables users to make more informed choices relating to 
tracking technology. 
SHAR IN G PER SON AL DA TA  
Most policies acknowledged that SNS providers share data with third parties, although most 
also pointed out that this data was usually aggregated to prevent identification of individual 
users: 
We [Facebook] only provide data to our advertising partners or customers 
after we have removed your name and any other personally identifying 
information from it, or have combined it with other people's data in a way that 
it no longer personally identifies you. 
We [Google] may share aggregated, non-personally identifiable information 
publicly and with our partners – like publishers, advertisers or connected sites. 
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From time to time, we [hi5] may share your email address [and/or other 
personal information] with third parties for marketing purposes. 
We [LinkedIn] do not share personally identifiable information with any 
third-party advertiser or ad network 
Third parties – including linked services (e.g., Twitter), advertisers, and 
advertising service providers may also collect certain information about you in 
connection with your use of the Myspace Services (e.g., Usage Information).  
…we [Myspace] may share your Personal Information, Demographic 
Information, Usage Information, Device Identifiers, and any other information 
that we receive or collect with third parties (including IMH affiliates and our 
third-party advertising partners) in order to enable customization of the 
advertising… 
Network Creators and Third Party Application Developers might use the Ning 
Platform to collect, use, and retain all information, including Personal 
Information and Network Data, that is disclosed and uploaded by Members in 
connection with their use of Networks 
We may share or disclose your information at your direction, such as when you 
authorize a third-party web client or application to access your Twitter 
account. 
Badoo does Ŷot sell peƌsoŶal data to thiƌd paƌties.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͞Badoo discloses aggregated 
non-personal data for marketing and promotional purposes͟. 
Some such as Google and LinkedIn indicate the circumstances under which they provide 
personal data to third parties.  For example: 
We protect your personal information and will only provide it to third parties: 
(1) with your consent; (2) where it is necessary to carry out your instructions; 
(3) as reasonably necessary in order to provide our features and functionality 
to you; (4) when we reasonably believe it is required by law, subpoena or other 
legal process; or (5) as necessary to enforce our User Agreement or protect the 
rights, property, or safety of LinkedIn, its Members and Visitors, and the public.  
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Several other privacy policies also refer to the right to make personal data available to law 
enforcement agencies or as part of legal obligations or court proceedings.  Although not 
specified in any of the policies viewed, this could include a requirement to make personal data 
available to security services and agencies in the United States under the Homeland Security 
Act 2002.  This issue has been discussed extensively by the Electronic Frontier Foundation on 
its website (www.eff.org). 
PR OC E S SOR S OR  SER V IC E PR OV ID ER S  
Most of the privacy policies also allowed for sharing of data for processing on their behalf by 
external agencies: 
We [Google] provide personal information to our affiliates or other trusted 
businesses or persons to process it for us, based on our instructions and in 
compliance with our Privacy Policy. 
We [Instagram] also may share your information as well as information from 
tools like cookies, log files, and device identifiers and location data, with 
third-party organizations that help us provide the Service to you ("Service 
Providers"). 
We may employ third party companies and individuals to facilitate our Services 
(e.g. maintenance, analysis, audit, marketing and development). These third 
parties have limited access to your information only to perform these tasks on 
our behalf and are obligated to LinkedIn not to disclose or use it for other 
purposes. 
We [Myspace] may make your information available to our agents and service 
providers so that they can provide requested services on our behalf. 
We may provide Personal Information to third parties for their use in 
performing internal business functions both for the Ning Platform and Web site 
(e.g., payment processing, maintenance, security, data analysis, email 
transmission, or data hosting) on our behalf. 
We [Snapchat] may share information about you as follows or as otherwise 
described in this Privacy Policy: […] With vendors, consultants and other service 
providers who need access to such information to carry out work on our behalf. 
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We [Twitter] engage service providers to perform functions and provide 
services to us in the United States and abroad. We may share your private 
personal information with such service providers subject to confidentiality 
obligations consistent with this Privacy Policy. 
We may share your Personally Identifiable Information with third party service 
providers to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to perform, improve or 
maintain the WhatsApp Service. 
AFF I LIA TE S  
SNSs also share information with companies within the same group or which have common 
ownership: 
We may share information we receive with businesses that are legally part of 
the same group of companies that Facebook is part of, or that become part of 
that group (often these companies are called affiliates). 
We may share User Content and your information (including but not limited to, 
information from cookies, log files, device identifiers, location data, and usage 
data) with businesses that are legally part of the same group of companies 
that Instagram is part of, or that become part of that group ("Affiliates"). 
We may share your personal information with our LinkedIn affiliates (meaning 
entities controlled by, controlling or under common control with LinkedIn) 
outside of the LinkedIn entity that is your data controller (for example, LinkedIn 
Corporation may share your information with LinkedIn Ireland, or other 
LinkedIn operating entities) as necessary to provide the Services. 
We [Ning] may share some or all of your Personal Information with our parent 
company or any subsidiaries, joint venture partners, or other companies that 
ǁe ĐoŶtƌol oƌ that aƌe uŶdeƌ ĐoŵŵoŶ ĐoŶtƌol ǁith us ;ĐolleĐtiǀelǇ, ͞affiliates͟Ϳ, 
in which case we will seek to require those affiliates to honor this Privacy 
Policy. 
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PAR TN ER  WEB S ITE S  
Badoo liŶks useƌs͛ pƌofiles ǁith those oŶ paƌtŶeƌ ǁeďsites, although it is possible to opt out of 
this type of linking. 
If you have registered on one of our partner websites, such as Facebook, your 
Profile will be available to all users of the Badoo social network whether via our 
site oƌ ouƌ paƌtŶeƌs͛ ǁeďsites.  
Instagram and hi5 have similar provisions: 
We [hi5] may also share your clickstream information and information 
collected from cookies, pixel tags and local storage with our vendors and 
partners for the purposes of enhancing your user experience. 
A device identifier may deliver information to us [Instagram] or to a third party 
partner about how you browse and use the Service and may help us or others 
provide reports or personalized content and ads. 
The third party linked service is covered in the Myspace privacy policy, and use of the service 
authorises access to a very wide range of personal data: 
When you choose to use a Third-Party Linked Service, you are authorizing the 
Myspace Services to share information generated by or available on the 
Myspace Services, including Personal Information, with Third-Party Linked 
Services, including, but not limited to: Full Name, Username, Profile URL, About 
Me, Profile Photo, Profile Cover, Unique Myspace Identifier (e.g., Myspace IDs), 
Stated Location, Gender, Age, Biographical or Demographic Information (e.g., 
professional title, college attended, etc.), Interests, Connections, Any 
Information that Is Publicly Available on the Myspace Services, Device location 
(including using GPS and longitude and latitude location information) 
US E O F CON TE NT  
Personal data or content from personal profiles may be used by the SNS: 
We may use material that you post on the open access areas of Badoo in 
advertising and promotional materials on our partner sites and partner 
products.  
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…when you post content to a LinkedIn Group that is open for public discussion, 
your content, including your name as the contributor, may be displayed in 
search engine results. 
INF OR MAT ION FR O M T HIR D PAR T IE S  
Some policies also mentioned that personal data may be obtained from third parties: 
Sometimes we get data from our affiliates or our advertising partners, 
customers and other third parties that helps us (or them) deliver ads, 
understand online activity, and generally make Facebook better. 
… when you visit a third-party site that embeds LinkedIn professional plugins 
;suĐh as ͞“haƌe oŶ LiŶkedIŶ͟ foƌ puďlisheƌsͿ ǁe ƌeĐeiǀe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that those 
pages have loaded in your web browser.  
Myspace may also receive or collect certain information about you from 
third-party websites, platforms, or services in the event you choose to take 
advantage of various features that may allow you to integrate information on 
or to the Myspace Services. 
We may also obtain information, including Personal Information, from third 
party sources. This includes certain Personal Information that may be provided 
to us through the installation and use of Ning Applications on third party web 
sites. 
If you connect your Twitter account to your account on another service in order 
to cross-post between Twitter and that service, the other service may send us 
your registration or profile information on that service and other information 
that you authorize. 
Facebook and Ning mention social plug-ins and other systems for sharing personal data with 
thiƌd paƌties.  Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe FaĐeďook͛s IŶstaŶt PeƌsoŶalizatioŶ is used to alloǁ paƌtŶeƌ 
services to tailor services based on your Facebook profile and activity: 
Instant personalization (sometimes also referred to as "Start now") is a way for 
Facebook to help partners (such as Bing and Rotten Tomatoes) on and off 
Facebook to create a more personalized and social experience for logged in 
users than a social plugin can offer. […] When you visit a site or app using 
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instant personalization, we provide the site or app with your User ID and your 
friend list (as well as your age range, locale, and gender). 
As part of the sign-up process [Social Sign-in], the third party service will 
transmit certain information used to Đoŵplete the Ŷeǁ Meŵďeƌ͛s pƌofile page, 
including name, email address and, where available, profile photo, birthdate, 
gender and location. [Ning] 
PERSI ST EN CE  
Some privacy policies are clear about the length of time that personal data is kept for and the 
reasons for doing so.  When someone wishes to leave a social network and have their profiles 
removed from public view, there is usually a commitment to remove the data within a set 
period: 
If you want to stop using your account it will be initially deactivated. […] After 
the expiration of 30 days, your account is permanently deleted from Badoo. We 
delete photographs from our servers within 14 days from the expiration of the 
deactivation period while other information (such as contact history) is deleted 
by us over a longer timescale. 
When you delete your account, it is permanently deleted from Facebook. It 
typically takes about one month to delete an account, but some information 
may remain in backup copies and logs for up to 90 days. 
After 30 days, we [Twitter] begin the process of deleting your account from our 
systems, which can take up to a week. 
If you close your account(s), your information will generally be removed from 
the Service [LinkedIn] within 24 hours. 
Instagram is less specific and simply refers to ͚a ƌeasoŶaďle tiŵe͛: 
Following termination or deactivation of your account, Instagram, its Affiliates, 
or its Service Providers may retain information (including your profile 
information) and User Content for a commercially reasonable time for backup, 
archival, and/or audit purposes … 
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Two services, hi5 and Tagged (part of the same commercial group), declare that they reserve 
the right to keep data indefinitely. 
The privacy policies also provide caveats about the operational requirements for keeping 
back-ups and the fact that they have no control over data which has been transferred or 
downloaded: 
Warning: Even after you remove information from your profile or delete your 
account, copies of that information may still be viewable and/or accessed on 
the Internet to the extent such information has been previously shared with 
others, or copied or stored by other users or to the extent such information has 
been shared with search engines… [Badoo] 
“oŵe of the thiŶgs Ǉou do oŶ FaĐeďook aƌeŶ͛t stoƌed iŶ Ǉouƌ aĐĐouŶt, like 
posting to a group or sending someone a message (where your friend may still 
have a message you sent, even after you delete your account). That 
information remains after you delete your account. 
When you delete your IP Content or terminate your hi5 account, your IP 
Content is removed from the Site, you understand that we may maintain 
backup copies of the IP Content. 
Even after you cancel your Account or delete information or Profile Content, 
copies of some information from your Account or Profile(s) may remain 
viewable in circumstances where, for example, you have posted information on 
another User's Profile, shared information with a Third-Party Linked Service, or 
if another Visitor or Member copied, stored or shared your information or has a 
copy of the link to content you shared on the Myspace Services. 
Please note: Information you have shared with others (for example, through 
InMail, network updates, content sharing, or LinkedIn Groups) or that others 
have copied may also remain visible after you have closed your account or 
deleted the information from your own profile. 
…even if you update or remove Personal Information that you have provided to 
us [Ning], your Personal Information may be retained in our backup files and 
archives for a reasonable period of time for legal purposes.  
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Snapchat and WhatsApp operate on the principle of ephemeral data: 
Once all recipients have viewed a Snap, we automatically delete the Snap from 
our servers and our Services are programmed to delete the Snap from the 
Snapchat app on the recipients' devices.  
If the ƌeĐipieŶt is Ŷot oŶliŶe, the uŶdeliǀeƌed ŵessage is held iŶ WhatsApp͛s 
server until it can be delivered. If the message is undelivered for thirty (30) 
days, the undelivered message is deleted from our servers. Once a message has 
been delivered, it no longer resides on our servers.  
If someone dies there are provisions for either memorialising profiles or removing them 
altogether.  Direct experience of this with LinkedIn and Facebook found that both SNSs 
required eǀideŶĐe of soŵeoŶe͛s death ;for example, a published obituary or a death 
certificate) and the status of the person making the request (spouse, colleague, friend).  They 
then attempt to contact the deceased person via their registered e-mail before removing the 
profile.  This precaution helps to avoid malicious removal of profiles of living persons. 
We may memorialize the account of a deceased person. When we memorialize 
an account, we keep the timeline on Facebook, but limit access and some 
features.  
SETTI NG S  AND US ER  OPTIONS  
Users have a degree of flexibility over what services or information they share and who can 
have access to it.  This varies from profile and account settings, through to opt-outs (and 
sometimes opt-ins) to specific services.  Table 12 summarises the settings and options that 
are mentioned in the privacy policies.  A selection of these sites is investigated further in the 
technology section.  The researcher signed on to a selection of services in order to gain 
access to the privacy settings of the SNSs. 
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TABLE 12  -  USER-CONTROLLED PRIVACY SETTINGS 
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Privacy settings            
   Change privacy settings            
   Control who sees content            
   Search visibility            
   Control collection of location info            
   Control access to sensitive info            
Control communications from SNS            
Control third party use of personal 
data 
           
Opt out of advertising            
 
The first group of features in Table 12 relate to privacy settings. Only three privacy policies give 
instructions for changing general privacy settings, although most do give information about 
the options available for specific privacy settings.  Controlling who sees content posted by a 
user or as part of their profile is a fundamental aspect of user management of privacy.  
Options include restricting to direct contacts, restricting to other members of the SNS or 
making the contents of a profile publicly discoverable.  There was sometimes a warning that 
public profiles could not be restricted to any specific group.  Facebook and hi5 both 
mentioned an option to prevent content posted by members becoming discoverable by search 
engines.  Snapchat allows users to suppress location information attached to photos. 
Many of the SNSs allow users to control the level and degree to which the provider 
communicates with them (usually via e-mail).  This ranges from suppression of notifications 
of chaŶges of status of ĐoŶtaĐts͛ sites, thƌough to adŵiŶistƌatiǀe aŶd pƌoŵotioŶal e-mails from 
the SNS itself. 
Third-party access to personal data has been the subject of much discussion (Shehab et al. 
2012; Kontaxis et al. 2012; Solove 2011), however only three of the policies surveyed 
specifically mentioned this, possibly because of disagƌeeŵeŶts aďout ǁhat ͚peƌsoŶal data͛ is. 
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Opting out of advertising by changing settings on the SNS site was mentioned in five of the 
policies.  In one instance, the instruction was to use the IAB-run scheme to register individual 
preferences centrally.  This was in addition to specific mentions of cookie suppression via 
browsers. 
The individual policies varied by the degree to which they mentioned user options.  For 
instance, WhatsApp makes no specific mention of user options, whereas Facebook provides 
instructions and detailed examples of how the user options work. 
SAFETY  GUI DAN CE AN D USER  EDU CATION  
The ChildƌeŶ͛s OŶliŶe PƌiǀaĐǇ PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt 1998 (COPPA) in the United States is one of the 
driving forces for age restrictions on SNSs and this may be why 13 was specified as the 
minimum age of users in the privacy policies of: Instagram, Ning, Snapchat and Twitter.  
Myspace allows restricted use of their service between the ages of 13 and 18 with the 
additional protection of under-18s profiles not being browsable.  WhatsApp has a minimum 
age requirement of 16 and Badoo and hi5 have a minimum age of 18.  Badoo enforces this 
policy by retaining the e-mail addresses of those who have contravened its age policy to 
prevent repeated attempts to join the service.  LinkedIn merely mentions that there is a 
minimum age requirement and refers users to their Terms and Conditions. 
Many of the SNSs provide additional guidance to users about safety.  Table 13 summarises 
the main aspects that were covered. 
TABLE 13  -  SAFETY GUIDELINES  
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Mention of additional safety guidance            
Guidance on SNS͛s use of data            
Guidance on technologies used            
Link safety guidance provided by an 
external organisation 
           
SNS safety site reviewed            
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Some of the safety policies have an educative role in that they alert users to the risks 
associated with misuse of personal data and steps that might be taken to ameliorate the risks.  
Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe Badoo ŵakes the ďald stateŵeŶt: ͞When you post information about yourself or 
use the messaging, the amount of personal information you share is at your own risk.͟  It then 
goes on to identify some of the risks: ͞These Đookies do thiŶgs like pƌoteĐt Badoo useƌs fƌoŵ 
spaŵ aŶd fƌaud͟, ͞…Ǉou ŵaǇ Ŷot use otheƌ useƌs' information for commercial purposes, to 
spaŵ, to haƌass, oƌ to ŵake uŶlaǁful thƌeats͟, and ͞We stƌoŶglǇ uƌge Ǉou to peƌiodiĐallǇ 
change your password to help reduce the risk of unauthorised access to your account 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ.͟ 
The majority of SNS privacy policies identify fraud as a risk factor which they take active 
measures to protect against, but which also require the cooperation of users.  The risk 
categories identified in the privacy policies shown in Table 14: 
TABLE 14  -  R ISK CATEGORIES IDENTIFIED IN PRIVACY POLICIES 
Risk SNS privacy policy that mentions the risk 
Fraud and unauthorised access Badoo, Facebook, Google, Instagram, LinkedIn, Myspace, Twitter 
Spam Badoo 
Safety, bodily harm or death Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter 
Harassment, bullying or 
infringement of human rights 
Badoo, Google, LinkedIn, Ning 
Illegal activity Facebook, Instagram 
Privacy violations Facebook 
 
CO MP LIANCE  
Although there has been recognition of the need for external validation of self-regulation and 
bodies such as the FTC monitor this regulation, there is still a problem with compliance.  Well 
documented cases suggest that one problem is the ͞disĐrepancy between the online service 
aŶd theiƌ ǁeďsite pƌiǀaĐǇ poliĐǇ͟ (Sherman 2012).  Some of the SNS privacy policies 
acknowledge European compliance issues and make reference to them in various ways.  
Facebook and LinkedIn refer to their European or International subsidiaries for their non-US 
users: 
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Company Information: The website under www.facebook.com and the services 
on these pages are being offered to users outside of the U.S. and Canada by 
Facebook Ireland Ltd […] and is the data controller responsible for your 
personal information. 
If you live outside the U.S., LinkedIn Ireland controls your information. 
As residents of a European Union member country, UK users are afforded protection under the 
European Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), enacted in the UK as the Data Protection Act 
1998.  The Directive requires minimum levels of protection for personal data of its citizens 
whether held in the EU or abroad.  Potential trading restrictions can be applied to firms that 
do not comply with EU standards for data privacy.  The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework, 
which was set up to protect EU citizens, is referred to in several privacy policies.  The 
registrations are summarised in Table 15. 
Facebook complies with the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor frameworks as 
set forth by the Department of Commerce regarding the collection, use, and 
retention of data from the European Union. 
LinkedIn complies with the U.S.-E.U. and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks as 
set forth by the U.S. Department of Commerce regarding the collection, use, 
and retention of personal data from European Union member countries and 
Switzerland.  
Ning complies with the EU Safe Harbor framework as set forth by the 
Department of Commerce regarding the collection, use, and retention of data 
from the European Union. Ning has certified that it adheres to the Safe Harbor 
Privacy Principles of notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, 
access, and enforcement.  
Twitter complies with the U.S.-E.U. and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles of notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, 
and enforcement.  
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TABLE 15  -  U.S.-EU  SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK  
Company Status Personal data processed 
Facebook, Inc.  Current Online, offline 
Google Inc. and its wholly-owned U.S. 
subsidiaries  
Current 
Off-line, on-line, manually processed, 
human resources data 
hi5 Recognition LLC  Current 
Data from a client's HR system, limited 
in scope as agreed up on by the client 
LinkedIn Corporation  Current 
On-Line and off-line, HR data from the 
Company's EEA subsidiaries 
MySpace, LLC  
Not 
Current 
On-line data 
Ning, Inc. Current Online and offline 
Twitter, Inc.  Current 
Online and offline customer and 
employee data which may be manually 
processed 
 
Facebook and LinkedIn also refer to TRUSTe and suggest this as a way of resolving privacy 
disputes, although Facebook is not a subscriber to the TRUSTe services (see Table 16): 
As part of our [FaĐeďook͛s] participation in the Safe Harbor program, we agree 
to resolve disputes you have with us in connection with our policies and 
practices through TRUSTe. 
We [LinkedIn] partner with TRUSTe because we take your privacy seriously and 
are committed to putting you and all of our Members first. TRUSTe certifies our 
compliance with the TRUSTe program and verifies our compliance with the US- 
EU and US-Swiss Safe Harbor programs. If you can't resolve a complaint 
through LinkedIn Customer Support, you may also contact TRUSTe.  
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Ning refers to its compliance with the TRUSTe privacy seal: 
NiŶg has ďeeŶ aǁaƌded T‘U“Te͛s PƌiǀaĐǇ “eal sigŶifǇiŶg that ouƌ pƌiǀaĐǇ poliĐǇ 
and practices haǀe ďeeŶ ƌeǀieǁed ďǇ T‘U“Te foƌ ĐoŵpliaŶĐe ǁith T‘U“Te͛s 
program requirements and the TRUSTed Cloud Program Requirements 
including transparency, accountability and choice regarding the collection and 
use of your personal information.  
LinkedIn and Ning both specifically mentioned TRUSTe as an independent certification agent.  
The TRUSTe website provides the following information (August 2014): 
TABLE 16  -  SUBSCRIPTIONS TO TRUSTE SERVICES  
SNS Provider TRUSTe Service Used 
LinkedIn Dispute Resolution 
EU Safe Harbor Seal 
Ning EU Safe Harbor Seal 
Trusted Cloud 
 
The EU Safe Harbor Seal operated by TRUSTe verifies compliance with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 
framework and replaces the self-certification provision in the framework.  Dispute resolution 
is another service that directly relates to privacy protection and the provisions of the 
framework.  LinkedIn refers users to this service in its privacy policy. 
Google and Myspace commit, in general terms, to work with the appropriate regulatory 
authorities: 
We [Google] regularly review our compliance with our Privacy Policy. We also 
adhere to several self regulatory frameworks. When we receive formal written 
complaints, we will contact the person who made the complaint to follow up. 
We work with the appropriate regulatory authorities, including local data 
protection authorities, to resolve any complaints regarding the transfer of 
personal data that we cannot resolve with our users directly.  
In certain countries, such as those of the European Union, you may have 
additional rights in respect of the processing of your Personal Information, 
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including the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify such 
information. [Myspace] 
Some make the proviso that users may not have the same privacy protections as are prevalent 
in their own countries: 
If you live in a country with data protection laws, the storage of your personal 
data may not provide you with the same protections as you enjoy in your 
country of residence.  [Badoo] 
Google processes personal information on our servers in many countries 
around the world. We may process your personal information on a server 
located outside the country where you live.  
If you are located in the European Union or other regions with laws governing 
data collection and use that may differ from U.S. law, please note that we 
[Instagram] may transfer information, including personal information, to a 
country and jurisdiction that does not have the same data protection laws as 
your jurisdiction.  
By providing information to Myspace, you do so in the knowledge that the laws 
applicable in your home country may not apply to protect your Personal 
Information or to your use of the Myspace Services.  
The Ning Platform is hosted in the United States. If you use the Ning Platform 
from the European Union, or any other region with laws governing data 
collection and use that may differ from U.S. law, please note that you are 
transferring your personal data to the United States. The United States does 
not have the same data protection laws as the European Union and other 
regions.  
Snapchat is based in the United States and the information we collect is 
governed by U.S. law.  
Irrespective of which country you reside in or supply information from, you 
authorize Twitter to use your information in the United States and any other 
country where Twitter operates.  
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…you are transferring your personal information to the United States and you 
expressly consent to that transfer and consent to be governed by California law 
for these purposes [WhatsApp] 
Although some protections and rights are offered in a piecemeal fashion: 
Users in certain jurisdictions are, in accordance with applicable law, entitled to 
exercise a right of access to personal information about themselves by asking 
for a copy of the information we [Badoo] hold about them (for which, where 
allowed by law, we may charge a small fee). 
D IS CUS SION  
DEGR E E S O F CLO S EN E SS  
One key aspect of privacy that has arisen from this examination of privacy policies is control 
over who has access to personal information.  There may be degrees of privacy, depending 
on the sensitivity of the information and how widely it is circulated.  Some of the privacy 
policies attempt to define different types of audience for personal data or content posted by 
users.   
A user may put information on his or her profile in the expectation that it is only available to 
their network, circle or friends.  Other information may be intended for a more general 
audience, such as in LinkedIn where part of the purpose of joining is to see job and business 
opportunities.  Some information may be made available to advertisers paying for access to 
personal data.  There are different rings of access to personal data depending on its 
sensitivity, and the potential risk associated with providing access to it (Figure 11). 
The further out from the centre, the less sensitive the information.  For example, the inner 
circle might include financial information and personal data such as date of birth for 
verification purposes.  The next level may include sensitive information such as personal 
interests and data required to complete transactions such as purchasing.  This might be 
shared by close personal friends or direct service providers.  A wider group is designated 
contacts, networks (LinkedIn), friends (Facebook) or circles (Google).  A less personal group 
might be other members of group or discussions to which a user belongs.  This identifies 
others with a similar common interest, but a user may not necessarily want members of one 
group to know which other groups he or she belongs to.  For example, belonging to a church 
choir and a work-based football team may not have many synergies.  The outer circle is other 
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members of the SNS service.   Beyond the outer ring, is the general public, including 
non-members of the SNS. 
 
FIGURE 11  -  DEGREES OF PRIVACY  
Sometimes there is an assumption that personal information on profiles is only available to 
other members of the network.   However for the general SNSs reviewed in this paper, this is 
not always the case.  For instance, both Facebook and LinkedIn state that profiles are visible 
to external search engines and are therefore discoverable by non-members of the SNS. 
REG ULA TI ON  
Legislation represents one of the main modes of regulation of access to personal data, along 
with self-regulation as expressed in privacy policies.  Some of the privacy policies refer to the 
legislation that might apply to the gathering, storage and processing of personal data.  In the 
UK the main legislation regulating access to personal data is the Data Protection Act 1998.  In 
an interview with an adǀisoƌ fƌoŵ the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe, it ǁas suggested 
that personal data on SNSs might be exempt under Sections 32 and 36 of the Act, discussed in 
Chapter 7.   
One analysis of the application of the Act to SNSs suggests that the definition of a data 
controller is ambiguous when applied to SNSs. Comparison of legislation in Sweden, Germany, 
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Canada, Australia and the UK provide varying views on this.  Some SNS providers explicitly 
state the scope of the definition of a data controller in relation to their own services (Garrie & 
Wong 2010). 
Woods (2012) describes the tension between freedom of expression and privacy in SNSs.  For 
instance the use of SNS postings by the media may conflict with the intention of users that 
content they post will not be widely distributed.  Wider distribution of user-generated 
content could be seen as a tort of misuse of private information.  It may also be seen as 
infringing on the right to a private life enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.  The Press 
Complaints Commission (PCC 2012) eǆĐludes ͞user-generated and non-edited material͟ fƌoŵ 
the Code͛s ƌeŵit iŶ oŶliŶe puďliĐatioŶs. 
SE LF-RE GU LAT IO N  
Privacy policies are an expression of intent and provide one manifestation of self-regulation.  
However it is difficult to monitor the degree to which SNS providers adhere to their published 
policies.  Several policies mentioned external agencies for monitoring and authenticating 
privacy policies by the Federal Trade Commission or by TRUSTe, the data privacy management 
company.  To some extent policies are monitored by the public, in that if there is a major 
discrepancy between published policy and practice, this is likely to be publicised.  There is 
certainly evidence that if users do not like changes to published policies this has generated 
considerable debate and protest (Helft & Wortham 2010; Kuzma 2011; Rubinstein & Good 
2013).  There is less evidence of protest associated with divergences from published policy 
and it is likely that that would have to be tested in court. 
In the United States a review of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) highlights unfair practices 
by Facebook, Google and Twitter (Hans 2012, p.167).  In its settlement with Facebook, 
finalised in 2012 the report stated that:  
The complaint alleged eight counts, including deceptive privacy settings, unfair 
and deceptive privacy changes, undisclosed dissemination of user information 
ǁith thiƌd paƌtǇ adǀeƌtiseƌs, a deĐeptiǀe ͞Veƌified Apps͟ pƌogƌaŵ, aŶd 
dissemination of user photos and videos. 
The review suggests that there has been a failure of self-regulation (Hans 2012, pp.197–198): 
Years of self-regulation have failed to create an industry standard of privacy by 
design, opt-in sharing provisions, or other principles that would more 
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effectively protect consumers. Web service providers consistently remain in the 
news for breaches involving user data.  The status quo has been plainly 
insufficient in protecting user privacy, just as the current regulatory tools 
available to the FTC have been inadequate to ensure that companies are 
deterred from violating reasonable user privacy expectations. 
US ER  OPT IO NS  
The privacy policies do not document the full range of user options that are available and there 
is scope for development in this area.  For instance, more attention could be spent on 
changing default settings to greater privacy.  This study of policies goes hand-in-hand with 
direct investigation of live sites to document what options are available to users (investigated 
in Chapter 10). 
As ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs haǀe suggested useƌ eduĐatioŶ, oƌ ͚Ŷoƌŵ ĐhaŶge͛ ŵaǇ ďe the ŵost effective 
way of protecting privacy in an online environment (Solove 2010, p.27): 
The most effective solutions encourage norm change, and that occurs not just 
thƌough the laǁ ďut thƌough iŶĐƌeasiŶg people͛s aǁaƌeŶess of the 
consequences of their online speech. 
Privacy policies are a way of setting user expectations and in doing so they alert users to the 
possibilities for managing their own personal data in SNSs.  
CHAN GE S S IN CE T HE LA ST REV I EW  
Although there have been some improvements since the last review of privacy policies 
(Haynes 2012), many policies are still opaque, repetitive and difficult to understand.  One 
encouraging development is the greater emphasis on user education.  The following services 
have separate online sites devoted to user safety: 
Badoo 
Facebook 
Google 
LinkedIn 
Myspace 
Snapchat 
Twitter 
 
Although it is difficult to be sure how effective privacy policies are on their own, they do have 
an important role in raising awareness and of setting the agenda for more general regulation. 
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CHAPTER 9  –  SELF-REGULATION:  DIGITAL ADVERTISING  
WHY I S  THER E A NEED FOR  REG ULATIO N? 
Advertising forms the basis for the economic model used by social media providers.  In return 
for a free service, customers provide personal information that can be used by online social 
networking services (SNSs) to profile their users.  The SNSs sell access to targeted groups of 
customers to brands and advertisers.  The more accurately they can profile a customer 
group, the greater the potential value to advertisers.  Although direct ads are also placed on 
some social network pages, they are not targeted to the same degree as online behavioural 
advertising (OBA).  Even though advertisers do not gather personally identifiable information, 
the act of categorising a user cookie can be seen as invasive.  This touches on a wider 
problem of the blurring boundary between public and private information on SNSs and the 
tendency of services to move from ͚Privacy by Default͛ to ͚Disclosure by Default͛ (Strauß & 
Nentwich 2013). 
The relationship between different agents in the advertising process is complex and 
continually evolving.  Figure 12 represents a simplified schema of the different agents 
involved and provides a basis for understanding the descriptions of advertising transactions 
that follow (IABUK 2012). 
 
FIGURE 12  -  AGENTS INVOLVED IN DELIVERING ONLINE ADS TO USERS 
A publisher of a website may belong to an ad network with a number of other publishers.  
Through the ad network they serve targeted ads to advertisers (or their agents) in return for a 
fee.  The ad exchange provides a mechanism for trading ads in bulk so that advertisers get 
the best price and publishers are able to sell available ad space on their websites.  
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This research sets out to consider the nature of risk associated with personal data on online 
social networking services (SNSs) and focuses specifically on the way in which this area is 
regulated.  Consumers in effect make a contract with the SNS provider when they sign up to 
the service.  In exchange for providing personal data about themselves, users are given 
access to a range of services and features via the social networking site.  The service provider 
may sell on the personal data or access to personal behavioural data to third parties. 
This study has highlighted the role of advertising in the dissemination and use of personal 
data.  This was perceived as contributing to the risks faced by individual users of SNSs 
(Haynes 2014b).  Regulation is one response to these perceived risks and this study identifies 
the regulatory modes or mechanisms that are used to mitigate that risk:  
 Law  Self-regulation  Code  Norms 
WHAT  IS  OBA  AND HO W DO  SOCI AL NET WOR KS  F IT  IN? 
One of the reasons online advertising is effective, is the ability of brands to target their ads at 
specific audiences.  The accuracy of a target group profile and membership can be improved 
by tracking the sites that a user accesses via their browser.  This type of online behavioural 
advertising (OBA) is done by means of a cookie placed on the browser of a customer when 
they access a service (Figure 13) (Barth 2011).  The cookie is detected on visits to other sites 
in the same ad network.  The cookie is compared with an audience profile held on the ad 
network server, enabling the second site to deliver an appropriate ad to the user.  The ad 
may also come via a trading system known as an ͚ad exchange͛.  This operates like a stock 
exchange where the price of ads is determined by supply and demand.  Each visit to a site will 
generate a cookie that captures details of that visit so that appropriate ads can be served to 
the user on future visits.  
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FIGURE 13  -  HOW ONLINE BEHAVIOURAL ADVERTISING WORKS  
The fact that this is not necessarily restricted to the social media site that placed the cookie is 
disturbing to many people.  This may be one factor in the implementation of the ePrivacy 
Directive 2009. 
Many social media also make APIs (application programming interfaces) available to 
interrogate personal profiles online.  When consumers use social logins for instance, the 
service can interrogate the public profiles of the consumer and download relevant data to its 
own customer database.  From the consumer͛s point of view social login might be seen as a 
ĐoŶǀeŶieŶt ǁaǇ of ǀeƌifǇiŶg ideŶtitǇ.  Fƌoŵ the seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀideƌ͛s poiŶt of ǀieǁ it is a ǁaǇ of 
gathering sometimes quite sensitive personal data in order to target ads more accurately.  
Sensitive personal data includes religion, relationship status, details of postings and even 
peƌsoŶal details of the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ͛s ĐiƌĐle of ĐoŶtaĐts. 
Once an advertiser has access to a consumer, either directly or via a social networking service, 
they can build up more detailed profiles by delivering short questionnaires, polls and games to 
find out more about the consumer and his or her attitudes (Gomez et al. 2009). 
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MET HODOLO G Y  
A series of telephone and face-to-face interviews were held with representatives of the 
advertising industry and their regulators and were used to explore themes identified in an 
earlier survey and literature review (Haynes 2012).  The purpose of the interviews was to 
build up a picture of the different modes of regulation used for online advertising via social 
media.  They also provided an opportunity to consider ways of evaluating the relative 
effectiveness of regulation and possible future developments.  Representatives of the 
following groups were interviewed: 
 Self-regulatory bodies (online industry bodies, advertising bodies and professional 
bodies)  Statutory regulators in the UK  Academics working in the regulatory arena  Technology companies providing technology-based solutions 
Social media providers such as Facebook, Google, Twitter and LinkedIn were approached but 
were reluctant to take part in this research and are not included in this survey.  Their privacy 
policies have been used instead as evidence of their views (Chapter 8).  Most participants 
were happy for direct quotes to be attributed to them, and one has allowed for 
non-attributable quotes. 
A series of semi-structured interviews (Appendix D) allowed for more open questioning and for 
the researcher to follow through information and ideas that arose during the session.  The 
interviews were recorded and transcribed manually.  A copy of the transcript was sent to 
each respondent for checking before a final version was imported into NVivo10 using for 
analysis using a combination of auto-coding and manual coding.  The websites of the 
regulatory bodies were explored to verify information gathered during the interviews and to 
provide additional background information about advertising regulation. 
INV ESTI GATI NG  ON LIN E BEHAVI OU RAL ADV ERTISI NG  
Online behavioural advertising (OBA) is the main revenue-generating activity of online SNSs.  
Several commentators have emphasised the benefits to the user of profiling and using cookies 
to ensure that ads are better targeted to users (Hammock & Rubin 2011).  This was borne out 
during the interviews: 
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But there are huge benefits in being able to communicate and share things at 
the touch of a button, wherever, whenever, however.  There are risks but I 
think the benefits massively outweigh the risks.  
Nick Stringer, IABUK 
The advertising industry is keen to promote this message and this was emphasised in the 
public information website, www.youronlinechoices.eu produced by the European Interactive 
Digital Advertising Alliance (EDAA).  Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe the ͚Aďout͛ page ĐoŶtaiŶs the folloǁiŶg 
statement (EDAA 2015):  
Online behavioural advertising (also known as interest-based advertising) is a 
way of serving advertisements on the websites you visit and making them 
more relevant to you and your interests. 
However one of the reasons for regulation is to address some of the actual, potential and 
perceived problems with OBA (Lynskey 2011).  These include:  
 Inaccurate profiling – leading to irrelevant ads, incorrect inferences about the 
consumer leading to disadvantageous terms or price discrimination for instance  Profile disclosure – leaving the consumer open to ID theft and fraud  Lack of transparency – difficult to hold profilers to account  Unease caused by perception of surveillance or loss of privacy 
The starting point for the investigation was to understand what regulation is already in place in 
the UK.  The interviews and online investigation identified the following: 
 Self-regulation of the advertising industry  Privacy policies and EULAs (SNS self-regulation)  Data protection legislation  Technology and design  User behaviour 
SE LF-RE GU LAT IO N O F T HE ADV ER T IS IN G INDU S TR Y  
The main response to online advertising up to now has been industry self-regulation.  Much 
of the focus of self-regulation has been on codes of practice and published guidance.  The 
Advertising Standards Authority features in most of the comments provided during interviews.  
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The social networks are slightly different and they self-regulate primarily via their privacy 
policies.  Some take the view that SNSs are in fact providing advertising services: 
But actually social networks work in a slightly different way in the sense that 
Facebook is the advertising network; Google is the advertising network; Twitter 
is the advertising network. So Twitter is serving you that advert, not a third 
party.  The adǀeƌtisiŶg iŶdustƌǇ͛s effoƌts haǀe ďeeŶ ŵoƌe foĐused oŶ the 
suƌƌouŶdiŶg ǁeď ďƌoǁsiŶg eǆpeƌieŶĐe. TheǇ haǀeŶ͛t goŶe iŶto soĐial Ŷetǁoƌks, 
which is partly [why] the target case gets over-used. I do ǁoŶdeƌ if theƌe͛s aŶ 
element of – to what extent in the social networking world there is a worry 
that advertising is becoming too accurate. 
Nick Pickles, Bigbrotherwatch 
Nick Pickles of Bigbrotherwatch also suggested that: 
The best regulators are still the consumers. Self-regulation beyond the law is in 
part driven by a fear of consumers. 
The European Advertising Standards Alliance issued a Best Practice Recommendation (BPR) on 
Online Behavioural Advertising in 2011.  These recommendations are directed at 
self-regulatory organisations (SRO) such as the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) in the 
UK.  The BPR establishes three pƌiŶĐiples ǁhiĐh haǀe ďeeŶ iŶĐoƌpoƌated iŶto the UK͛s 
self-regulatory regime (Gray & Mills-Wade 2011): 
1. Notice that OBA is being used 
2. User Choice over OBA, including an opt-out mechanism 
3. Sensitive Segmentation (i.e. children should not be targeted by OBA) 
The advertising industry in the UK operates under a self-regulation regime that is funded by 
the industry through a levy.  The Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) produces a 
comprehensive code of practice which is monitored and enforced by the Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA).  The code of practice covers all aspects of advertising including online 
behavioural advertising.  It is influenced by consumer protection legislation as well as the 
Data Protection Act 1998 and the ePrivacy Directive. 
The ASA scheme is a complaints-driven system.  When a member of the public registers a 
complaint, the ASA decides whether it is within scope and whether there is sufficient cause to 
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investigate.  If an investigation takes place the ASA will adjudicate on whether to uphold the 
complaint or not.  If a complaint is upheld, the advertiser has an opportunity to correct the 
problem before sanctions are applied.  Sanctions include: adverse publicity; denial of licences 
to operate; and referral to other regulators or the Courts.  The ASA depends to a large extent 
oŶ ͚ŶaŵiŶg aŶd shaŵiŶg͛ aŶd puďlishes a database of adjudications as well as a list of 
non-compliant advertisers.  They also apply pressure indirectly by for instance requesting 
search engine providers to remove links to websites of non-compliers.   
The CAP Code has incorporated these principles into its rules on OBA, with Rules 31.1.1 and 
31.1.2 specifically covering third parties.  It is designed: ͞To eŶsuƌe that ĐoŶsuŵeƌs aƌe ŵade 
aware of, and can exercise choice over, the collection and use of information for the purposes 
of OBA͟.  The rules require: a clear notice on their website to consumers that data is being 
gathered for OBA along with a link to an opt-out mechanism; and a notice in or around the 
display ad.  Rule 31.1.2 states (Committee of Advertising Practice 2014, p.122): 
Third parties that use technology to collect and use information about all or 
substantially all websites that are visited by web users on a particular 
computer in order to deliver OBA to that computer must obtain explicit consent 
from web users before doing so. 
The ASA administers CAP rules on OBA, which ͞applǇ to ĐoŵpaŶies aŶd oƌgaŶisatioŶs ;ƌefeƌƌed 
to as ͞thiƌd paƌties͟Ϳ that eŶgage iŶ the ĐolleĐtioŶ aŶd use of ǁeď ǀieǁiŶg ďehaǀiouƌ data foƌ 
OBA via websites belongiŶg to otheƌ ĐoŵpaŶies oƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶs͟ (ASA 2013, p.3). During the 
first 6 months of operation of these rules ASA investigated 75 complaints.  Many of the 
complaints were about failed attempts to opt out of OBA.  Some of the complaints were 
based on misunderstandings of the provisions of the OBA rules (for example they do not cover 
right to privacy or human rights) or of the way in which OBA operates.  None of the 
complainants were able to provide sufficient evidence to enable the ASA to carry forward their 
investigations. This represents a very low level of complaints, none of which were upheld in 
the first 6 months of operation of the new rules. 
The ASA also monitored OBA 386 third party websites and noted 297 potential breaches of the 
CAP Code (rule 31.1.1) about prominent display of notices on ͞ĐolleĐtioŶs aŶd use of web 
ǀieǁiŶg data͟.  The ϭϯ thiƌd paƌties falliŶg ǁithiŶ the UK͛s juƌisdiĐtioŶ ǁeƌe iŶfoƌŵallǇ 
notified of the potential breaches and asked to make appropriate changes to their websites.  
The ASA also examined a sample of ads from the 100 most popular sites visited by UK 
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consumers to see whether they complied with the CAP guidelines.  Of 41 ads that were 
considered, six were thought to breach the rules (ASA 2013). 
The Internet Advertisers Bureau UK (IABUK) provides self-regulation for the digital marketing 
industry and covers both media owners and technology companies.  They maintain that 
self-regulation is better than statutory regulation because it can adapt more rapidly to changes 
in the market and technology, a view echoed in the United States (Christiansen 2011). 
IABUK͛s ŵaiŶ iŶstƌuŵeŶt of ƌegulatioŶ is promotion of good practice by its members and the 
industry generally.  It runs a kite mark scheme and has developed a public education website: 
www.yourchoiceonline.org as part of a European-wide initiative coordinated by the EDAA 
(European Digital Advertising Alliance) to educate the public about behavioural advertising.  
The website provides educational videos and background information about how behavioural 
advertising works as well as practical guidelines on how to protect privacy.  There is also a 
link to an online utility which identifies the companies that provide online advertisements and 
allows users to change settings to opt out of a selection or all of the behavioural advertising 
provided by the companies.  IABUK recognises the global nature of the advertising industry 
and therefore the need for an internationally coordinated approach to self-regulation.  For 
instance, ďodies suĐh as WϯC aƌe ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ a staŶdaƌd ͚do Ŷot tƌaĐk͛ faĐilitǇ. 
VI EW S AB OUT PR IV AC Y PO LI CI E S  
Another aspect of self-regulation is the policies and terms provided by the SNSs for their users.  
Having a policy that makes clear to users their rights and obligations is important.  Ultimately 
they are enforced by contract law, although there may be some dispute about which 
jurisdiction holds sway. 
The wider issue of informed consent raises the need for more transparent privacy policies and 
end user licence agreements (EULAs). There is also pressure on social media companies to 
adopt ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ͛ appƌoaĐhes to the deǀelopŵeŶt of theiƌ seƌǀiĐes.  “oŵe haǀe also 
started responding to the need for greater transparency so that users can make informed 
decisions about how their personal data is used: 
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I think also the way in which social media systems work, they frequently 
change their terms and conditions, in the way they do things, in ways that can 
be quite confusing.  They could do more to give people clearer choices and 
control mechanisms. I think people sometimes feel overwhelmed and again are 
lacking control over who really does see their information.   
Iain Bourne, ICO 
You have the fundamental starting point, data protection law is based on 
consent. I would argue that would also mean informed and meaningful 
consent and that Ǉou doŶ͛t get iŶfoƌŵed aŶd ŵeaŶiŶgful ĐoŶseŶt fƌoŵ askiŶg 
someone to sign a privacy policy that is longer than the theory of relativity, 
that was written by lawyers for lawyers. 
Nick Pickles, Bigbrotherwatch 
VI EW S AB OUT DAT A PR OTE CT ION L E GI S LAT ION  
The UK͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ is the pƌiŶĐipal statutoƌǇ ƌegulatioŶ goǀeƌŶiŶg peƌsoŶal data 
and most of the comments received were focused on this and on the principles that underpin 
the legislation.  There are eight data protection principles which the Act encompasses 
including: 
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and 
lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner 
incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. 
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
[…] 
7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken 
against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against 
accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
PƌiŶĐiple Ϯ effeĐtiǀelǇ ŵeaŶs that peƌsoŶal data should Ŷot ďe ͚ƌepuƌposed͛.  If it is gatheƌed 
for one purpose (providing access to social networking services) it should not be sold on or 
used for advertising, for instance. 
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Principle 3 means that the personal data should be adequate and relevant for the stated 
purpose – and that additional details of an individual should not be gathered if they are 
beyond the original stated purpose. 
Principle 7 means that active measures should be taken to ensure the security and integrity of 
the personal data gathered by the SNS provider. 
In May 2011 the ePrivacy Directive came into force in the UK specifically to address the issue 
of cookies.  This requires all websites to make an explicit statement with an opt-out option if 
it plaĐes Đookies oŶ useƌs͛ ďƌoǁseƌs.  “iŶĐe theŶ a Ŷuŵďeƌ of teĐhŶologǇ seƌǀiĐes haǀe ďeeŶ 
developed to specifically address the desire of users to block cookies. 
TECH NO LO G Y AND DE SI GN  
Technology plays an increasingly important role in regulating access to personal data on social 
media.  Cookie blocking software can be used as apps or add-ins on many browsers to 
identify and highlight cookies and allow users to block them selectively or comprehensively.  
The Ghostery software is one example of this.  The EDAA also offers a utility via the 
www.youronlinechoices.eu website to block cookies.  
Ad blocking software can also be installed to prevent pop-up ads from appearing on websites.  
This type of software is increasingly being adopted by users, a point that was noted: 
Social media users and others are slowly but surely getting more assertive and 
more critical in terms of how people use their information and that they do find 
some forms of advertising intrusive. The fact that so many people are using ad 
ďloĐkiŶg seƌǀiĐes is a ďit of a ǁoƌƌǇ I͛d haǀe thought if ŵǇ ďusiŶess ŵodel ƌelied 
on advertising. 
Iain Bourne, ICO 
Software designed for computer security and dealing with malware also includes anti-tracking 
technologies that delete or suppress cookies as one of a number of security features.  There 
are also services such as tScheme and JanRain, which provide ways of sharing personal data in 
a more controlled manner, so that the user has a choice about who sees what. 
US ER  BE HAV I OUR  
Market responses and individual behaviour are both manifestations of individual attitudes 
about what is acceptable.  In effect users regulate online advertising either by the decisions 
 164 
they take as individuals (for instance to determine how much personal data they will share on 
social media), or by the cumulative effect of their collective behaviour (using alternative 
seƌǀiĐes if theǇ do Ŷot like ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶͿ . 
The issue of user awareness has arisen in previous surveys and this is seen as one of the most 
effective ways of protecting users.  As Guy Daines of CILIP (the Chartered Institute of Library 
and Information Professionals) says: 
What we are really talking about here is information behaviour, in how people 
use information in their work and also in their personal life. It is about instilling 
the idea about responsible use. […] It͛s about changing the culture about being 
careful about privacy.  
It is also about personal responsibility: 
The ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁho ƌegisteƌ oŶ these sites doŶ͛t ƌead the sŵall pƌiŶt aďout 
what they are allowing the brands to do with their data.  
Russell Loarridge, JanRain 
From the early days of SNSs commentators were calling for greater investment in user 
education, specifically in response to the use of advertising beacon technology (Gray et al. 
2008).  The ĐolleĐtiǀe ďehaǀiouƌ of useƌs ĐaŶ ďeĐoŵe ƌegulatioŶ ďǇ the ŵaƌket, oƌ ͚ŵode͛ iŶ 
Lessig͛s ĐategoƌisatioŶ of ƌegulatoƌǇ ŵodalities.  Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, if a sigŶifiĐaŶt pƌopoƌtioŶ of 
users start to leave a service, the service may respond in a way that addresses user 
dissatisfaction.  As one respondent put it: 
the only reign in on those organisations is the damage to their brand if they did 
something stupid 
Russell Loarridge, JanRain 
Research by the Future of Privacy Forum in the United States ͞to assess the Đoŵmunication 
effiĐaĐǇ of ďehaǀioƌal adǀeƌtisiŶg disĐlosuƌes oŶ the ǁeď͟ found that disclosure statements and 
icons increase the comfort of active internet users when confronted with ads on third-party 
websites (Hastak & Culnan 2010). 
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SHORT CO MI NG S  OF REG ULATIO N  
Respondents identified a number of areas where the existing regulatory instruments fell short 
of what is needed.  This included: 
 Lax legislation  Poor enforcement   Ignorance of legislation  Controversy over the defiŶitioŶ of ͚peƌsoŶal data͛  Lack of awareness of options available to users 
LAX LE G IS LAT I ON  
The UK is seen in some quarters as being relatively lax in the way in which it has implemented 
the Data Protection Directive: 
In our view the UK Data Protection Act is one of the weakest in Europe. Privacy 
International has done a comparator of all the implementations of this Act 
throughout Europe.  We have even got a colour-coded map somewhere (it 
should be on the website).  We did, a while back, an analysis of all the Data 
PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐts aƌouŶd Euƌope Đalled ͚PƌiǀaĐǇ aŶd HuŵaŶ ‘ights͛ aŶd theƌe aƌe 
reports on every European country published on our website.  
Anna Fielder, Privacy international 
PO OR  EN FOR C E M ENT  
The ICO raised concerns about territoriality and the difficulty of enforcing the data protection 
legislation outside Europe.  Iain Bourne believes that the attitude of search companies is 
changing, taking down harmful personal data or making it unsearchable and that this will 
accelerate when the General Data Protection Regulation 2012 comes into force.  Since the 
interview, the Court of Justice of the European Union made a ruling which effectively brought 
forward this agenda (Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v AEDP, Mario Costeja González).  
Others also identified problems with enforcement: 
There is very little enforcement activity in this area through the system.  
Malcolm Phillips, CAP 
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There have been very, very few prosecutions in the area of misuse of data or 
unauthorised sharing of data.  Most prosecutions have been to do with 
telecommunications or miss-selling of PPI for instance, rather than misuse of 
personal data on social networks. 
Peter Harris, BCS 
There you would need to switch to the second approach, which would be 
enhanced enforcement of the rules. I know that this is something that has been 
disĐussed iŶ the ƌisk ĐoŶteǆt at EU leǀel. I doŶ͛t see the ƌelatioŶship ǁith ƌisk 
myself, but you have regulators such as the ICO saying that because of their 
limited resources they need to take a more targeted approach to enforcement, 
which is entirely reasonable. They might even claim that is a more risk-based 
approach to enforcement – again, fine. But if you were only able to exercise 
your enforcement powers vis-à-vis a limited segment of data processing 
entities, then I think you have to have other methods to discipline other entities 
in the direct line of enforcement. There I think the backdrop of heavier fines 
would be quite useful.  
Orla Lynskey, LSE 
It is Ŷot effeĐtiǀe at all. As I said eaƌlieƌ, I douďt it is legal, ǁhat͛s happeŶiŶg – 
as far as I know there are no test cases – because it is not informed consent.  
͞WheŶ Ǉou log iŶ ǁe ǁill take Ǉouƌ geo positioŶ͟. WhǇ? You aƌe oŶlǇ supposed 
to ĐolleĐt data uŶdeƌ the Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt if it͛s diƌeĐtlǇ ŶeĐessaƌǇ aŶd 
Ǉou͛ǀe got peƌŵissioŶ to pƌoĐess it.  
Anonymous Civil Servant 
Even where enforcement does take place the argument is that the ICO is under-resourced to 
do this properly: 
My problem is that the ICO is broken. I am not referring to the Office or the 
Commissioner, I am referring to their funding and their ability to investigate 
the law as it stands. […] They almost invariably pick on public authorities, who 
aƌeŶ͛t alloǁed to fight ďaĐk, oƌ sŵall ĐoŵpaŶies ǁithout the ƌesouƌĐes to fight 
back. You will rarely see the ICO take on a bank. They might get the FCA to take 
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on a bank – usiŶg the seĐtoƌ speĐifiĐ ƌegulatoƌs.  I doŶ͛t thiŶk legislatioŶ ǁill 
achieve anything. 
Toby Stevens, Information Privacy Group 
Nick Pickles, at the time Director of Bigbrotherwatch, talked about differences in resources 
between large corporates and government: 
If you look at the equality of arms between the individual member state data 
protection authorities and Facebook (a £500,000 fine from the ICO for Google 
is small change), whereas antitrust sanctions come with a much higher and 
ŵoƌe iŶtiŵidatiŶg set of saŶĐtioŶs. I thiŶk that͛s paƌtlǇ dƌiǀiŶg it.  Theƌe is a 
feeling from regulators that the existing sanctions regime is too weak. 
He goes on to say: 
Equally the data protection regulator is quite reticent to go after big 
corporates because they know that even if they are in the right they will lose 
three years in court and God knows how much they will have to lose in lawyers.  
There does seem to be a reluctance on the part of data protection authorities 
to enforce against the larger players. As a result they go after the public sector 
or very small players. 
The limited territorial coverage of the DPA and the DPD is a major constraint for regulating 
services provided by global or international companies.  The Information Commissioner͛s 
Office recognises that ͞it ĐaŶ ďe diffiĐult to liŶk these ŵulti-national, global companies to a 
paƌtiĐulaƌ teƌƌitoƌǇ͟.  Peter Harris of the British Computer Society takes view that the 
effectiveness of legislation is likely to be limited because of territoriality issues and that 
alternative approaches are needed: 
There are many countries where the intent to regulate is almost impossible.  
The only real regulation is almost by naming and shaming and a lot of publicity 
ǁhiĐh disĐouƌages people fƌoŵ doiŶg thiŶgs ǁhiĐh theǇ doŶ͛t appƌeĐiate the 
consequences of. 
He goes on to cite the problem of service providers headquartered outside the European 
Union and the difficulty in applying regulations to them: 
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Regulation is incredibly difficult.  One of the issues is for example, most of the 
social networks which are marketed within the European Union, which has 
strong data protection regulation, they are actually managed externally, from 
outside. I doŶ͛t thiŶk EU laǁ applies iŶ Delaǁaƌe [Headquarters for many 
major US corporations, including Apple and Google], for example. 
Peter Harris, BCS 
IGN OR AN CE OF L E GI S LA TIO N  
The DPA is also limited by public ignorance.  If people do not know their rights or know that 
there is a remedy for breaches of the data protection principles, they are unlikely to take 
action over breaches.  Annual surveys of public awareness suggest that in 2013 40% of the UK 
populatioŶ had heaƌd of the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe.  OŶlǇ ϯϯ% of ƌespoŶdeŶts iŶ 
the ICO survey spontaneously mentioned the DPA when asked about laws concerning the 
handling of personal data, however when prompted this rose to 96% awareness of the DPA.  
This still means that most people would probably not know where to complain about a data 
breach, rendering the DPA ineffective for them.  This perception is supported by other 
commentators: 
For me, in terms of effectiveness, there are two things that could be improved. 
On the one hand, we could do more about user awareness. In recent months 
there has been an increased awareness even amongst the general population 
about the data protection rights. Those rights are, in my opinion, quite difficult 
to exercise for two reasons: it is difficult for individuals to identify the relevant 
actor when something goes wrong or when they want access to the data so 
that they can amend data; and then also you have a (sort of) de minimis 
problem. 
Orla Lynskey, LSE 
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There is also ignorance about the application of the DPA: 
The Data Protection Act places considerable responsibilities on data 
controllers, but even that term suggests that those people are capable of 
control. The issue is: who is the data controller, in terms of information that 
people may share in a chat room and they discover that it is public knowledge? 
Martin Horrox, CIPR 
CONTR OV ER SY OV ER  T H E DE FI NIT IO N O F ǮPER S ONA L DATA ǯ  
Consideration of OBA throws up the question of what is defined as personal data.  However 
the definition of personal data has been a topic of debate for some time (Millard & Hon 2012; 
Aldhouse 2013).  In its response to the proposed DPR the Direct Marketing Association (2012) 
in the UK says: 
The definition of personal data has been extended to include, in certain 
circumstances, online identifiers such as IP addresses. The EDPS believes that 
online identifiers should only be classified as personal data when there is a 
close relationship between the online identifier and an individual. This would 
mean, for example, that an IP address would only become personal data if the 
organisation holding the IP address knew some other piece of information to 
link it back to particular individual. 
However researchers have found ways to de-anonymize data used by advertisers on social 
networks by combining different data sets (Narayanan & Shmatikov 2009).  In the view of 
some commentators this throǁs iŶto ƋuestioŶ the ǁhole ͚pseudoŶǇŵisatioŶ͛ appƌoaĐh 
(Information CommissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ϮϬϭϮͿ.  All this hinges on whether the data gathered in 
cookies is considered personal data.   
There were also concerns about pseudonymised data and the proposed creation of a separate 
category in the legislation: 
The introduction of pseudonymous data as a separate category of personal 
information – on the one hand it makes things like online advertising more 
certain, but when you apply that information to banking or medical data, it 
arguably weakens the protection systems. By creating this new category of 
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information and acknowledging it has lesser protection you weaken protection 
around pseudonymous use of medical data.  
IŶ the UK ǁe͛ǀe ďeeŶ haǀiŶg this ďig deďate aďout Đaƌe.data. In our view that 
is personal data, whether it is pseudonymised or not, because if there is any 
risk of re-identification, then it remains personal information. So having that 
second category is a step backwards. 
Nick Pickles, Bigbrotherwatch 
LACK O F AWAR EN E S S O F OPT IO NS AV A I LAB LE TO USER S  
Privacy International raises the concern that self-regulation is not very effective because users 
are not aware of the options or privacy settings available: 
I doŶ͛t thiŶk theǇ aƌe ǀeƌǇ effeĐtiǀe ƌeallǇ. I thiŶk theǇ still taƌget aŶd pƌofile to 
great detail and people still don͛t kŶoǁ aďout the faĐt that theǇ aƌe ďeiŶg 
taƌgeted aŶd pƌofiled oƌ hoǁ theǇ ĐaŶ opt out of it. I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if theƌe is aŶǇ 
oversight of these self-regulatory codes, whether there are any complaints 
(where are the data?), how it is solved, is it self-policing.  All these questions 
that are not answered or resolved. From our perspective effective data 
protection legislation is the best answer.  
Anna Fielder, Privacy International 
BENEFI TS  O F REGU LAT ION  
This review of the different models of regulation of advertising mediated by online SNSs 
throws into relief the relative merits of statutory regulation and self-regulation.  
DATA PR OTE CT ION ACT  1998  (DPA) 
There was a degree of support for the data protection principles in the DPA by the advertising 
industry, because it sets a standard.  The application of the eight data protection principles is 
seen as a flexible and appropriate way of protecting personal data:  
Interestingly the 7 [sic] key principles have proved relatively flexible and when 
combined with the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulation (PECR) 
have created an environment in the UK where people are very comfortable.  
Chris Combemale, DMA 
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I think the principles are valid Ŷoǁ. Theƌe is oďǀiouslǇ a deďate aďout ͚the 
iŶteƌŶet has ŵoǀed oŶ aŶd ǁe didŶ͛t haǀe Facebook in 1998 so therefore we 
Ŷeed to ƌefoƌŵ thiŶgs͛, ďut the pƌiŶĐiples of the DPA eǆist ǁell aŶd good Ŷoǁ.  
Nick Stringer, IABUK 
By setting a standard for good handling of personal data, the DPA is seen as being effective.  
It affects the behaviour of companies that use or collect personal data and helps them to make 
their privacy policies more transparent: 
They achieve very little dealing with incidents.  They probably have quite an 
effective deterrent effect for any legitimate business. 
Toby Stevens, Information Privacy Group 
I guess that because the kind of providers we are working with, who are 
tending to look at it [tScheme] as a mainstream business (BT, the Post Office or 
the banks), they tend to have a healthy respect for the Data Protection Act and 
the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe aŶd theƌefoƌe go out of theiƌ ǁaǇ 
almost to do things in a way that they believe is correct. 
Richard Tevorah, tScheme 
A good test of its effectiveness is to compare the situation with regions where there is no 
eƋuiǀaleŶt of Euƌope͛s data pƌoteĐtioŶ legislatioŶ: 
However what I always compare this to is the counter-factual, which is the US. 
So a system where you have a total absence of rules governing the private 
sector and there you can see the effect the EU rules are actually having an 
impact in practice insofar as there is a minimum non-negotiable level of 
protection available for individuals, and companies will respect that. 
Orla Lynskey, LSE 
Risk reduction was not seen as an easily-measurable outcome that would allow investigators 
to assess the relative effectiveness of different regulatory modes such as the statutory 
legislation embodied in the DPA. 
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SE LF-RE GU LAT IO N  
There was general support for self-regulation, not only from the advertising industry but also 
from other professional bodies: 
…there is a lot of feeling that self-regulation and adverse publicity is stronger 
ǁaǇ of eŶfoƌĐiŶg people͛s pƌiǀaĐǇ thaŶ oǀeƌ-regulation which can clearly affect 
competitiveness. 
Peter Harris, BCS 
The Direct Marketing Association thought that self-regulation of the advertising industry works 
well in comparison with self-regulation of the press, for instance: 
In marketing and advertising it works very well. The ASA has been particularly 
effective and when they announce their adjudication that people have 
over-stepped the mark, it tends to be quite well respected. There is an 
agreement that when the ASA has adjudicated against an ad, the media 
oǁŶeƌs ǁill Ŷot ĐaƌƌǇ it, ǁhetheƌ it͛s TV oƌ pƌess oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ. EffeĐtiǀelǇ it gets 
withdrawn voluntarily by the advertiser.  
Chris Combemale, DMA 
It was also seen as a preferable alternative to statutory regulation.  For instance, the 
cryptographic industry has made the following case: 
This is a new industry and it will kill the industry if you get too heavy-handed, 
aŶd ǁe doŶ͛t Ƌuite kŶoǁ ǁheƌe the ŵaƌket is goiŶg. ͚WhǇ doŶ͛t Ǉou ǁoƌk ǁith 
us to come up with best practice processes and we, the industry, will 
self-ƌegulate aĐĐoƌdiŶg to those staŶdaƌds. If Ǉou͛ƌe happǇ those staŶdaƌds aƌe 
appropriate, it should be good enough͛. That was basically was the first 
tScheme as an industry body to police the self-regulation.  
Richard Tevorah, tScheme 
Toby Stevens suggests that self-regulation needs to be very focused, with clearly-defined 
regulatory mechanisms to be effective.  He suggests that a bond paid by members of the 
industry would act as a way of rapidly responding to complaints and penalising offending 
companies: 
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Self-regulation is only going to work where it is sector specific. It only means 
anything if all the significant players in one space saǇ ͚Yeah, ǁe͛ll sigŶ up to 
this͛ […] I͛ǀe Ŷot seeŶ aŶǇ eǀideŶĐe of a self-regulation mechanism that has 
teeth.  An effective self-regulation mechanism would be Identity assurance. 
For example, you have to deposit funds, a bond, like the travel industry, so that 
ǁheŶ theƌe is a failuƌe, the ƌegulatoƌ ĐaŶ dip iŶto that deposit to fiǆ thiŶgs. It͛s 
out of your hands. If you screw up, you lose the bond, and that allows instant 
recompense for affected parties, instant punishment for the culprits. It also 
Đƌeates a BϮB ŵeĐhaŶisŵ ;ďeĐause this isŶ͛t just aďout ĐoŶsuŵeƌsͿ. Without 
that soƌt of ŵeĐhaŶisŵ I doŶ͛t thiŶk self-regulation can be meaningful.  
The social network providers also regulate the way in which brands use personal data they 
have downloaded via APIs by applying contract law: 
Each of the brands that we engage with has to have a contractual 
arrangement with those Ŷetǁoƌk seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀideƌs. It͛s ďasiĐallǇ the soĐial 
Ŷetǁoƌks pƌoteĐtiŶg ;iŶ theiƌ laŶguageͿ theiƌ useƌs͛ data. That͛s a eupheŵisŵ 
foƌ pƌoteĐtiŶg the data that theǇ͛ǀe got aŶd aƌe alƌeadǇ usiŶg foƌ adǀeƌtisiŶg. 
For example, Facebook will happily let you have access to the data on the 
customers that they have in the social network because they have published a 
bunch more [profiles] than anyone else. You get 52 different elements of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual fƌoŵ postiŶgs. But if Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to use that 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ foƌ adǀeƌtisiŶg, theǇ thƌoǁ a flag oŶ the plaǇ aŶd theǇ ǁoŶ͛t let 
you do it. […] Theƌe͛s Ŷo seŶse iŶ takiŶg the data fƌoŵ FaĐeďook aŶd puttiŶg 
the information into your database and using that for advertising, because you 
are contractually unable to do that. 
Russell Loarridge, JanRain 
US ER  BE HAV I OUR  
Others maintain that user behaviour is probably the best regulator: 
To what extent in the social networking world is there a worry that advertising 
is becoming too accurate? Everyone always jokes when they get a Facebook 
adǀeƌt that is tƌǇiŶg to sell theŵ a ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌoduĐt ǁheŶ theǇ aƌe Ϯ0; it͛s 
trying to sell them wigs or something bizarre – eǀeƌǇoŶe alǁaǇs laughs: ͚They 
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doŶ͛t kŶoǁ eǀeƌǇthiŶg aďout ŵe; theǇ͛ƌe showing me all these ǁƌoŶg adǀeƌts͛. 
It has got to a point where to what extent do they have to start deliberately 
showing me wrong adverts, because if they were right all the time, consumers 
ǁould go ͚Hang on a minute, they do kŶoǁ eǀeƌǇthiŶg aďout ŵe͛.  It͛s the 
͚ĐƌeepǇ liŶe͛ ;phƌase used ďǇ Google aŶd the NY TiŵesͿ. That ĐƌeepǇ liŶe is 
probably the better regulator than either self-regulation or legal regulation.  
(Nick Pickles, Bigbrotherwatch) 
Iain Bourne of the ICO argued that regulation probably works because of the concern of SNS 
providers about loss of market through user behaviour: 
That͛s gettiŶg ǀeƌǇ poǁeƌful.  If Ǉou look at the ǁaǇ that gƌoups of soĐial 
media users grouped together to campaign against changes to privacy policies, 
ĐhaŶges to pƌaĐtiĐes, it͛s really interesting.  There is evidence that some of 
the social networking sites [are] changing the way they do advertising, because 
of pressure from their own users, who are in a much better position through 
the services that these companies currently provide to find each other, to 
campaign, to join together.  
Iain Bourne, ICO 
He went to on suggest that this was seen in the response of users to beacon advertising: 
Do you remember the beacon advertising issue, where if you bought something 
on eBay, all your friends would be told what you had bought?  That was very 
intrusive marketing which a lot of people really did not like.  That was 
stopped largely through user pressure.  
FUT UR E RESPON SI BILI TY  FO R  REGU LATION  
A survey of LIS professionals suggested that primary responsibility for protection of personal 
data on social networks should lie with SNS providers (Haynes 2014b).  When the interview 
respondents in this survey were asked who should be responsible for regulation, most felt that 
to some extent all stakeholders had a responsibility for what happens to personal data: 
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There are a lot of different elements here and we͛ǀe all got ouƌ paƌt to plaǇ.  
Regulators need to be a lot more connected to other consumer protection 
groups such as the OFT and people in advertising.  
Iain Bourne, ICO 
I think the responsibility has to be shared, in recognition of the different uses to 
which the data can be put, the different people who have access to the data 
and the responsibility of individuals who provide that data about themselves. I 
think that subject to consumer education it is possible to expect a certain level 
of individual responsibility among consumers for what data they make 
available. I think that, in as far as data is used for marketing purposes, then 
industry and industry regulators such as ours have a responsibility.  And the 
platforms in as much as the platforms [such as Facebook] employ that data 
directly for example to target advertising or to seek to sell products directly to 
the consumer.  
Malcolm Phillips, CAP 
I think it is an obligation on everyone. There may be a role for legislation and 
statutory regulation.  There may be a role for self-regulation.  There is 
certainly a role for business and there is certainly a role for us as internet users. 
We all haǀe a ƌole to plaǇ, ǁe all Ŷeed to ďe aĐĐouŶtaďle, ǁe͛ƌe all goiŶg to get 
benefits out of this, whether it is in advertising or in medical research. We all 
have a duty to have a responsibility.  
Nick Stringer, IABUK 
Government features in many responses, as do the tech, advertising and PR industries: 
Tech companies. It is primarily the tech companies, the people who host this 
stuff have just got to find ways of being as responsive as they can.  When 
there is evidence that stuff that is being posted is causing injury, distress, hurt – 
that͛s the ďottoŵ liŶe.   
Iain Bourne, ICO 
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There is a difference between regulation and policing and good practice. The 
regulation and policing – you do need a body like the Information 
CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe iŶ oƌdeƌ to shoǁ that theƌe is a peŶaltǇ foƌ Ŷot dealiŶg 
with information responsibly.  
Guy Daines, CILIP 
There is an enormous role in government for educating and informing.  And 
also for the regulators to inform.  There is also a need for standards bodies to 
impose privacy standards on organisations certain software developments.  
But ultiŵatelǇ it͛s the ĐoŵŵeƌĐial pƌessuƌes oŶ oƌgaŶisations to get the best 
marketing data, to make use of the information they have are very very strong.  
Peter Harris, BCS 
There was a strong feeling that individuals should have some responsibility for regulating 
access to their personal data, by their behaviour: 
Clearly individuals have a responsibility to protect their own privacy if they 
understand what they are doing; to understand where it is being compromised.  
Peter Harris, BCS 
There has to be a greater acceptance of personal responsibility for 
disseŵiŶatioŶ of these data. It͛s oŶlǇ a tiŶǇ paƌt of the pƌoďleŵ, ďeĐause I ĐaŶ 
give away my data quite legitimately and carefully and then the third party 
loses it or misuses it.  
Toby Stevens, Information Privacy Group 
Guy Daines of CILIP suggested that LIS professionals should have a role in educating users so 
that they can exercise greater control over what happens to their personal data: 
At the end of the day the person who should be most aware of the risks they 
are taking should be the individual. They need to become an intelligent 
consumer, intelligent customer. That comes back to the role of library staff in 
actually enabling them or giving them some of the skills and evaluation 
framework to enable them to do that. If they are not interested in their own 
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personal reputation and safety, then I think it is going to be that much harder 
for other bodies, the Information Commissioner to do what they do. 
CON CLU SION  
REG ULA TOR Y EFF EC TIV EN ES S  
During the interviews there was general acknowledgement of the difficulties of trying to assess 
regulatory effectiveness.  The ICO for instance has no formal mechanism for assessing 
regulatory effectiveness, although of course it does publish annual reports and commissions 
research on the impact of the DPA and other regulatory instruments within its remit.  The 
DMA argues that if ƌegulatioŶ is ǁoƌkiŶg, people ǁoŶ͛t ŶotiĐe aŶd it is oŶlǇ ǁheŶ thiŶgs go 
wrong that it comes to attention as in the case of regulation of the press: 
You can tell when regulation is not working.  When it͛s ǁoƌkiŶg people ŵight 
take it for granted. […] WheŶ it doesŶ͛t go Ƌuite ƌight as ǁith the pƌess aŶd the 
phone hacking and where their self-regulatory structures were not enforcing 
because they were scared of Murdoch, they end up bringing themselves into 
disrepute. 
Chris Combemale, DMA 
Some suggested counting the number of reported incidents or complaints or prosecutions as 
measures of regulatory effectiveness: 
The number of prosecutions, the number of complaints made against phone 
marketing are, I suppose some measures.  It͛s Ŷot aŶ aƌea that͛s easǇ to 
measure. 
Peter Harris, BCS 
Or you could apply success measures used in other sectors: 
We would assess regulatory effectiveness by the extent to which marketers 
agree to modify their practices in response to ASA adjudications, for example.  
Or the extent to which we are able to resolve satisfactorily the issues which 
complainants bring to us.  We would regard those as the success measures 
for regulation. That would hold for this area and generally.  
Malcolm Phillips, CAP 
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Country comparisons are another possible avenue, although, as was pointed out by one 
respondent, there are so many other factors that affect the situation in each country it is 
difficult to separate out the effect of regulation alone: 
One way is to do country comparisons.  Compare prosecutions, compare the 
role of the press, has implications on data protection and privacy. I think it is 
quite a challenge to try and measure it.  
Peter Harris, BCS 
I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhetheƌ Ǉou Đould do geogƌaphiĐ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶs. I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ of 
methods beyond comparison that would help assess effectiveness. 
Orla Lynskey, LSE 
The BCS suggested surveys as a possible way forward for assessing regulatory effectiveness.  
CILIP ƌefeƌƌed to people͛s feeliŶgs of failuƌe oƌ injustice, which could be captured by a survey: 
First of all you have got to get them aware of the problem, therefore you would 
expect the complaints and feelings of failure to be more. You would hope that 
what you were doing would bring that sense of failure, sense of injustice down, 
but it would be a difficult one to actually interpret 
Guy Daines, CILIP 
Cost benefit analysis is another possible avenue – although again it can be difficult to quantify 
this properly: 
OŶe of the ƋuestioŶs I͛ǀe asked is ǁhether or not prior to the enactment of 
legislation we could have things like cost-back benefit analysis in the context of 
data protection. […] The question is again, this is similar to the problem you 
face in the risk-based approach, do you quantify the benefits? You could do this 
from a purely economic perspective, the benefits to business.  But how do you 
ƋuaŶtifǇ the ďeŶefits of data pƌoteĐtioŶ foƌ the iŶdiǀidual? I͛ǀe seeŶ ǀeƌǇ feǁ 
people question that. […] it͛s ŵoƌe diffiĐult to ƋuaŶtifǇ the ŶoŶ-economic 
benefits. 
Orla Lynskey, LSE 
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R IS K RE DUCT ION  
One of the purposes of regulation is to reduce risk to consumers.  Nick Stringer of IABUK 
takes a wide view of the ways in which risks to users are reduced: 
There are lots [of ways of reducing risk to users].  Theƌe͛s the EU iŶitiatiǀe, 
also media literacy – informing people.  There is also a very fast-moving 
technology-dƌiǀeŶ ŵaƌket that soŵe people loǀe aŶd soŵe people doŶ͛t 
understand. We have a duty to inform people as to how it works that is 
meaningful. 
Mydex draws parallels with credit ratings.  The ratings agencies are all members of a 
payments club and over the years have established a process for subject access requests and 
for fixing credit ratings.  A similar process is evolving for data protection. 
The idea of using risk as a means of assessing regulatory effectiveness had not been explored 
to any great depth by any of the respondents.  Some rejected the idea outright or pointed 
out problems with quantifying and therefore measuring risk levels: 
Some of the elements we are talking about here are just so difficult to quantify 
oƌ to ideŶtifǇ ǁith ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ, that that͛s oŶe of the doǁŶfalls of a ƌisk-based 
approach when you are talking about something that is now a fundamental 
right.  
Orla Lynskey, LSE 
COMB IN ED AP PR OA CH  
The debate about regulating access to personal data has moved beyond privacy 
considerations.  This demands a wider approach than relying on legislation alone.  The 
interviews suggested that although legislation provided an environment that encourages 
responsible behaviour by advertisers, it is not enough in itself.  It has the following 
shortcomings:  lack of enforcement, territoriality, inflexibility, etc.  As user behaviour 
evolves and new services are developed, legislation is in danger of lagging behind.  
CoŶtƌoǀeƌsǇ aďout the ͚ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ is aŶ eǆaŵple of legislatioŶ ;aŶd its eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶtͿ 
being out of step with current practice and market behaviour.  Despite attempts to enforce 
the May 2014 decision by the European Court of Justice about the Google Spain SL, Google Inc. 
v AEPD, Mario Costeja González case, there is a growing realisation that this is unenforceable 
(Haynes 2014a; Powles & Singh 2014; Floridi 2014). 
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There is a strong argument for self-regulation, and not surprisingly, this is an approach 
favoured by the advertising industry.  There is also a degree of support in other quarters, so 
that for instance the ICO sees this as a desirable adjunct to the legislation.  However it is 
important that any self-regulatory system is credible and has independent oversight.  The 
CAP Code of Practice and the enforcement regime administered by the ASA is considered an 
effective regulatory scheme that works largely through a coŵďiŶatioŶ of ͚ŶaŵiŶg aŶd shaŵiŶg͛ 
and exclusion of non-compliant organisations from media and platforms provided by members 
of the industry.  The ASA has avoided the failures of regulation represented by the finance 
sector (moral hazard), police complaints (poor compliance), and press complaints (regulatory 
capture).  There is however a question about whether existing self-regulatory regimes 
effectively protect personal privacy.  The self-regulatory regime in the advertising industry is 
primarily focused on the content of advertisements rather than the nuisance caused by 
advertisements and the potential breaches of privacy (ASA 2013).  
Stauß and Nentwich (2013) see ͚privacy by design͛ as a way of shifting SNSs toward privacy by 
default settings.  There is a role for data protection agencies in scrutinising this but they also 
emphasise the need to raise user awareness, so that there is a multi-pronged approach to 
regulation. A study on attitudes to OBA in the Netherlands found that there was a great deal of 
ignorance about cookies and the authors concluded that there was a need to educate the 
public before legislation could be effectively applied (Smit et al. 2014).  
These ƌefleĐt Lessig͛s ǀieǁ that ŵultiple ŵodes of ƌegulatioŶ ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ ĐoŶĐeƌt aƌe likelǇ to ďe 
the most effective in the long term (Lessig 2006). 
FURT HER  RES EAR CH  
Further work is needed in this area to compare the effect of advertising regulation on privacy 
and social networks outside Europe.  Emerging economies such as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China) countries have large and growing populations of social network participants and 
which are targets for online advertising by global and regional brands.  
This research has touched on ways in which regulation can be evaluated and there is an 
on-going need to develop some metrics that would allow comparison of different regulatory 
modes.  There is a particular problem in quantifying the effect of regulation on privacy or in 
reducing risks to users, but the measures tend to be qualitative.  Using measurements of risk 
might be one way of attaching a value to access to personal data and thereby providing a basis 
for comparing the most effective modes of regulation in this area. 
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Recruiting social network providers to this study proved difficult and this is an obvious area for 
further development.  In particular it would be useful to understand their perspectives on 
current legislation and self-regulation and to explore what they consider to be appropriate 
future development of regulation in this area. 
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CHAPTER 10  –  CODE AS A MEANS OF REGULATION  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
OV ER V I EW  
͚Code͛ is oŶe of Lessig͛s (2006) four modes of regulation of the internet.  In the context of 
SNSs, code is about the way in which a system is designed (or coded) and how that regulates 
access to personal data.  Mostly this is about restricting access to specified groups.  
However there is a contradiction between this need on the part of users and the desire on the 
part of SNS providers to make personal profiles as visible as possible.  Visibility helps in the 
recruitment of new members and it also means the provider can charge advertisers more for 
access to their customers. 
This chapter eǆaŵiŶes the pƌiǀaĐǇ settiŶgs of thƌee ŵajoƌ “N“s fƌoŵ the useƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe: 
Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter.  The case study protocol is described in Appendix E.  These 
vignettes are used to build up a model of the types of personal data that is available on SNSs 
and who it is available to.  It also provides an insight into the degree of control allowed to 
users.  
The idea of pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ ;PďDͿ is ďuilt iŶto EuƌopeaŶ legislatioŶ aŶd is a teŶet of the ICO͛s 
(2008) guidelines to data controllers.  However there is a problem detecting whether PbD has 
been adopted.  It is more of an approach than a measurable outcome.  There is a danger 
that regulation can become too prescriptive and this approach of PbD offers an alternative 
way of embedding privacy in systems, rather than imposing processes on service providers. 
Three technology providers, JanRain, MyDex and tScheme, were interviewed and their views 
feed into the analysis of options.   
Finally, this chapter considers the effect of code as a regulatory approach and its effect on 
personal risk. 
METH ODO L OG I ES US ED BY OT HER  RES EAR CH ER S  
Facebook has been the focus of a lot of attention on privacy settings.  As far back as 2005, the 
privacy policies of Facebook have been systematically surveyed.  For instance, McKeon (2010) 
maps the increasing availability of personal data on Facebook default privacy settings between 
2005 and 2010.  A simple graphic interface demonstrates the dramatic change in the 
availability of personal information over this period.  He defines five levels of availability of 
information.  The information is available to: 
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You 
Friends 
Friends of Friends 
All Facebook users 
The entire Internet 
He looks at the following classes of information: Wall posts, Photos, Likes, Name, Picture, 
Gender, Other Profile Data, Birthday, Friends, Contact Information, and Networks.  
FaĐeďook͛s pƌiǀaĐǇ poliĐǇ has evolved in response to market pressure, changing legislative 
requirements, competition, and the perceived threat of new regulation.  This process has 
continued as has the range of information types available.  
In an investigation of the Facebook privacy settings of 400 randomly-selected information 
professionals in Turkey, KülĐü & HeŶkoğlu (2014) developed a scoring systems for privacy 
protection based on the proportion of users that invoked a particular type of protection.  This 
is an interesting methodology which could be applied to other countries.  
This investigation of code considers the case of three contrasting SNS and explores the 
featuƌes fƌoŵ a useƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe.  This ŵeaŶt loggiŶg oŶ to eaĐh seƌǀiĐe aŶd ŵakiŶg a 
record of the privacy options that are available to users.  The presence or absence of a 
particular feature may in itself be signifiĐaŶt iŶ that it ŵaǇ ƌeǀeal the pƌoǀideƌ͛s attitude to 
privacy and security of personal information.  The settings available to users of the three 
services were compared in September 2014.   
SETTI NG S  ON  SNSS  
Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter form the basis of three vignettes to consider the way in which 
͚Đode͛; is implemented as a regulatory approach.  The attached CD-ROM (contents listed in 
Appendix F) contains screenshots that were captured during this research.  These three 
services were chosen because they are widely used but have distinct purposes.  Many people 
subscribe to all three.  Facebook started primarily as a way for college students to socialise 
and this is reflected in its emphasis on social activities and on building up networks of friends.  
LinkedIn is a professional network directed towards career information and showcasing 
expertise.   Twitter has much less personal data on its profiles but is a pervasive 
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communication medium used for personal networks, monitoring events in real time and as a 
leisure resource – also increasingly used as a campaigning and political resource. 
PER S ONA L PR OF IL E S  
All three vignettes allowed personal profiles to be edited.  The choice that users make about 
how much information they put up on their personal profiles is probably the single most 
important decision that affects safety and security. If the data is not available on the personal 
profile, it may be much more difficult for someone (a criminal or a security agency) to get hold 
of.  The three services vary considerably in the amount of personal data that is explicitly 
made visible via the personal profiles.  However it is important to remember that a lot of 
personal data is also revealed by online activity such as postings, contacts made and 
favourites, which is dealt with later in this chapter.   
Facebook requires users to use their real identity (as far as it is possible for Facebook to verify 
and enforce) even if they have a different public identity.  This has prompted some debate 
and controversy about what soŵeoŶe͛s tƌue ideŶtitǇ is (BBC News 2014).  Part of FaĐeďook͛s 
success depends on links between users and online activity.  The more that the service is able 
to encourage this, by disclosing changes to status and updates on the activities of individuals 
online, the more that a dialogue is created and the greater the opportunities for behavioural 
advertising to be delivered.  In order to facilitate this, the default conditions tend to public 
disclosure.  Each field of the profile can have its target audience changed independently.  
The main categories used are: 
Me Only 
Close Friends 
Family 
Friends 
Friends of Friends 
Public 
Custom (e.g. by group membership or by location) 
AŶotheƌ ǁaǇ of editiŶg pƌiǀaĐǇ settiŶgs is ǀia the ͚Edit MǇ Pƌofile͛ liŶk oŶ the useƌ͛s FaĐeďook 
Home page.  Table 17 shows the default setting for different classes of data in the user 
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profile (September 2014).  The ŵajoƌitǇ of the pƌofile data oŶ FaĐeďook defaults to ͚PuďliĐ͛.  
Although making changes from the default is fairly straightforward, the user needs to know 
that this choice is available in the first place. 
TABLE 17  -  FACEBOOK DEFAULT AUDIENCE SETTINGS  
Profile area Default audience 
Work and Education Public 
Places Youǯve Lived Public 
Contact and Basic Info Friends 
Family and Relationships Public 
Details about You Friends 
Life Events 
Generated automatically from other fields and so 
does not allow entry of new items 
 
Facebook has also introduced a Privacy Check-up, which is accessible via the ͚lock͛ icon at the 
top of the main screen, and shows the user their current privacy and security settings. 
LinkedIn provides access to user Profile and Settings via an icon in the top menu.  This 
invokes a password request for further security.  A series of tabs allows settings including 
privacy settings to be adjusted from the default or previous settings: 
 Profile  Communications  Groups, Companies & Applications  Account 
Under the Account tab the Activity Broadcast heading has a tick box to ͞Let people kŶoǁ ǁheŶ 
you change your profile, make recommendations or follow coŵpaŶies͟.  There is a warning 
underneath that this potentially alerts current employers if a user is seeking a new job.  The 
AĐtiǀitǇ Feed defaults to ͚Youƌ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs͛ but can be changed to one of: Everyone, Your 
network (contacts of contacts), or Only Ǉou.  What otheƌs see ǁheŶ theǇ look at soŵeoŶe͛s 
profile reveals the name and headline, but can be changed to a generic heading such as 
͚SoŵeoŶe at CitǇ UŶiǀeƌsitǇ LoŶdoŶ͛ or it Đould ďe totallǇ aŶoŶǇŵous.  AŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s 
connections can also be made visible to only that individual.  Normally they are visible to all 
his or her other connections by default. 
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The Communications tab allows users to select who can send invitations to connect, defaulting 
to aŶǇoŶe oŶ LiŶkedIŶ.  The pƌiǀaĐǇ ĐoŶtƌols uŶdeƌ ͚Gƌoups, CoŵpaŶies & AppliĐatioŶs͛ alloǁ 
users to turn on or off the data sharing with third party applications. 
Managing advertising preferences comes under the Accounts tab.  The default is to share 
non-personal data (i.e. aggregated or anonymised data) so that:  ͞LiŶkedIŶ ŵaǇ shoǁ ŵe ads 
on third-paƌtǇ ǁeďsites͟; and ͞LiŶkedIŶ ŵaǇ shoǁ ŵe ads ďased oŶ thiƌd paƌtǇ data͟. 
Although there is limited personal data available on Twitter profiles – up to 160 characters – 
personal preferences and interests are revealed by tweets and locations from which tweets 
are made.  It is possible to click on the profile of a tweeter and find out who is following 
them, who they are following, their tweets, photos and videos they have incorporated into 
tweets, as well as tweets they have ͚favourited͛ and any lists that they subscribe to.  Twitter 
is seen as a public domain and many people and organisations use it to raise their media 
profile.  This is well and good for public figures, but the consequences of this level of visibility 
may not always be clear to many individual users.  Like many social networks Twitter 
participates in behavioural advertising, and while individual identities are anonymised there 
can still be the perception of invasion of privacy. 
Twitter allows users to change the default security and privacy settings via the Edit Profile page 
(accessed from the Settings icon in the top menu bar).  The following settings can be 
adjusted: 
Security 
 Login verification   Password reset 
Privacy 
 Photo tagging  Tweet privacy  Tweet location  Discoverability  Promoted content 
It is also possible to request an archive of all the Tweets that an individual has made since first 
joining the service.   
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D IS COV ER AB IL IT Y  
Facebook posts are visible to the public as the default.  These can be limited to specific 
audiences such as Friends, or Family at any time by clicking on the audience icon.  From then 
on any subsequent posts will conform to the new setting until it is changed again. 
No discoverability settings were detected on LinkedIn.  This may be because part of the 
purpose of LinkedIn is to encourage business, employment and professional opportunities and 
limiting who can find a profile would be counter-productive.  
Twitter allows users to opt out of having their tweets being searchable and visible by search 
eŶgiŶes that Đhoose to ĐoŵplǇ, ďǇ usiŶg the ͚pƌoteĐt ŵǇ tǁeets͛ settiŶg.  This effeĐtiǀelǇ 
makes the tweets only visible to followers.  If this feature is invoked it then becomes possible 
to control who is a follower as new followers have to be approved. 
Searches on Google routinely bring up Facebook and LinkedIn profiles and sometimes also 
Twitter profiles.  The LinkedIn site provides a list of profiles fitting the name search and 
clicking on any one of them will reveal the full profile or as much of the profile as has been 
made public.  If the searcher is recognised as a LinkedIn user, the level of connection is also 
indicated (e.g. 1st, 2nd and 3rd level connections).  Facebook provides direct links to profiles 
with name, profile photo and favourites listed.  Searchers are invited to log on for more 
services such as the opportunity to link up with the individual concerned.  A list of alternative 
names is provided in case the selected profile is not the one sought. 
LOCAT ION IN FOR MAT IO N  
Facebook users can change the location status of individual posts, including removal of the 
location altogether.  The system can detect location on a mobile device and automatically 
add this to the post if required.  
Although LinkedIn does track the IP addresses and locations of devices through which a user 
logs onto the system, it is not clear that this information is available to others.  The user has 
the optioŶ of ƌeǀieǁiŶg past loĐatioŶ histoƌǇ fƌoŵ ͞Youƌ aĐtiǀe sessioŶs - See where you're 
logged iŶ͟ oŶ the Settings page. 
Twitter defaults to location not being revealed.  Users have to opt in to revealing their 
location when they post a Tweet.  It is also possible to retroactively remove the location tags 
of previously posted tweets.  The level of specifiĐitǇ foƌ loĐatioŶ ;e.g. ͚IsliŶgtoŶ, LoŶdoŶ͛ oƌ 
just ͚LoŶdoŶ͛Ϳ can be adjusted as well. 
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ADS  
All three services declared that they do not share personal information with third party 
organisations or sites.  However third-party apps are able to harvest personal data or 
metadata attached to individual profiles.  In the case of Facebook this is up to 52 fields of 
personal data including: 
Posted By Username 
Post 
Tagged 
Picture 
Link Information (several fields) 
Video 
Type 
Likes 
Created Time 
Updated Time 
Comment Information (several fields) 
Gender 
Birthday 
Location 
Relationship Status 
Bio 
Religion 
Hometown 
Page Category 
Page Likes 
 
The thƌee “N“s do shaƌe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ǁith adǀeƌtiseƌs that is ͚hashed͛ so that aŶ iŶdiǀidual is 
not immediately identifiable.  This form of anonymising data allows the SNSs to gather 
information about user behaviour without breaching their commitment to not share personal 
data with third parties.  This hashed data is used to deliver relevant ads to individuals based 
on their online behaviour. 
Facebook allows users to supress ads that they do not like from their timelines by clicking the 
cross in the top right hand corner of the ad.  The user is offered a choice of deleting the 
specific ad or all ads from that advertiser.  Facebook then asks for feedback on the reason for 
choosing to suppress the ad.  It is not clear whether this is taken into account in determining 
what ads are displayed in future. 
LinkedIn allows users to opt out of ads from third party sites and ads based on third party data.  
This ŵeaŶs that if a useƌ͛s oŶliŶe ďehaǀiouƌ is ďeiŶg tƌaĐked ďǇ a Đookie plaĐed oŶ theiƌ 
browser by a third party, the user can opt out of that data being taken into account when ads 
are served on LinkedIn. 
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Twitter allows users to opt out of receiving tailored ads.  This does not prevent ads being 
delivered to users, but it means that the ads are not based on tracking user behaviour and 
therefore not tailored to individual users. 
AUDIT IN G PR E SE NC E O N SNSS  
Another Facebook feature, possibly introduced in response to the Europe vs Facebook 
ĐaŵpaigŶ, is aŶ aƌĐhiǀe fuŶĐtioŶ that alloǁs a useƌ to ͚DoǁŶload a ĐopǇ of Ǉouƌ FaĐeďook data͛ 
(Shaw et al. 2012; europe-v-facebook.org 2014).  This includes data that is not normally 
ǀisiďle ǀia a useƌ͛s oŶliŶe pƌofile, suĐh as ďƌoǁsiŶg aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd adǀeƌtiseŵeŶts folloǁed.  The 
system takes a few seconds to create the archive and then sends the user an e-mail message 
with a link to access the archived data.  It is password protected to prevent potentially 
sensitive personal data falling into the wrong hands.  The data can be viewed as a text file or 
via a browser. 
Twitter has a similar feature for downloading all the tweets that a user has made since joining 
the service. 
No such feature was detected on LinkedIn. 
EXT ER NA L T ECH NO LO G Y SO LUT IO N S  
A number of research groups have been looking at ways of improving security.  For example 
one group has worked on automating the definition of different social groups, which ͞helps 
users set up their privacy policies automatically for their uploaded content͟ (Squicciarini et al. 
2014).  Another group has looked at ways ͞to deǀelop a seĐuƌe appƌoaĐh liŵited the access of 
useƌs͛ data to the appliĐatioŶs, aŶd disĐlose oŶlǇ the attƌiďutes that the useƌ ĐoŶseŶted͟ 
(Shehab et al. 2012).  One possible response is the launch of Simply Secure, a new service 
enabling ordinary users to access the technology in order to improve their security and privacy 
(Doctorow 2014).  
AD BLO CK ER S  
A growing number of ad blockers are emerging on the market.  It is a feature of several 
security software and anti-virus packages such as McAfee, Norton Security etc.  Some search 
browsers such as Google Chrome also include ad blocking features that can be switched on.  
Theƌe aƌe also ͚Pƌiǀate BƌoǁsiŶg͛ featuƌes suĐh as that offeƌed ďǇ Mozilla Fiƌefoǆ: 
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In a Private Browsing window, Firefox won't keep any browser history, search 
history, download history, web form history, cookies, or temporary internet 
files. However, files you download and bookmarks you make will be kept 
There are also add-ins that can be integrated with commonly-used browsers (e.g. Mozilla 
Firefox, Google Chrome) such as:  
Ad Killer 
Adblock Edge 
Adblock Plus 
Ads No More 
Blue Hell Firewall 
Page Tweak 
Smart Ads Blocker 
Updated Ad Blocker 
 
Ghostery is one example, which can be used to demonstrate the way in which ad blockers 
work.  Ghostery was installed on Mozilla Firefox to monitor the trackers that are invoked 
when visiting the three test case SNSs.  Table 18 shows the ad trackers detected by Ghostery 
on Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn. 
TABLE 18  -  AD TRACKERS USED BY THREE SNSS 
SNS service Tracker detected with Ghostery 
Twitter DoubleClick, Google Analytics 
Facebook None 
LinkedIn DoubleClick, LinkedIn Ads, NetRatings 
SiteCensus, Quantcast, ScoreCard Research 
Beacon 
 
Theƌe is also the EDAA͛s ǁeďsite aŶd oŶliŶe faĐilitǇ foƌ ďloĐkiŶg tƌaĐkeƌs ƌepoƌted iŶ Chapteƌ ϵ.  
At the time of writing (September 2014) a browser add-in was under development to let 
browsers remember the last ad blocking settings, rather than having to reset them each time. 
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EFFECT O F ǮCO D E ǯ  ON  PERSON AL R I SK  
Privacy by design and ad blockers are mostly focused on preventing personal data from being 
seen by potential abusers or misusers of data.  The probability of data misuse occurring is 
reduced, but the impact of a data breach is unaffected by technology interventions.  For 
instance, the design of a system to default to greater privacy when posting personal data 
means that there is likely to be less personal information available than if the default was for 
greater disclosure or disclosure to a wider group.  Using ad blocking software to deny access 
to personal online behaviour also reduces the possibility of targeted ads being directed at a 
user.  This could be an annoyance, because untargeted ads may still get through.  However 
it does reduce the possibility of online behaviour being used for other purposes – such as 
surveillance by the security services and its attendant risks. 
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CHAPTER 11  –  NORMS (CONSUMER MARKET AND USER RESPONSES) 
INT RO DU CTIO N  
The purpose of this chapter is to consider ways in which users individually and collectively (the 
consumer market) regulate access to personal data.  The chapter will look at evidence that 
user behaviour and market response have affected the way in which personal data is made 
available on SNSs, and how these are based on the norms that motivate behaviour. 
The evidence used in this chapter is derived from the literature and an analysis of in-depth 
interviews with stakeholders with an insight into users and market behaviour.  Analysis of 
privacy policies reveals the options available to users – backed up by online interactions and 
documented by the researcher (Appendix F).  The results from a survey of LIS professionals in 
the UK (reported later in this chapter) also provides some insight into this mode of regulation.  
IŶ his desĐƌiptioŶ of ͚Ŷoƌŵs͛ as a ŵeans of regulation Lessig (2006, p.124) uses some examples 
from the internet which now need to be updated in order to be applied to SNSs.  He focuses 
on user behaviour and the ways in which groups can apply sanctions to individuals who 
transgress the boundaries (or norms) set by the group.  While this is an important 
phenomenon it is also important to consider the way in which consumers apply sanctions to 
SNS operators as well. 
Norms also regulate behavior in cyberspace. Talk about Democratic politics in 
the alt.knitting newsgroup, and you open yourself to flaŵiŶg; ͞spoof͟ 
soŵeoŶe͛s ideŶtitǇ iŶ a MUD, aŶd Ǉou ŵaǇ fiŶd Ǉouƌself ͞toaded͟; talk too 
much in a discussion list, and you are likely to be placed on a common bozo 
filter. In each case, a set of understandings constrain behavior, again through 
the threat of ex post sanctions imposed by a community.  
Westin (2003) discussed norms in terms of socially acceptable personal behaviour and ties this 
in with privacy.  When an individual strays beyond accepted norms, a public response is 
required.  It is no longer a private matter.  In doing so he is describing the mechanism by 
which norms operate as a regulatory system. 
Although some norms may be reflected in privacy policies and terms of use of SNSs, 
particularly in defining what is considered acceptable behaviour, different groups will have 
different standards of what they consider to be appropriate behaviour.  Miller (2011) 
suggests that there are many different communities in Facebook, each with their own way of 
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working and norms of behaviour.  Peter Harris of the British Computer Society illustrated the 
development of communities with their own languages and norms of behaviour: 
…aŵoŶg teeŶageƌs, ǇouŶg people usiŶg soĐial Ŷetǁoƌks, ĐoŵpletelǇ ƌe-defined 
ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͚paƌeŶts͛ ͚fƌieŶds͛ etĐ.  TheǇ speĐified paƌeŶts as Đlose 
friends in order to bypass or twist the standard privacy settings on sites.  So 
you ǁill fiŶd that people aƌe ͚ŵaƌƌied͛ to people that theǇ just happeŶ to ďe 
friends with.  Unless you understand the social background of people using 
these services you can completely misunderstand some of the profiles that are 
up there, but they [young people] understand what they are doing, but they 
are trying to subvert the intentions of what is up there. 
Norms are an emergent attribute of groups that are manifest in individual responses and 
observed in collective (or aggregated) behaviour.  Norms may be manifest in responses to 
other users, for instance if someone strays beyond the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. 
TAKI NG  UP  T HE CON S U MER  VI EW  
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012) talk aďout ƌegulatoƌǇ stƌategies that use ͚ŵaƌket-haƌŶessiŶg͛ 
controls.  They focus on regulating the markets though instruments based on legislation.  
They do not consider the effect that consumers have on regulating the behaviour of 
companies.  The closest they come to regulation by the market (i.e. by consumers 
collectively) is the regulatory framework around competition.  They go on to identify a 
number of laws in market regulation that effectively ensure consumer choice.  The high cost 
of entry to the market can be applied to the case of SNS so that one cost model predominates 
(free at the point of use services and revenue generated through online behavioural 
advertising) making it very difficult for alternative cost models to develop.  Large numbers of 
users and high market share are required to generate the level of income necessary to support 
and develop a new SNS.  The other is the natural monopoly that early providers have gained 
for their markets.  The way the market is structured, it becomes a matter of moving not only 
your own account but those of your friends in order to exercise choice in SNSs. 
Users͛ concerns have been driven by a number of factors such as perceived risk, the desire for 
privacy, and concerns about surveillance by national security agencies.  The Snowden 
ƌeǀelatioŶs aďout the N“A͛s ŵoŶitoƌiŶg aĐtiǀitǇ has highlighted the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh useƌs͛ soĐial 
media activity is monitored and how this information is used for actions such as rendition, 
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arrest, and even targeting for assassination (Greenwald 2013).  There are particular concerns 
about government agencies acting beyond the scope of the law, suspending due process. 
The work of campaigning groups such as Privacy International, Bigbrotherwatch, and the Open 
Rights Group can be seen as both expressions of emerging social norms (around privacy and 
security) and as influencing public opinion about acceptable behaviour on the part of the 
authorities.  However the impact is limited, as Anna Fielder of Privacy International pointed 
out in an interview:  
We have a number of small digital rights organisations that really do very good 
work, but it is not clear how many ordinary people actually plug into them all. 
PR ES SU R E ON  SNS  PRO VIDER S  
Wilson et al (2012, p.216) in their review of the literature on Facebook research suggested that 
users had a number of choices for managing risks: 
(a) changing the level of privacy from the permeable default setting to a more 
private setting, such as friends-only status; (b) limiting the amount of personal 
information shared on Facebook; or (c) not acquiring a Facebook account 
Although these approaches represent significant choices by the market and therefore are 
potential means of modifying the behaviour of SNSs, this does not represent the whole range 
of possible responses.  Existing users can also withdraw from Facebook (and other SNSs), or 
can request that material is taken down (with varying levels of success).  Following the 
sustained campaign by an Austrian law student, Facebook now provides an automated service 
that allows users to download an archive of their transactions on Facebook 
(europe-v-facebook.org 2014). 
User responses to privacy concerns have been considered by a number of researchers (Wills & 
Zeljkovic 2011; Willis 2014; Xu et al. 2013) and the range of responses to privacy concerns 
include the following: 
 Cease using the SNS 
 Change SNS 
 Change privacy settings 
 Change the amount of information disclosed 
 Remove existing information from personal profiles 
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 Falsify personal information 
 Adopt ad blocking technology and other privacy enhancing tools 
 Campaigning 
The last of these could be seen as an expression of social norms referred to by Lessig (2006).  
If a significant proportion of users begin to adopt these measures they may exert some 
influence on the SNS service and could ďe ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ a ͚Ŷoƌŵ͛ of aĐĐeptaďle ďehaǀiouƌ 
concerning SNSs.  
Nick Pickles (then Director of Bigbrotherwatch) acknowledged the effect of collective action 
and the sometimes contrary effect of legislation as an alternative mode of regulation: 
There is a market pressure there, which sometimes if you regulate you take the 
market pressure in a way in which the consumers were not intending going. 
ATTIT U DES  O F LIS  PR OFES SION ALS  
The content of this section has been published as an article in CILIP Update (Haynes 2014b). 
A convenience survey of UK-based users of social networks was conducted.  The 222 
respondents were predominantly from the Library and Information Services (LIS) community 
(90% of respondents).  This community was targeted because of their multiple roles as: users; 
intermediaries; and educators. The survey was conducted from mid-February to the end of 
April 2014. 
The purpose of the survey was to find out what LIS professionals saw as being the main risks to 
adult users of online social networking services.  It also explored attitudes to different 
regulatory approaches and considered who should have responsibility for implementing them.   
The majority of respondents used Facebook, and Twitter on a daily basis and LinkedIn at least 
occasionally.  Google+ was used by 31% of respondents.  A total of 41 other social 
networking services were identified.  Usage figures for the most commonly-used services can 
be seen in Table 19. 
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TABLE 19  -  USAGE OF SNSS 
Service No. using the service 
at least weekly 
No. using the 
service 
occasionally 
Total No. of 
users 
Proportion 
of total 
Twitter 157 41 198 89% 
Facebook 167 26 193 87% 
LinkedIn 94 75 169 76% 
Google+ 23 46 69 31% 
Pinterest 13 6 19 9% 
Instagram 8 2 10 5% 
Tumblr 7 2 9 4% 
Total Respondents: 222 
When it came to identifying risks faced by users, there was a clear ranking of risks in terms of 
their importance to individual respondents (Table 20).  
TABLE 20  -  RANKING OF RISKS  
Item Score Overall 
Rank 
Identity theft 1934 1 
Strangers able to see sensitive personal details 1841 2 
Targeting by advertisers 1575 3 
Victim of fraud 1531 4 
Discrimination by employer or potential employer 1443 5 
Targeting by criminals (e.g. so that they can burgle your home while you 
are away) 
1411 6 
Friends, family or colleagues able to see sensitive personal details 1297 7 
Cyber-bullying or harassment (including stalking) 1288 8 
Targeting by official bodies or security agencies 980 9 
Extortion or blackmail 628 10 
Prosecution by authorities because of crime allegations 590 11 
Physical violence or kidnapping 451 12 
Total Respondents: 213 
Users were most concerned about identity theft and about strangers being able to see 
sensitive personal details.  Identity theft can itself expose users to other risks such as fraud 
and other forms of criminal targeting.  Geo-location data was cited as another area of 
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poteŶtial eǆposuƌe aŶd ƌisk.  ͚“tƌaŶgeƌs ďeiŶg aďle to see seŶsitiǀe peƌsoŶal details͛ ƌaŶked 
ŵuĐh ŵoƌe highlǇ thaŶ ͚FƌieŶds, faŵilǇ aŶd Đolleagues ďeiŶg aďle to see seŶsitiǀe details͛.   
Some of the risks may have consequences that are more to do with social awkwardness or 
annoyance rather than loss of money or physical threat.  For instance, targeting by 
advertisers may be irritating, particularly if users feel they are being spammed or cold-called as 
a result of existing personal data in their social media profiles.   
Discrimination by employers or potential employers was ranked fifth.  In addition several 
respondents identified discrimination by peers or by communities to which the user belongs as 
potential risks.  This is often a result of data being used in a way that was not originally 
intended to make judgements that may be unfavourable to the user. 
The cyber-bullying category includes: trolling; harassment; and ͞uŶǁaŶted atteŶtioŶ of a 
peƌsoŶal oƌ seǆual Ŷatuƌe͟ – i.e. stalking.  A new teƌŵ, ͚doǆiŶg͛ ǁas used to iŶdiĐate the 
thƌeat of ďeiŶg ͚outed͛ as a ƌesult of postiŶgs oŶ soĐial ŵedia, ǁith poteŶtiallǇ eŵďaƌƌassiŶg 
outcomes or even reputational damage.  
Loss of intellectual property was identified as a risk by several respondents who had 
experienced loss of images, designs, writing or other creative work as a result of postings on 
social media.  
Several respondents expressed a concern about loss of control ranging from information 
overload to ͞sale of data Ǉou ǁould Ŷot ǁaŶt sold͟.  Some pointed out the problem of their 
personal data leaking through contacts with lower privacy settings than their own, or the 
consequences of being tagged by other users without their knowledge or explicit permission to 
do so. 
When it came to who should have primary responsibility for protecting personal data on online 
social networks, 55% of respondents felt that it was the responsibility of the service providers, 
Ϯϲ% thought it should ďe the useƌs theŵselǀes, aŶd ϭϯ% felt that it ǁas the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
responsibility (Figure 14).  
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FIGURE 14  – V IEWS ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING PERSONAL DATA ON SNSS 
There was no appreciable difference in attitudes between the different age groups or between 
males and females in the distribution of responses. 
Several respondents felt that the users and the service providers should be jointly responsible 
for protecting personal data.  One respondent suggested that a special body independent of 
͚ďig goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛ oƌ the seĐuƌitǇ agencies should be given responsibility for this area. 
A more nuanced picture emerged from the degree to which respondents agreed or disagreed 
with a series of statements about current measures to regulate and protect access to personal 
data (Figure 15).  There was agreement or strong agreement with the idea that personal 
profiles should only be visible to those people or groups that they specify (97% agree or 
strongly agree) and that SNSs should be set up with maximum privacy as the default setting 
(94% agree or strongly agree).  Ninety-seven percent agreed or strongly agreed that SNSs 
should be designed with protection of personal data in mind. 
Government 
13% 
Online social 
network 
providers 55% 
Advertisers 0% 
Users 26% 
Other 7% 
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FIGURE 15  -  ATTITUDES TO DIFFERENT REGULATORY MEASURES 
Interestingly 91% agreed or strongly agreed that users should be responsible for their own 
online privacy, although in the previous question only 26% of respondents felt that users 
should be primarily responsible for protecting personal data on social networks. 
Personal data should be regulated (84% of respondents), although 67% agreed or strongly 
agreed that SNS providers should be responsible for protecting personal data without 
government interference.  A large majority (82% of respondents) felt that service providers 
should work with government to protect personal data.  Other suggestions were that 
providers should be more transparent and make it clear which personal data is provided to 
third parties in what circumstances.   
There is a clear picture emerging that the focus of effective protection of personal data should 
be the SNS providers themselves in the way in which the set up and operate their services and 
in the way in which they work with government.  Only 30% of respondents thought that 
current legislation was an effective means of regulation.  
User education and greater clarity in the guidelines provided to users on privacy settings were 
also seen as important measures.  These included: more graphical interfaces to explain 
privacy settings, improved digital literacy on the part of users, and a partnership between 
government and providers to educate users. 
Respondents wanted greater control over their data, including the requirement for providers 
to gain permission before gathering personal data or passing it on to advertisers or apps 
providers.  They also wanted to be able to delete information or to archive the profile of a 
deceased former user.  It was also felt that providers should not be able to change privacy 
settings and defaults without permission or at least prior notification. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Current data protection legislation is effective
The SNS providers should be responsible
The SNS providers should work with government
SNSs should be set up with max. privacy as the default
My personal should only be visible to people I specify
SNSs should be designed for protection of personal data
There should be no external regulation
Users should be responsible
Agree or strongly agree Disagree or strongly disagree
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The concern about the global nature of SNSs could be addressed by means of international 
agreements that govern the use of personal data.  One view was that enforcement was the 
issue rather than the regulations that are already in place. One person suggested that there 
should be laws to prohibit government and security agencies from ͞spǇiŶg oŶ people͟. 
Suggestions for controlling advertising ranged from outright prohibition to a system of more 
informed consent on the part of users. 
The overall message from this survey was that current regulation is not particularly effective 
for protecting users of online social networking services against risk.  Perhaps the greatest 
potential for mitigating risk is user education.  This is one place where members of the LIS 
community have a particular role to play.  This would help to ensure that users continue to 
benefit from the extensive range of features available on social networking services. 
NOR MS  APP LI ED TO  SNS  PRO VIDERS  
Following on from the survey, industry experts provided additional insight into norms that 
affect SNS services.  For instance, Guy Daines of CILIP thought that individuals have an 
important role to play: 
At the end of the day the person who should be most aware of the risks they 
are taking should be the individual. They need to become an intelligent 
consumer, intelligent customer. 
Useƌs ĐaŶ ƌespoŶd ĐolleĐtiǀelǇ to ͚uŶaĐĐeptaďle͛ ďehaǀiouƌ ďǇ “N“ pƌoǀideƌs eitheƌ ďǇ 
organising pressure groups, or by changing the way they make use of those services.  If a 
sufficiently large number of users change their online behaviour, this becomes a market effect.  
For example, in 2010 Facebook simplified its privacy policies in response to widespread 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌ ĐoŵplaiŶts aďout ͚disĐlosuƌe Đƌeep͛.  “uĐĐessiǀe ĐhaŶges to pƌiǀaĐǇ settiŶgs had 
made initially private information more widely visible and this resulted in user information 
being disseminated in a way that was not envisaged when they originally disclosed it (Helft & 
Wortham 2010).  
Chris Combemale of the DMA cites another example: 
When Instagram wanted to use images that their customers had loaded and 
wanted to sell those images to advertisers and not share the royalties with the 
individual – of Đouƌse it͛s just ďoŶkeƌs that soŵeoŶe ǁould load theiƌ photos iŶ 
 201 
a social media service, as a service to them and their friends and then you 
would sell those images to advertisers is completely incorrect – and it took 
about 48 hours of a major backlash of all their community rebelling against the 
idea. They had to back-track quite quickly.  If Facebook goes too far, I think 
their members know them and they can move elsewhere now – is also effective 
in policing any company for customer service. 
IŶdeed aĐĐoƌdiŶg to IaiŶ BouƌŶe of the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe gƌoups of useƌs aƌe 
now getting together to campaign for change: 
If you look at the way that groups of social media users grouped together to 
ĐaŵpaigŶ agaiŶst ĐhaŶges to pƌiǀaĐǇ poliĐies, ĐhaŶges to pƌaĐtiĐes, it͛s ƌeallǇ 
interesting.  There is evidence that some of the social networking sites [are] 
changing the way they do advertising, because of pressure from their own 
users, who are in a much better position through the services that these 
companies currently provide to find each other, to campaign, to join together. 
NOR MS  O F US ER  BEHAVIOUR  
Users can control what they reveal about themselves on online social media.  An examination 
of the terms of service and privacy policies suggests that there is a minimum level of 
information required in order to register with a service.  However many services encourage 
sharing of more information (particularly activity-based information) with wider groups of 
people in order to increase the connectivity and reach of the service.  Pressure to do so 
establishes norms of what level of disclosure is considered reasonable. 
Analysis of privacy policies, backed up by test registrations demonstrate a minimum level of 
personal information is required to enrol on an SNS (Table 21).  In some cases there are 
checks to discourage falsification of personal data, although in most cases this is very difficult 
to control. 
Of the 11 SNSs surveyed, 8 were available via a web browser (the remaining three needed to 
be downloaded as Apps) and required full name or first name and surname.  The only 
exception was Badoo which only requires a first name.  Most required an e-mail address 
(Facebook requires either an email address or a mobile phone number).  Many also require 
the gender of the user and their location.  Several also require users to select a username 
and/or a password.  See also Table 9 on page 129. 
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TABLE 21  -  REGISTRATION INFORMATION REQUIRED BY SNSS 
SNS Name Gender Birth 
date 
Location Email/Mobile Other 
Badoo First Yes Yes Yes Email Purpose 
Facebook First and 
Second 
Yes Yes  Email or 
Mobile 
 
Google First and 
Second 
Yes Yes Yes Email and 
Mobile 
 
hi5 First and 
Second 
Yes Yes Yes Email  
Instgram     Email  
LinkedIn First and 
Second 
   Email  
Myspace First and 
Second 
Yes Yes  Email  
Ning First and 
Second 
   Email  
Snapchat     Email  
Twitter First and 
Second 
   Email  
Whatsapp     Email  
 
Users can exert pressure on their peers, especially when they step outside accepted norms of a 
group.  As pointed out earlier in this chapter, there is no one set of standards that apply 
across social media or even within one SNS.  This can work in a negative way, in that an 
iŶdiǀidual peƌĐeiǀed to ďe oŶ the ͚outside͛ ĐaŶ ďe ostƌaĐised, oƌ iŶ its ŵost eǆtƌeŵe foƌŵ, 
bullied. Within a group certain types of behaviour might be considered unacceptable and the 
individual manifesting that behaviour may be subject to social controls.  For example, using a 
personal account to promote a business service or to send spam e-mail to contacts could lead 
to ďeiŶg ƌeŵoǀed fƌoŵ people͛s oŶliŶe soĐial Ŷetǁoƌks, oƌ ďeiŶg expelled from the service 
altogether.  Some services have a mechanism that allows users to report material that is 
inappropriate or offensive.  If there are sufficient complaints that material may be removed 
or the user barred altogether.  Although the remedies are applied by the SNS provider, the 
resolution to act comes from peer pressure. 
Well-publicised instances of trolling on Twitter and other media have revealed a deep 
revulsion at the misogynistic, threatening and unpleasant messages directed at prominent 
women such as Mary Beard (Professor of Classics at Cambridge University) and the journalist 
and feminist Caroline Criado-Perez (BBC News 2013b).  However user responses are often not 
a satisfactory solution and, where available, legal remedies may be sought (Agate & Ledward 
2013).  
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CON CLU SION  
Woƌk ďǇ the ŵaiŶ UK ƌegulatoƌs, the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe aŶd the Adǀeƌtising 
Standards Authority have emphasised the importance of user education.  Analyses of user 
responses to privacy concerns have also consistently pointed to the need for user education.  
As one government official put it: 
I doŶ͛t aƌgue that ƌegulatioŶ should be what governments do, regulation is 
also what markets do. Regulation is also what good practice people do, 
ďeĐause it͛s iŶ eǀeƌǇďodǇ͛s iŶteƌests. As the tƌeŶds that ǁe highlighted deǀelop, 
more people will be aware of the choices they should be being given and things 
will change. 
This is a ŵessage that has ďeeŶ piĐked up ďǇ the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe iŶ the UK 
and which forms a major strand of its strategy for improving data protection.  One mode of 
operation of the ICO is to educate users and thereby modify the behaviour of users.  This is 
one element in the ICO strategy to protect personal data on social media.  The campaigns are 
aimed at children.  Although this study has focused on adults using SNSs, the education of 
todaǇ͛s ĐhildƌeŶ ǁill offeƌ pƌoteĐtioŶ to toŵoƌƌoǁ͛s adults ;it is to ďe hopedͿ.  GuǇ DaiŶes of 
CILIP drew an interesting parallel with swimming: 
One of the key roles of library staff is to start to get people questioning […] 
asking the questions […] so that they are able to evaluate and to come to some 
foƌŵ of ƌisk assessŵeŶt theŵselǀes.  UsiŶg aŶ aŶalogǇ fƌoŵ the ĐhildƌeŶ͛s 
world but which could apply to the adult world.  You have a fear of water – 
you can put in the lifeguards, you can give them buoyancy aids, but what 
Ǉou͛ǀe got to do is to leaƌŶ to sǁiŵ. That is pƌeĐiselǇ ǁhat Ŷeeds to happeŶ 
within the online world. 
Indeed Peter Harris of the British Computer Society suggests that because of the problems of 
applying national law to international entities such as social media providers, social norms 
become one way of exercising some kind of regulation: 
Naming and shaming is probably the strongest thing that people can do.  
There have been very, very few prosecutions in the area of misuse of data or 
unauthorised sharing of data.  Most prosecutions have been to do with 
telecommunications or miss-selling of PPI for instance, rather than misuse of 
personal data on social networks. 
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Nick Pickles (then Director of Bigbrotherwatch) summed up the effect of norms on other types 
of regulation: 
Instagram is probably a good example.  The best regulators are still the 
consumers. Self-regulation beyond the law is in part driven by a fear of 
consumers. 
He goes on to describe the power of the market (the collective manifestation of social norms): 
In the middle you have the self-regulation which is trying to strike the balance 
of how far can we [go].  It͛s Ƌuite stƌaŶge the self-regulatory function is 
aĐtuallǇ ͞hoǁ faƌ ĐaŶ ǁe eŶfoƌĐe ouƌ oǁŶ teƌŵs of seƌǀiĐe, ďefoƌe Đustomers 
staƌt gettiŶg aŶŶoǇed?͟. That͛s the ďeŶefit of haǀiŶg laƌge Ŷetǁoƌks ƌatheƌ 
than lots of small ones, is that if Facebook loses 2% of its user ďase, that͛s a 
critical problem for the business, because it could very quickly escalate.  
Evidence from the literature (Chapter 2) and from discussions with industry experts (Chapter 9 
and this chapter) suggests that SNS providers respond to user norms and expectations.  
Where those norms are challenged (because of unilateral changes to privacy settings) users 
rebel and it is through the threat of legislation as well as potential loss of market share that 
SNS providers respond. 
One of the ways of enhancing the effect of social norms is to educate users so that their 
expectations of privacy are reinforced and so that they learn appropriate ways of responding 
to requests for disclosure.  User education forms an important part of the strategies of 
regulators such as the ICO and industry self-regulatory bodies such as IABUK. 
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SECTION IV. CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTER 12  –  DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the evidence to support the hypothesis that 
different regulatory modes have differing effects on risk to individual users of SNSs.  It starts 
with a review of statutory regulation and its shortcomings as a sole means of regulation.  It 
then considers self-regulation and the mechanisms by which SNSs regulate access to personal 
data.  This includes the efforts made by the advertising industry.  The design of SNS 
incorpoƌatiŶg pƌiŶĐiples suĐh as ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ͛ is ĐoŶsideƌed as a ƌegulatoƌǇ ŵode.  The 
chapter then considers the behaviour of individual users and collective behaviour manifest in 
the market and considers the evidence that this is being taken up as an effective means of 
regulating access to personal data.  The second part of the chapter looks at personal risk as a 
means of evaluating regulatory effectiveness and presents the findings in Table 22. 
STAT UTO RY  REG ULATI ON  
One of the areas that this research set out to investigate was whether legislation alone was the 
most effective way of protecting users against the risks associated with use of SNSs.  A 
detailed analysis of the legislatioŶ iŶ Chapteƌ ϳ ideŶtified the EU͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ DiƌeĐtiǀe 
(95/46/EC) (DPD) aŶd the UK͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ (DPA) as most directly relevant to this 
issue.  The Human Rights Act 1998 and legislation governing the online advertising industry 
were also considered. 
The internet and services such as online SNSs are international in nature.  The provider or 
website does not need to be located in the UK to deliver services to British users.  This 
applies more generally to the European Union and its citizens.  Providers may be beyond the 
jurisdiction of the countries in which their services are available and this presents a challenge 
to national authorities.  In the case of the EU and US-based providers, an imperfect 
self-regulatory regime, the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework, has been put in place. 
Another failing of the legislation is the limited resources available for enforcement.  This has 
resulted in a paucity of rulings against SNS providers in breach of the privacy regulations. 
Users have the option of taking providers to court if there has been a breach of trust – such as 
revealing personal details to third parties.  This is a costly and time-consuming process and is 
therefore a remedy unlikely to be available to most users.  The most notable case has been 
that of an Austrian law student who has taken Facebook to court and who has initiated a 
campaign ͚Euƌope ǀeƌsus FaĐeďook͛ (2014).   To date there has been no similar initiative in 
 207 
the UK.  The DPA contains exemptions for journalistic use and for domestic use of personal 
data.  It could be argued that these prevent users from protecting their privacy.  This is 
compounded by the lack of clarity of who is a data controller in an SNS and what constitutes 
personal data.  For instance, there has been discussion about whether the user or the service 
provider is the controller in the case of personal profiles on SNSs.  There has also been an 
argument about whether aggregated data counts as personal data.  The service providers 
tend to say not, and the European regulators are beginning to take the view that they are. 
The other problem is the inconsistent way in which the DPD has been implemented across 
Europe.  This allows SNS who do wish to be seen as compliant with the Directive to pick and 
choose the most friendly regulatory framework.  This is a charge that has been made of 
Facebook Europe which is located in Ireland, a territory considered to have a less rigorous 
regime than the UK which itself is considered to have a relatively permissive regime compared 
with that of France or Germany. 
The EU͛s GeŶeƌal Data PƌoteĐtioŶ ‘egulatioŶ ϮϬϭϮ addresses the issue of lack of consistency 
because it will be directly applicable across the European Union.  Even so it does not fully 
address the problem of extra-territoriality nor that of enforcement which will still be the 
responsibility of national authorities.  Enforcement has been strengthened so that the 
potential maximum fine has been increased to ϭϬ% of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s gloďal iŶĐoŵe, for 
instance.  It also makes provision for users to move their accounts to other providers more 
easily, potentially strengthening the power of users. 
SELF-REG ULATIO N  
An examination of the privacy policies of SNSs revealed that these are still evolving.  Some of 
these changes have been well documented.  For instance, the changing privacy settings of 
Facebook showed a move to greater disclosure over several years (McKeon 2010).  This 
meant that personal data that was originally set at a default value of ͚reveal to friends͛ 
gradually became publicly discoverable data via search engines.  The privacy policies also 
revealed what data was gathered and who it is disclosed to.  The policies were quite explicit 
about the minimum amount of personal data required to register as a user and this is borne 
out in the case studies.  This included contact details and personal addresses.  Behavioural 
and device data is also captured during SNS sessions.  The behavioural data is aggregated and 
shared with advertising networks so that they can target different groups of users.  This is a 
major revenue stream for most SNS providers.  There was some dispute about whether this 
constitutes personal data or not.  Another problem area for user data was the persistence of 
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personal data and the difficulty of removing it from an SNS.  The privacy policies are 
declarations of intent and self-compliance is not independently audited (the TRUSTe scheme is 
an exception). 
The two self-regulatory regimes investigated for this study were the ASA code of practice 
adopted by the advertising industry in the UK and the TRUSTe scheme in the United States.  
Groups such as the European Digital Advertising Alliance (EDAA) and IAB have also developed 
guidelines on online behavioural advertising.  The main enforcement mechanisms are: name 
and shame; and peer-pressure.  For instance, if an advertiser does not comply with the DAA 
guidelines, they can be ostracised by other advertising and media organisations, making it 
difficult for them to operate in the European market. 
TRUSTe operates in the United States and is associated with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 
framework.  This is not actively policed although in recent years the Federal Trade 
Commission, which is responsible for this agreement, has indicated that it might start to apply 
sanctions to non-compliant companies (Solove & Hartzog 2014).  A study by Connolly (2008) 
suggested that many companies registered on the Safe Harbor scheme did not even comply 
with their own privacy policies. 
The analysis of privacy policies and the investigation of the Advertising Standards Authority 
and the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework suggests that self-regulation does not afford much 
protection to users.  However it does establish some principles of user rights and privacy and 
this is a starting point. 
THE DESI GN  O F SYS TEMS AN D T HEI R  DEFAU LTS  (CO DE) 
Several online SNSs were investigated by structured sessions with screen capture to document 
the options that users have for managing their personal data (Appendix F).  There was a 
degree of discretion allowed to users in terms of what data they revealed to whom.  The 
concept of successive rings of closeness in Figure 11 on page 151 is useful here because it 
provides a framework for comparison of the different audiences that personal data may be 
revealed to.  Some less sensitive personal data (such as name) may be released to a wider 
group, whereas sensitive personal data such as religious or political views has additional 
pƌoteĐtioŶs aŶd ŵaǇ oŶlǇ ďe ǀieǁed ďǇ a tƌusted ͚iŶŶeƌ ĐiƌĐle͛ of ĐoŶtaĐts. 
Privacy by design was developed as an approach in Canada and has been adopted by the ICO in 
the UK.  The concept is that when systems are designed, privacy options should be built into 
theŵ.  Fƌoŵ the useƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe settiŶg the defaults to gƌeateƌ pƌiǀaĐǇ ƌatheƌ thaŶ gƌeateƌ 
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disclosure (the tendency of SNS at the moment) would do a great deal to improve the 
protection of personal data.  Another recommendation by the ICO is that users should opt 
into having their personal data shared rather than opting out. Opting out is like a version of 
inertia selling; do nothing and your personal data is shared. 
Users also resort to external technology solutions to protect their privacy.  Perhaps the best 
developed category is ad blocking software.  This type of software can be downloaded as an 
app or installed on a browser.  They detect cookies and prevent them from being saved on 
the browser.  This disrupts the tracking of user behaviour.   
The use of code is primarily a voluntary activity on the part of SNSs although this may be 
subject to some pressure from users and legislators.  It is very difficult to police this as it 
would require detailed analysis of the interactions of a range of user types with the SNS.  The 
rise of a market for ad blocking software is perhaps the strongest evidence that the user 
options available on SNS do not give adequate protection to personal data. 
NOR MS  
A survey of library and information service (LIS) professionals in the UK (Appendix C) was used 
as the initial instrument to discover the range of views that might be represented by users, 
intermediaries and instructors.  From this perspective the LIS profession is a convenient way 
of gaining access to a range of perspectives.  The survey revealed that although users 
accepted some responsibility for their own privacy the majority thought that the SNSs were 
primarily responsible for privacy.  
Interviews with representatives of the regulators, the advertising industry and privacy 
campaigning organisations revealed a consensus that user education was key to improved 
safety and privacy online.  As users become more educated, their expectations are likely to 
change and this in turn will influence the SNS providers.  One analogy for user education is 
that it is like teaching children the highway code and instilling some kind of traffic sense.  
Rather than stopping the traffic or imposing severe speed limits (walking pace) to limit the 
damage caused by collisions with pedestrians, everyone is taught traffic safety awareness.  
The activities to inform and educate users about online safety could have a similar effect for 
SNS users. 
REVI SITI NG  T HE R I SK  MODEL  
The review of risks created a model of five categories of risk faced by users of online SNSs.  
The relationship between risks and consequences in the detailed model in Figure 6 on page 84 
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can be summarised where the risks are described in terms of the outcomes that are expressed 
in terms of consequences to the user (Figure 16). 
 
FIGURE 16  -  R ISKS AND CONSEQUENCES 
NUI SA NC E  
The investigation has highlighted advertising as one of the major areas of concern to users.  
These range from annoyance at being targeted with irrelevant ads, through to unease about 
use of personal information for targeting ads to concerns about the potential embarrassment 
if others become aware of what ads are directed at an individual.  
PS YC HO L OG ICA L HAR M  
Social media can be used to identity victims and to stalk them.  The SNS can also be a vehicle 
for harassment, which in extreme cases can lead to self-harm.  Cyber-bullying, stalking, 
trolling and harassment can all affect self-esteeŵ aŶd ĐaŶ uŶdeƌŵiŶe iŶdiǀidual͛s Đonfidence 
and ability to deal with everyday issues. 
F INAN CIA L AN D MATER IAL L OS S  
Identity theft from poorly protected social media profiles can make users vulnerable to 
financial loss through bank and credit card fraud, for instance.  Disclosure of sensitive 
personal information can also affect job prospects (if there is evidence of unacceptable 
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behaviour) or insurance premiums (if there is evidence of ill-health).  Revealing travel plans 
can make a user vulnerable to burglary. 
LOS S O F L IB ER T Y  
State authorities and security agencies sometimes aĐt oŶ the ďasis of ǁhat is oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s 
profile or by surveillance of their online behaviour.  Examples might include boasting about 
criminal acts, visits to websites hosted by terrorist groups, or simply having a profile that 
corresponds to what the authorities are looking for.  This might be quite a vague criterion 
that could be used to sweep up potential suspects.  
PH Y SIC AL HAR M  
Two aspects of physical harm were discussed earlier: self-harm; and targeting for violence by 
others.  There have been documented cases of individuals sheltering from domestic abuse 
being followed via their profiles and then being attacked in their new location (Thomas & 
Walport 2008).  Criminals and gangs may also target individuals for kidnap or for retribution.  
Data revealed on the social profiles may identify them as potential targets and reveal sufficient 
information about location and habits to enable targeting for attack (Cox 2014).  
EFFECT O F REG ULATO R Y MO DE ON  PER SON AL R ISK  
A model of risk, which focused on the consequences to the user of a threatening event taking 
place on an SNS, has been presented.  This produced a taxonomy of risk with five main 
categories.  These risk categories have been used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of 
each of the four regulatory modes described in a model of regulation in Chapter 6.  Table 22 
on page 217 summarises the effects of each regulatory mode on individual risk. 
LAW  
In the UK the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) is the main statutory regulation in place for 
personal data on social networks.  Early research suggested that SNSs might be exempt from 
the provisions of the DPA, on the basis that it is for domestic use.  However that view has 
been questioned and it is now accepted by the ICO that social media do indeed fall within the 
remit of the DPA.   
The EU͛s ePrivacy Directive, which came into effect in the UK in 2012, raised awareness of 
cookies and required all website providers to declare use of cookies and to provide users with 
an opt-out.  Although this is theoretically backed by provision of enforcement, there is little 
indication that this is currently a priority for the ICO.  Cookies are used by some advertisers to 
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track individual behaviour and thereby making deductions about the individual which can be 
used to target ads. 
The DPA prohibits the reuse of personal data for purposes other than that for which it was 
gathered.  It could be argued that data gathered to provide a SNS service should not be used 
for advertising, although many providers would then claim that this allowed for in the terms 
and conditions that users sign up to. 
Extra-territoriality continues to be an issue.  The fact that most of the SNS services reviewed 
are headquartered outside the EU means that they are beyond the control of the UK 
authorities.  The result is that SNSs mostly ignore UK law.  
The DPA does not specifically address the issue of individual misuse of personal data; its focus 
is on corporate behaviour.  However other legislation such as incitement to racial hatred or 
sectarian hatred or human rights legislation can and has been used to prosecute individuals 
sending abusive messages to public figures via social media.  This may have a deterrent effect 
on potential perpetrators. 
Another abuse is appropriating and misusing data to make decisions that are detrimental to 
the subject.  For instance, insurance premiums, refusal of credit, job selection can all be 
affected by unauthorised disclosure of personal information. 
The law does not specifically protect against scams – and is always trying to play catch-up.  It 
could also be argued that the DPA is ineffective in protecting against this risk, although other 
laws afford some protection.  By extension the anti-discrimination laws protect against job 
discrimination and resulting financial loss. 
The DPA has specific exemptions for security-related uses of personal data and for 
court-related information.  In these instances the law does not protect users against the loss 
of liberty because of specific exemptions.  In effect the law is used as an instrument to deny 
protection of personal data of individuals suspected of a crime and can even punish them 
before conviction, by depriving them of their liberty. 
Although there are laws against physical violence, there is nothing specific in the DPA or other 
legislation to protect individual from the risk of physical harm.  The J19 v Facebook Ireland 
case is an example where the plaintive wanted to publish details of a ͞seĐtaƌiaŶ paƌade 
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oƌgaŶiseƌ͟ (the respondent) on a Republican Facebook website, which the court found would 
expose the respondent to the threat of physical harm.  
Data protection law is probably neutral with respect to physical harm, because the provisions 
protecting individuals against harm are covered by other laws. 
SE LF-RE GU LAT IO N  
Annoyance of users is the area where self-regulation is most developed and evident.  The 
advertising and public relations industries are governed by codes of practice with industry 
bodies in place to monitor the behaviour of advertisers and take appropriate action.  Bodies 
such as the Advertising Standards Authority have extensive powers to get advertisers to 
change their behaviour.  Self-regulation has a strong impact on the behaviour of advertisers 
and there is consistent focus on online behavioural advertising.  There is pressure on 
advertising industry to behave responsibly as discussed in Chapter 9. 
The SNS providers can intervene in extreme cases of bullying, but there is a marked reluctance 
for them to do so.  This may be because they are wary of being accused of censoring the sites 
or of interfering with free speech.  In this respect self-regulation is neutral. 
SNS providers can block apps or users who abuse the system.  Whether they are willing to 
take action is another matter.  Commentary on recent events (such as the revelations about 
the N“A͛s P‘I“M pƌogƌaŵŵeͿ suggests that unless SNS and other social media providers 
rigorously apply their own standards of privacy in the face of pressure from governments, they 
can exacerbate the risk to users (Strauß & Nentwich 2013; Greenwald 2013; Bedi 2014; 
Morrison 2014; Witte 2013).  On the other hand if SNS providers rigorously apply their own 
privacy policies they could afford some protection to users.  The potential is for 
self-regulation to effectively mitigate this particular risk.  
There is no evidence of self-regulation being an effective protection against physical harm.  
SNSs can remove threatening postings, but the practical difficulty of monitoring all postings 
militates against this.  Some have a reporting function so that persistent offenders are 
identified and may eventually be excluded from the service.  This may be because the 
number of reported incidents is low and the perception that this is not a priority for many 
users. 
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CODE  
The design of SNSs and the privacy options they offer users affect the potential levels of risk to 
which users are exposed.  Third-party technical solutions such as encryption and ad blocking 
software (to give two examples) can also act as preventative barriers to external threats.  A 
variety of ad supressing software has entered the market recently and this is being adopted by 
significant numbers of users.  The threat of widespread adoption of this software may have a 
moderating effect on some advertisers and service providers whose income is affected by the 
loss of potential target audiences. However there is a big security hole in systems such as 
Facebook because of the volume and type of personal information that is routinely made 
available to external apps or to third parties when social login is used.  Without rigorous 
policing of third party apps and their providers, it is not possible to guarantee the security of 
any personal information transmitted to those organisations. 
Some systems allow for unacceptable content to be flagged up for attention.  This can work 
in two ways: either automatically removing or blocking offensive material; or by intervening 
manually when something has been flagged up.  A variation on this approach is to have a 
minimum threshold of complaints that must be received before further action is taken, to 
defend against capricious and arbitrary decisions when someone is pursuing a vendetta.  
LinkedIn and other service providers have a mechanism for reporting unacceptable behaviour 
(such as spamming) which could include threatening behaviour.  
The privacy options are important in limiting who has access to sensitive personal data.  For 
instance, where credit card or other payment details are provided by a user, the card and 
transaction details must be kept securely and this is a result of the system architecture or 
͚code͛.  Other suggestions such as warning users when they are entering potentially sensitive 
personal data could be invoked and this is an aspect of code along with default opt-ins that 
require future development. 
Some SNSs reportedly encrypt their messages to protect against interception.  This approach 
is also available via a number of tools on the market that help users to encrypt messages or to 
restrict access to specific data.  There is an emerging class of service where users store 
personal data on a server in such a way that allows them to control who or which services have 
access to the data. 
The architecture of systems (whether it is the native SNS or an app associated with it) can 
restrict the amount of personal data that is available for mining or interception by intelligence 
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services, for instance.  There is of course a potential arms race.  As more sophisticated 
encryption becomes available, better techniques for breaking encryption codes emerge, and 
so on. 
Some systems allow users to restrict sensitive personal information to defined groups of 
people.  For example, the ͚Đlose fƌieŶds aŶd faŵilǇ͛ settiŶg oŶ FaĐeďook ĐaŶ ďe used to liŵit 
access to very personal data to a smaller circle of contacts.  The Google+ service works with 
the idea of user-defined circles, which can each be configured with appropriate viewing rights.  
This use of Code would tend to protect against stalking or direct physical threats. 
NOR M S  
Norms are manifest in individual behaviour.  Collectively that behaviour can be seen as a 
market response. 
Norms can be seen at the most fundamental level of operation when people leave a service.  
If, for instance, they do not like the way in which their personal details are shared with 
third-party advertisers, they can vote with their feet.   
There was some debate in a misogynistic trolling incident in the UK in 2013 about whether the 
subjects of attack should boycott services or whether they should out-face and eventually 
shame their attackers.  Eventually there was such a groundswell of disgust that the trolls 
were put off (Agate & Ledward 2013).  This was a good example of norms protecting against 
psychological harm. 
User behaviour is a very important mechanism for protecting against financial and material 
loss.  Teaching users to register with secure and unique passwords for instance will help to 
improve security and to protect against identity theft.   
User behaviour will determine first of all what information is available, and to some extent 
how visible it is.  Using privacy settings appropriately can improve personal security, although 
it is unlikely to be wholly effective against persistent and forensic investigation of individual 
profiles.  Targeting of individuals by their online behaviour or by who they are connected to 
via SNSs can be avoided by modifying behaviour – but that restricts the utility of the service.  
The use of non-language can mask the intent of groups of individuals.  This has been reported 
in the literature about use of social media by teenagers, who in attempting to preserve their 
privacy against parental snooping have devised their own code or language to mislead external 
 216 
users (Miller 2011).  This could also be used by criminal conspirators and members of 
subversive groups. 
In North America there is evidence to suggest that SNS providers respond to user concerns 
when there is the threat of user rebellion (Streitfeld & Perlroth 2012; Story & Stone 2007; 
Stone 2009).  
Perhaps the best protection against physical harm is user behaviour.  If users are aware that 
everything they post to social media is potentially in the public domain, it may moderate their 
behaviour.  Some of the public education initiatives emphasise the importance of protecting 
personal safety and privacy.  Although many of these initiatives are targeted at young people, 
they apply to all users.  This raises the issue of the need to bring all users up to a level of 
͚tƌaffiĐ safetǇ aǁaƌeŶess͛. 
USIN G PER SON AL R ISK  TO AS S ES S  REGU LATIO N  
The second major question that this research set out to address was whether personal risk can 
be used as a way of evaluating different modalities of regulation.  A model of regulation was 
described in Chapter 6 and has been assessed in terms of their effect on the risk categories 
defined in Chapter 5. 
Comparing different modes of regulation is difficult to do in a purely objective way, just as it is 
difficult to identify and assess risk where the categories are not well-established and there is 
no large corpus of statistical data to provide evidence of past events and consequences. 
A grid of risk categories and regulatory modalities was used to create a risk-regulation matrix 
(Table 22).  Evidence from the literature and documented events (such as court cases and 
actions taken by regulators) was used to determine whether a particular mode of regulation: 
a) mitigated against the risks to an individual; b) had little or no practical effect; or c) was 
detrimental to users with respect to the hazard being discussed.  Each cell of the table 
indicates the mechanism by which regulation affects the risk category, whether it be 
positive(+), neutral (0) or negative (-). 
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TABLE 22 -  EFFECT OF REGULATION ON RISK  
RISK CATEGORY Lawi Self-regulation Code Norms 
Annoyance 0 
Cookie regulation 
DPA not enforced 
 
+ 
ASA and other regulatory bodies 
Codes of practice and industry 
bodies 
Effective for UK advertisers 
 
+ 
Ad supressing software 
Opt out of ads 
 
+ 
Leaving a service 
Ad blocking software 
Education by advertising 
industry 
 
Psychological 
harm 
0 
Not addressed by DPA legislation 
0 
Infrequent intervention by SNS 
providers 
0 
System allows users to flag up 
inappropriate content 
+ 
Flagging up unacceptable 
content 
Ostracism 
Financial and 
material loss 
0 
No addressed by DPA legislation 
Anti-discrimination legislation 
0 
SNS providers can block 
scammers, but do not seem to 
very often 
+ 
A lot of data is automatically 
transferred to apps freely 
Better password control 
+ 
User education and behaviour 
geared to online safety 
Loss of liberty - 
DPA exemption for security and 
court cases 
- 
Ineffective.  All too often SNS 
providers capitulate to demands 
of security agencies 
+ 
Encryption of messages 
+ 
Deception by users 
Use of anti-language 
User boycotts 
Physical harm 0 
Not covered by DPA 
May be covered by criminal law 
0 
No evidence that SNSs are 
devoting much attention to this 
+ 
User-defined groups with access 
to control access to very personal 
data 
+ 
Safe behaviour to avoid risk 
Key 
+ = mitigates personal risk 
0 = Neutral, or no effect on personal risk 
- = worsens personal risk 
 
                                                          
i
 Primarily focused on the Data Protection Act 1998 
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The column for Law in Table 22 shows that the DPA exemption for national security actually 
exposes users to greater risks that their personal data will be used to their disadvantage.  
Personal data can be used to target and pinpoint a potential terrorist or criminal conspiracy 
leading to loss of liberty. 
Self-regulation, particularly by the digital advertising industry, has a positive effect by reducing 
the annoyance to individuals caused by persistent targeted advertising.  However 
self-regulation can be negative where SNS providers choose to comply with extra-legal data 
requests by security agencies. 
Self-regulation is seen as most effective in the category that includes regulation of ads, a 
significant cause of annoyance to users.  There may be a commercial pressure here because 
of the ease with which users can install ad-blocking software, denying the SNS providers of 
revenue generated from purchase of access to targeted groups of users.  In some instances, 
such as handing over personal records to state authorities and security agencies, 
self-ƌegulatioŶ is detƌiŵeŶtal to useƌs͛ iŶteƌests ďeĐause of its laĐk of aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ.  
Independent monitoring of self-regulation would be a necessary first step to strengthening the 
effectiveness of this mode of regulation. 
Code is potentially effective in mitigating against all the risk categories although is not 
exploited to its fullest extent, despite active encouragement from the ICO to incorporate 
͚pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ desigŶ͛ pƌiŶĐiples iŶto the deǀelopŵeŶt of Ŷeǁ sǇsteŵs.  EǆteƌŶal teĐhŶologǇ 
solutions such as ad supressing software and encryption of data and messages are effective 
ways of managing annoyance and possibly also problems associated with financial and 
material loss and loss of liberty, through interception of messages and other personal data.  
Having the facility to control who sees what information is an important safety measure to 
protect against financial loss and against physical harm. 
Code in the form of ad-blocking software has a positive effect by enabling users to opt out of 
ads and the consequent annoyance.  Encryption and security software can help to protect 
against mining of personal data for fraud and thereby financial loss.  Another positive effect 
is use of technology to protect against scrutiny of online activity by security agencies.  This 
reduces the threat of loss of liberty.  Countering this is the potential financial and material 
loss from inappropriate sharing of data gathered by Apps from websites.  The design of SNSs 
to allow additional protection to sensitive personal data can limit the exposure to harassment, 
stalking and criminal targeting.  This is achieved by allowing users to control who can see 
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what information on their profiles.  Improved design and defaulting to greater privacy would 
enhance this protection further, although the economic drivers suggest that this is unlikely to 
happen.  Any site that makes its money from selling on personal data is not going to 
discourage exchange of information. 
Where norms include user behaviour, this is an effective strategy for mitigating all categories 
of risk.  For instance, leaving a service or ostracising services and individuals who behave in a 
threatening or unacceptable manner can achieve a degree of protection.  Learning a 
͚highǁaǇ Đode͛ foƌ use of soĐial ŵedia helps to pƌoŵote safe ďehaǀiouƌ that aǀoids ƌisks suĐh 
as inadvertently publishing your home address, current location and movements and 
transmission of sensitive personal information to apps providers and other external sites. 
Norms have a positive effect on all types of risk.  Teaching users about online safety offers 
the possibility of greater choice of online behaviour.  The collective behaviour of users 
becomes a market force.  
The differing effects of legislation on each of the personal risk types suggests that personal risk 
can be used as a way of distinguishing between regulatory modes.  It is possible that it may 
go beyond this by providing a measure of the relative effectiveness of each regulatory mode.  
The measures can only be comparative at this stage because there is an insufficient corpus of 
data available to accurately quantify these values. 
It is important to set this in a wider context.  Personal risk is not the only consideration that 
needs to be made when evaluating different regulatory modes.  The effects of regulation on 
society should be taken into account.  An individual threat such as loss of liberty may be a 
societal good, by reducing the risk of terrorist attacks, for instance.  It is probably also 
desirable to take into account the effects of regulation on the operation of the market.  
Over-regulation may stifle innovation and lack of regulation may result in harm to individuals, 
society and ultimately to the markets themselves. 
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CHAPTER 13  –  CONCLUSION  
INT RO DU CTIO N  
SCO PE  
This research set out to test the hypothesis that law-based regulation alone is not the most 
effective way of protecting users against the possible risks associated with use of SNSs.  It 
also set out to test a second hypothesis that risk to individual users can be used to compare 
the effectiveness of different modes of regulation.  In investigating these two hypotheses, 
first stated in Chapter 1, the following research questions were considered: 
 What is the nature of regulation of access to personal data on online social networking 
services (SNSs)?  What are the risks to users of having personal data on SNSs?  How have law-makers responded to the inception and growth of SNSs?  What effects do different regulatory methods have on risk to individuals?  Is risk to users an effective method of comparing different modes of regulation? 
In this concluding chapter each of the research questions is considered in turn before 
examining how the answers to these questions support the two hypotheses.  The final 
section of the chapter identifies potential avenues of further research. 
WH Y RE GU LAT E?  
Before examining the different regulatory mechanisms at play in the social networking 
landscape it is important to understand what motivates regulation.  Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 
(2012) in their work on the regulation of UK utilities have suggested that there are two main 
reasons for regulating: firstly to protect against market failure; and secondly to protect human 
rights and enhance social solidarity.  
An example of market failure is the unequal bargaining power of consumers and service 
providers.  This study found that consumers were not in a position to bargain about personal 
privacy because they did not have the expertise, nor do they have much power individually.  
This ŵeaŶs that “N“s ĐaŶ adopt a ͚take it oƌ leaǀe it͛ attitude.  AŶotheƌ foƌŵ of ŵaƌket failuƌe 
is market monopoly.  Although there are competitors, one service, Facebook, dominates the 
SNS market.  Where there is a genuine choice, consumers (the market) are able to exercise 
some pressure on providers by moving their custom elsewhere (Rodrigues 2010).  Wu (2010, 
p.304) in his study of the failure of regulation of the information industries in the United States 
focuses primarily on market regulation.  He advocates ͞ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg a salutaƌǇ distaŶĐe 
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between different functions in the information iŶdustƌǇ͟.  He argues that the information 
industry is not a special case and that it is as prone to monopolies as other industries.   
Chapter 4 of this thesis considers the other main reason for regulating SNSs, which is to 
protect human rights, including the right to privacy and the right to freedom from abuse and 
eǆploitatioŶ.  The ƌight to pƌiǀaĐǇ is the ďasis foƌ the UK͛s Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ, disĐussed 
in Chapter 7.  Lessig (2006, p.xv) asks the following questions in the preface of his book, 
͚Code is Laǁ͛: 
How do we protect liberty when the architectures of control are managed as 
much by the government as by the private sector? How do we assure privacy 
when the ether perpetually spies? How do we guarantee free thought when 
the push is to propertize every idea? How do we guarantee self-determination 
when the architectures of control are perpetually determined elsewhere? 
Blacklock (2003) in his study of regulation in the qualifications sector in England identified a 
Ŷuŵďeƌ of pƌoďleŵs ǁith ƌegulatioŶ.  These ďuilt oŶ BaldǁiŶ aŶd Caǀe͛s (1999) work on 
regulation of utilities.  Blacklock talks about regulatory capture where a regulator identifies 
too closely with the regulated industry.  This may be because they come from that industry 
or because the possibility exists of being employed by that industry in future.  For instance, 
where an individual moves from working for the regulator to employment as a legal counsel 
for an SNS provider, there is a real possibility that enforcement during their time as regulator 
might not have been as rigorous as it would otherwise have been.   
Another problem is the limited territorial scope of regulation highlighted by Lessig (2006) and 
Wu (2010).  The Internet is an international service and a service provider may be located 
outside the jurisdiction where its customers are based.  For instance, Facebook Europe is 
incorporated in Ireland and is therefore not subject (so the argument goes) to British law – 
even if it deals with personal and confidential data relating to British citizens and residents.  
BEN EF IT S AN D D I SADV ANTA GE S OF R E GUL ATI ON  
Earlier discussion in Chapter 6 suggested that managing risk was a benefit of regulation.  This 
is despite the problems or defects that arise from the implementation of statutory regulations.  
Enormous effort and resources have been devoted to data protection regulation and this has 
facilitated a market where differences in privacy protection should not be a barrier to trade 
within the European Union.  However this has called consumer protection into question, and 
especially the protection of individual privacy rights.  There has been some concern about the 
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differences in the implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) in different 
European countries, an issue that the General Data Protection Regulation 2012 aims to 
address.  Ireland, in its efforts to become a European hub for many US based firms has not 
only established a favourable tax regime, but is also considered to be lenient about data 
protection compared to countries like Germany (Zell 2014).     
Regulation is expensive.  It imposes costs on service providers and these costs are inevitably 
passed on to the consumer.  This may be done indirectly by increasing the need for revenue 
generation through advertising for instance, which was discussed in Chapter 9.  Or it could be 
by introduction of fees, although this seems unlikely given the currently established 
advertising-driven market.  If badly designed, regulation can interfere with the efficient 
operation of the market and even the level of transparency.  For instance, data protection 
legislation could prevent multi-national companies from operating efficiently if they were 
restricted by location in the way in which they could pƌoĐess Đustoŵeƌs͛ aŶd eŵploǇees͛ data.  
The legislation could create a trade barrier, an indirect tariff, on trade beyond the European 
UŶioŶ͛s ďouŶdaƌies. 
The disadvantages of regulation are compounded by the shortcomings in implementation of 
regulatory measures that do exist.  One response is to consider whether regulation is 
necessary or desirable.  Although there are significant benefits, the costs of achieving them 
may not make them worthwhile.  It is difficult to enforce regulations on companies that are 
based outside the European Union.  An analysis of privacy policies (Chapter 8) demonstrated 
that some providers do not consider themselves bound by European legislation and claim that 
by signing their Terms and Conditions users are agreeing to this.  The other concern is that 
legislation could lull consumers into a false sense of security by believing that protections are 
in place, when in fact they are unenforceable. 
Regulation can be justified in terms of the benefits to society, to government, to industry and 
to iŶdiǀiduals.  The People͛s IŶƋuiƌǇ ĐoŶduĐted ďǇ Deŵos eŵphasised the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of 
tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ iŶ the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh iŶdiǀiduals͛ data is used aŶd ƌegulated (Bradwell 2010): 
The best defence against the inappropriate use of personal information and 
the harms associated with it is to make the use of personal information as 
democratic as possible. That requires a solid governance framework, including 
giving people the means to make meaningful, informed decisions about when 
and where to release information when it is in their power to do so. 
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RES EAR CH QUESTIO NS  ANS W ER ED  
This consideration of the rule of regulation, its costs and benefits leads to the research 
questions that were posed at the start of this research. 
RQ1  WH AT I S T HE NA TUR E O F RE GU LAT IO N OF AC CE S S T O PER S ON AL DATA ON 
ONL INE SO CIA L NET WO R KIN G SER V I CE S (SNSS)? 
Chapter 6 examined ways in which regulation applies to the online environment.  Reidenberg 
(1998) in his model of regulation identified the following characteristics of internet regulation:  
Lex Informatica has three sets of characteristics that are particularly valuable 
for establishing information policy and rule-making in an Information Society. 
First, technological rules do not rely on national borders. Second, Lex 
Informatica allows easy customization of rules with a variety of technical 
mechanisms. Finally, technological rules may also benefit from built-in 
self-enforcement and compliance-monitoring capabilities. 
This led to the development of a new model of regulation that, while acknowledging the 
importance of statutory legislation based on Law, considers other modes of regulation namely:  
Norms, Market and Code (Lessig 2006).  The advantage of this approach is that it neatly 
addressed one of the major problems of legislation – its territorial limits.  Lessig goes on to 
present strong arguments for the effect of Code on the operation of systems.  He also 
considers the effect of collective norms on individual behaviour, particularly focusing on the 
power of ostracism to regulate online behaviour.  This research extended the regulatory 
model to include the effect of collective user behaviour on service providers, as well as the 
effect of individual choices (Chapter 6). 
Self-regulation is potentially a powerful instrument in the regulatory toolbox.  The analysis of 
privacy policies in Chapter 8 indicates that there is an emerging consensus about protection of 
personal data and its use.  There is some controversy about what is defined as personal data 
(Chapter 4), and this is an area that is likely to continue evolving. 
The model of regulation developed for this study and described in Chapter 6 identified the 
following modes of regulation: 
 Law – the statutory legislation at UK and European level that governs data protection 
and privacy 
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 Self-regulation – measures taken by SNS providers to protect personal data, and 
manifest in privacy policies and industry codes of practice  Code – the way in which systems are designed and set up and technologies designed 
to protect privacy  Norms – the values and behaviour of users, individually and collectively and their 
effect on SNS providers 
RQ2  WH AT AR E TH E R I SK S T O USER S OF HAV I NG PER SO NA L DATA O N  SNSS?  
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, p.83) state that ͞ƌegulatioŶ ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ as ďeiŶg iŶheƌeŶtlǇ 
about the control of ƌisks…͟.  This is a theme that has underpinned the approach taken by 
both the European Union and the UK Government in recent years (Better Regulation 
Commission 2006).  Chapter 5 of this thesis identified the range of risks that an individual 
faces from using SNSs and the need to manage those risks.  
After considering existing risk typologies, a set of risk categories based on consequences to 
users was developed.  This helped to focus attention on the user outcomes rather than the 
causative events.  This also provided a means of analysing and clarifying the complex 
relationships between cause and effect.  The categories of risk identified were: 
 Loss of liberty  Nuisance   Psychological harm  Physical harm  Financial and material loss 
RQ3  HO W HAV E LAW-MAKER S RE SP OND ED T O THE IN CE PT ION AND GR OW TH O F 
SNS S?  
Chapter 7 describes how law-makers have responded to the emergence of SNSs and the 
legislative framework in the UK for regulating access to personal data.  This centres around 
the Data Protection Act 1998, based on the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC).  This 
legislation has its origins in the European Convention on Human Rights which identifies the 
right to respect for private and family life.  One response to the global reach of SNSs has been 
the development of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework.  This self-regulatory scheme allows 
US-based companies (including SNSs) to process the personal data of EU citizens and residents 
iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith the DiƌeĐtiǀe͛s pƌiŶĐiples.  IŶ ϮϬϭϰ the EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt passed the 
General Data Protection Regulation, which will apply directly to all EU member states.  
 225 
Implementation and enforcement will be devolved to national authorities, such as the 
IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe iŶ the UK.  The ‘egulatioŶ has a Ŷuŵďeƌ of Ŷeǁ 
pƌoǀisioŶs iŶĐludiŶg ͚the ƌight to ďe foƌgotteŶ͛ aŶd the ƌight to tƌaŶsfeƌ peƌsoŶal “N“ aĐĐouŶts 
to new providers. 
RQ4  WHAT  EFF EC TS  DO D I F FER EN T RE GU L ATOR Y ME TH OD S H AV E  ON R I SK TO 
INDIV IDUA L S?  
Baldwin et al (2012, p.3) provide a threefold definition of regulation: ͞As a speĐifiĐ set of 
ĐoŵŵaŶds͟; ͞As deliďeƌate state iŶflueŶĐe͟; and ͞As all foƌŵs of soĐial oƌ eĐoŶoŵiĐ iŶflueŶĐe͟.  
It encompasses statutory regulation via legislation, as well as other mechanisms that control or 
affect the behaviour of systems such as SNSs.  
One of the purposes of regulation is to manage risk.  Chapters 4 and 5 look at the nature of 
risk and who was affected when personal data is made available via SNSs.  Although 
employers, service providers, and society in general are affected, the focus of this study has 
been on the individual subjects of the data being regulated.  Individuals face the widest range 
of risk and are most affected by access to personal data.   
The four modes of regulation defined in Chapter 6 were evaluated in terms of their effect on 
the five categories of risk defined in Chapter 5.  Chapters 7-11 in Section III of this thesis 
consider each of the regulatory modes in turn (including two chapters on self-regulation).  
This is followed by a discussion in Chapter 12 which compares these modes of regulation and 
presents them in Table 22. It concluded that each mode of regulation ameliorates risk by 
decreasing the probability of occurrence or by decreasing the impact (consequence) of a risk 
event, none of them improves the outĐoŵe iŶ all the ƌisk Đategoƌies.  “oŵe, suĐh as ͚Laǁ͛ 
aŶd ͚“elf-‘egulatioŶ͛ Đould poteŶtiallǇ eǆpose useƌs to iŶĐƌeased ƌisk of haƌŵ ;suĐh as 
imprisonment) by their policies of passing on personal data to security agencies. 
EU legislation and the Data Protection Act 1998 set public expectations about the storage and 
use of personal data.  Although the provisions of the law are quite extensive, the resources 
for enforcement are very limited.  For most of the risk categories effectiveness depends on 
awareness of the individual rights and corporate responsibilities when it comes to handling 
personal data. 
The review of self-regulation demonstrated was difficult to police, partly because of the lack of 
agreement on what constitutes personal data and partly because of the range of agents 
involved.   
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The way in which systems are designed (or Code) has a profound effect on usability of privacy 
optioŶs ;foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, ǁhetheƌ theǇ aƌe theƌe oƌ ŶotͿ.  The IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe 
in the UK actively enĐouƌages sǇsteŵ desigŶeƌs aŶd seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀideƌs to adopt the ͚pƌiǀaĐǇ ďǇ 
desigŶ͛ appƌoaĐh.  The ŵaiŶ shoƌtĐoŵiŶg is the iŵďalaŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ the poǁeƌ of the seƌǀiĐe 
providers and the regulatory authorities in the UK.  It is entirely up to SNS providers to 
determine how they design their systems and trends towards greater disclosure seem to 
suggest that the main driver is the ability to generate revenue from advertisers.  User 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe is also a ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ aŶd pƌiǀaĐǇ ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe at the top of ŵost useƌs͛ priorities to 
begin with. 
This brings us to the final category: Norms, as expressed by user behaviour.  This is the one 
regulatory mode that can affect the outcome of most (but not all) the risk scenarios identified 
in Chapter 5.  Individual consumers have the ultimate sanction of not using a service at all or 
of ceasing to use a service, if they do not like the conditions of use or the way in which the 
service providers conduct themselves.  Users can also make choices (for the most part) about 
what information they divulge, who sees it and even whether it is real or made up.  It 
therefore seems logical that more emphasis should be placed on user education (Christiansen 
2011).  This has been recognised increasingly by the service providers such as Facebook.  
Their privacy policies have become more accessible and interactive and the SNSs are beginning 
to provide tools that help users to easily monitor their privacy settings.   
The digital advertising industry has also taken on user education.  This is coordinated on a 
Europe-wide basis to provide consumers with consistent and helpful guides to safe usage of 
online systems (EDAA 2015).  The authorities in the UK have developed or supported user 
education materials and guidelines to encourage and help people to use SNS more safely and 
to continue to benefit from the richness of features and possibilities that they provide 
;IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ϮϬϬϵ; Get “afe OŶliŶe Liŵited ϮϬϭϱͿ. 
RQ5  IS R I S K TO US ER S AN EF FE CTIV E MET HOD  OF COM PAR I NG D I F FER ENT MOD E S  
OF REG ULA TI ON?  
Chapter 5 reviewed the risks and developed a typology based on the outcomes of risk events 
fƌoŵ the useƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe.  While this studǇ aiŵs to tƌeat peƌsoŶal ƌisk fullǇ it ǁas felt that 
it should not stray into areas such as child protection where special considerations occur, such 
as the meaning of consent, parental supervision and age restrictions on services.  Other 
aspects such as intellectual property, censorship and national security are also potentially rich 
areas of future research. 
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In discussing the effect of different modes of regulation on personal risk, Chapter 12 
demonstrated that each regulatory mode has different effects on the personal risk 
consequences identified in Chapter 5.  This could be developed into a methodology that 
allows policy makers and legislators to compare and assess the relative effectiveness of 
different regulatory modes.  This methodology could be used in a similar manner to privacy 
impact assessments. 
TESTI NG  T HE HYPO THESES  
The research questions threw light on the two hypotheses that were proposed at the 
beginning of this thesis.  They used empirical data collected and analysed during this 
investigation as well as evidence from the literature (Chapter 2). 
H1  TH E LAW I S NO T EN OUG H  
The legislative approach to regulation has the benefit of being developed over several decades 
across Europe, with input from many different interest groups.  In order to be effective, 
regulation usually has the force of law behind it.  The law represents a codification of the 
public good, often contrary to the interests of the industries or enterprises that are being 
regulated.  Legislation also provides a framework within which other forms of regulation can 
operate.  This research demonstrated the relationship between self-regulation in the 
advertising industry and statutory regulation (Chapter 9).  
The hypothesis that the law alone is not the most effective method of regulation begs the 
question: Is there a better way of regulating access to personal data on SNSs?  The evidence 
gathered during this study highlighted the interdependence of different modes of regulation in 
this aƌea, a faĐtoƌ aĐkŶoǁledged ďǇ the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe iŶ its pƌoŵotioŶ of 
Privacy by Design (Code) and user education (Mode). 
Chapter 7 identified a number of weaknesses in the legislative approach, namely: 
 The problem of interpretation of exemptions  The uneven implementation of the data protection directive across Europe  The extra-territoriality and weakness of the self-regulatory U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 
framework  The lack of means to rigorously enforce the existing statutory regulation 
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Although some of these points may be addressed by the General Data Protection Regulation 
2012, the problem of variation in enforcement remains, as this will be the responsibility of the 
national authorities. 
The Data Protection Act 1998 (and other national legislation) is limited in its territorial reach 
aŶd theƌefoƌe its appliĐaďilitǇ to “N“ seƌǀiĐes ďased ďeǇoŶd the EU͛s ďoƌdeƌs.  AlteƌŶatiǀe 
approaches such as persuading SNS providers to build more protection into their systems 
would help to overcome this problem. 
The lack of resources available for enforcement is the other major limitation on the 
effectiveness of legislation.  The ICO in the UK brings very few cases and tends to avoid cases 
with large corporates because they are likely to be difficult and expensive to pursue.  Instead 
theǇ ƌelǇ oŶ ͚Ŷaŵe aŶd shaŵe͛ taĐtiĐs.  VeƌǇ feǁ Đases haǀe ďeeŶ ďƌought to the Couƌts ďǇ 
aggrieved individuals because of lack of awareness of their rights, the costs of bringing cases 
and the perceived likelihood of failure. 
One of the benefits of legislation is that it sets standards and therefore the expectations of 
users.  There is a view expressed by regulators, LIS professionals and experts in the field 
(Chapters 9 and 11) that users own at least some responsibility for safe use of social media and 
that soŵe foƌŵ of ͚tƌaffiĐ seŶse͛ is ƌeƋuiƌed.  IŶdeed “Đhŵidt aŶd CoheŶ (2013, p.54) 
maintain that ͞seĐuƌitǇ aŶd pƌiǀaĐǇ aƌe a shaƌed ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŵpaŶies, useƌs aŶd 
iŶstitutioŶs͟.  Few people would advocate banning vehicles from the roads because they are 
inherently dangerous.  Instead there is a regime of statutory regulation that governs the 
behaviour of drivers and from a young age children are taught about road safety.  It is 
possible to see parallels with the internet where some statutory regulation is required for the 
data controllers but a great deal of the responsibility for safety lies with the individual.  
This suggests that while the law is very important for protecting personal data, it depends on 
other regulatory modes to be effective.  Norms of users and the behaviour of providers are 
both affected by the law.  Self-regulation also has a key role to play, a factor acknowledged 
ďǇ the IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe in its efforts to promote PbD and encourage defaults 
to less disclosure.  These factors all suggest that law-based regulation alone is not the most 
effective way of protecting users against the risks associated with use of SNSs. 
H2  A  R I S K-BA S ED ME T HOD OL O GY FOR  EV ALUA TIN G RE GU LAT OR Y EF F ECT IV E NE S S  
One of the challenges of using risk as a way of comparing different modes of regulation is the 
difficulty first of all in defining risk, and then in measuring it.  There are limitations to any 
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methodology and the principal issue with this approach is its qualitative nature.  It is 
probably possible to say that one regulatory mode has a greater or lower impact on a specific 
category of personal risk than another.  However it has not proven possible to quantify these 
relativities.  One approach would be to assign a monetary value to each risk event or type of 
risk in the UK or even within the EU.  For example, the monetary value of fines, damages, or 
compensation awarded following court cases could be added up.  However there are too few 
cases for this approach to work.  There is also an insufficient corpus of events to estimate 
probabilities of occurrence. 
The second area of concern was the difficulty in separating out the effects of regulation from 
other environmental factors that affect personal risk.  Cultural and national characteristics 
might have a more profound effect on personal risk than the regulatory mode.  In some 
countries people might for instance be more concerned about freedom of speech and 
censorship, whereas in others privacy and security might be considered higher priorities. 
A third objection to the hypothesis is the existence of other, better methods of comparing the 
effectiveness of different regulatory modes.  Existing approaches focus on the effect of 
regulation on the market or on its impact on the industry being regulated (Baldwin et al. 2012; 
Serpell 2008).  The socio-legal literature focuses on comparison of similar types of legislation 
in different countries (Radaelli 2010; Gray et al. 2008).  Even though risk management has 
been one of the major justifications for regulation in Europe from the late 20th century 
onwards (Hutter 2005), the literature review in Chapter 2 revealed very little on the use of risk 
measurement as a method of evaluating regulation. 
Chapter 6 identified four main modes of regulation of access to personal data on online social 
networking services (SNSs).  Using personal risk as a perspective it was possible to distinguish 
different degrees of effectiveness of the different regulatory approaches.  The risk 
perspective showed that there were shortcomings with each regulatory approach.  For 
example, law does not always cover the territories in which the services are based, and there 
is an uneven implementation of legislation such as the Data Protection Directive across 
Europe.  Self-regulation in the form of privacy policies is opaque to users and does not 
provide sufficient information for them to make informed decisions about their privacy 
settings.  Code, the use of technology to protect personal data, is an emerging area but is 
very patchy and there is not a full suite of tools to monitor and evaluate SNSs.  Finally, the 
useƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ (Mode) can be effective, if the infrastructure is in place for users to make 
meaningful decisions. 
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Risk has thrown light on these regulatory modes and provides some support for the second 
hypothesis that risk to individual users can be used to compare the effectiveness of different 
modes of regulation.  However this approach needs further development if it is to be useful 
to legislators and policy-makers and the programme of future research described in the 
following section might help to develop the tools to do so. 
FURT HER  RES EAR CH  
The model used to describe the different modes of regulation could provide a framework for a 
research programme to develop thinking on effective regulation of personal privacy in social 
media.  The proposed programme would test this model of regulation further by extending it 
into other areas of activity, described below.  It would also be the basis for comparative 
studies across different jurisdictions – possibly through collaborative research projects.  The 
programme would have four main strands, corresponding to the four modes of regulation 
identified in this research: 
Legislation – This study focused primarily on EU legislation as it applies in the UK.  
The regime is very different from the fragmented approach to privacy protection in the 
United States.  Although there have been a number of comparative studies (Gray et 
al. 2008; Mendel et al. 2012; Schwartz 2013) there has been very little comparison 
between Europe, the US and emerging nations such as Brazil with large populations of 
SNS users.  In the first instance a review of online privacy legislation in Brazil, Marco 
da IŶteƌŶet ϮϬϭϰ, Đould foƌŵ the ďasis of a ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ ǁith the pƌoǀisioŶs of the EU͛s 
General Data Protection Directive 2012. 
Self-regulation – The privacy policies of eleven major SNS providers available to UK 
users were investigated.  Accessibility of these policies has been raised as an issue in 
a survey of information professionals (Haynes & Robinson 2015).  A project could 
gather empirical data on the degree to which users consult privacy policies (tracking 
usage of the privacy pages of SNS providers, for instance) and what effect that has on 
their behaviour.  There is also a real issue of the effectiveness of privacy policies in 
non English-speaking countries such as Brazil, which make extensive use of 
English-language SNSs.  Attitudinal surveys of these groups could also point the way 
towards more effective user education and behaviour modification to avoid risk.  
Another aspect of self-regulation that warrants detailed investigation is the degree to 
which the privacy policies accurately reflect the choices that users face.  Some 
aspects may be difficult to verify – such as whether SNS providers do actually destroy 
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personal data in the timeframes that they indicate in their policies – but others could 
be checked through a detailed auditing process.  This would require the cooperation 
of the SNS providers. 
Code – This research identified a number of tools that could be used to enhance 
privacy (Chapters 9 and 10).  There is already considerable attention paid to Privacy 
by Design and this has been taken up as a principle by regulators in Europe and North 
America ;IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe ϮϬϬϴ; CaǀoukiaŶ ϮϬϭϮ; ‘uďiŶsteiŶ & 
Good 2013).  A comprehensive survey of external tools for protecting personal 
information privacy would complement this.  For instance, data encryption tools, ad 
blockers and secure personal data centres are all areas that have seen recent growth 
in new products and services.  A survey would identify emerging trends and might 
also help policy makers to identify gaps in the market and therefore inform research 
policy and investment. 
Mode – The relationship between attitudes and behaviour warrants further work.  
The OXIS longitudinal surveys provide a useful starting point (Blank 2010).  The 
proposed research would investigate the relationship between what people say 
(attitudes and reported behaviour) and what they do (actual behaviour).  Attitudes to 
risk associated with personal data on social networks were considered in this research 
and the qualitative investigations identified a number of important risks and issues.  
This could be developed further by undertaking a national quantitative survey using a 
stratified sampling technique to see whether the attitudes of different demographic 
groups vary.  Similar surveys could also be conducted in Brazil, North America, and 
other European Union countries, for comparison. 
The other major strand of this research considered the role of risk to evaluate different modes 
of regulation.  Social media are increasingly being used in the workplace in a number of ways: 
 Use by the organisation for marketing and promotion  Use by individuals in the workplace for private purposes  Use by employees at home for private use 
Future research could investigate the degree to which employers regulate usage of social 
media by employees, building on previous work (Wilkes 2011; Yokoyama & Sekiguchi 2014; 
Haynes 2011).  The research would identify the risks that employers are trying to protect 
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themselves against such as: reputational damage; exposure to malware; security breaches; 
and lower staff productivity (Anon n.d.).  It would also look at the extent to which these risks 
are addressed by internal information governance frameworks.  The risk paradigm would be 
relevant in this context because one of the main purposes of information governance is to 
ŵaŶage ƌisk.  EŵploǇeƌs͛ soĐial ŵedia policies have already been gathered and collated by 
Chris Boudreaux (2014) and this provides a rich resource for a preliminary investigation.  This 
could be extended by surveying employers and their staff.  A risk analysis could be tested as a 
way of evaluating information governance policies, in a similar way to the evaluation of 
regulatory modes in this research. 
These proposed research strands would build on the two approaches tested in this thesis: the 
categorisation of regulation into four distinct modalities; and the use of risk as a way of 
evaluating regulatory effectiveness.  The proposed research programme carries forward the 
conclusions of this thesis by providing an international perspective and by considering 
workplace issues.  This fills a gap in existing research programmes such as those of the 
Berkman Centre (Harvard University 2015) and the Oxford Internet Institute (University of 
Oxford 2015). 
CONT RIBUTIO N TO KNO WL EDG E  
This research set out to explore the nature of regulation of access to personal data on SNSs by 
investigating the different modes of regulation and their effect on risk to individual users.  
One of the objectives of the research was to discover whether there was a way of comparing 
or evaluating the relative effectiveness of the different regulatory modes identified.  The 
research was prompted by the rapid growth in the use of SNSs and the evolution and 
development of new services and facilities.  Online social media provide considerable 
benefits to users which are free at the point of use.  They facilitate greater interaction and 
create opportunities to connect with a wide range of people.  The technology also presents 
significant opportunities for businesses to market to targeted audiences.  However where 
these two interests collide, there is a perception of loss of control of personal data as well as a 
growing concern about misuse of personal data. 
This research contributes to the on-going debate about personal security and privacy in the 
context of online social media and has made the following unique contributions to the field: 
 It has developed an approach to assessment of regulatory effectiveness based on risk 
to individuals (Chapter 12).  This method could be extended to cover wider social 
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media or to consider use of SNSs in the workplace.  Although one of the 
acknowledged purposes of regulation is to manage risk, there was a gap in the 
reported research about using risk to evaluate regulatory effectiveness.  A new typology of risk was developed (Figure 6) based on the consequences of risk 
events from the perspective of the individual user.  This model was developed 
because existing models were either too general (Swedlow et al. 2009) or where they 
applied to SNSs were very partial in their coverage.  The ƌegulatoƌǇ laŶdsĐape ǁas iŶǀestigated usiŶg Lessig͛s (2006) model of four modes 
of regulation as the starting-poiŶt.  Lessig͛s ŵodel pƌedates the ƌise of soĐial ŵedia 
and does not take full account of self-regulation.  This has become a much more 
prominent feature of regulation and deserves separate scrutiny.  The adapted model 
described in Chapter 6 allows for that.  A new conceptualisation of the relationships between agents that participate in an 
online SNS (Figure 5) was useful in identifying the different interest groups affected by 
risk.  Degrees of privacy (Figure 11) based on closeness to the individual is a simplified 
model of personal data that consolidates the approaches of other workers in the field.  
This simplified model makes it easier to understand how different measures expose 
users to risk. 
This research is timely and topical.  At the time of writing, the new European Data Protection 
Regulation had been passed by the European Parliament and was in the process of being 
finalised before being implemented.  It is broadly based on data protection principles, but 
introduces several new provisions such as: the right to be forgotten, the right to transfer 
personal profiles to new services, and the duty of data controllers to report data breaches.  
This research provides a unique perspective on regulation and it is hoped that policy makers 
and legislators will be able to call on some of the concepts, insights and methods developed 
here as they finalise the legislation and set up mechanisms to enforce and monitor it. 
Although the research is UK-based and European in perspective, the research methods used 
and concepts developed may be applied more widely.  Large emerging economies such as 
that of Brazil, are already heavy users of social media and are increasingly attractive to 
advertisers trying to reach large, aspirant populations with increasing disposable income.  
This research may provide a basis for comparison with Europe and perhaps help them to avoid 
some of the mistakes that have already been made. 
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Finally, there is a move to greater user control, based on user education and awareness. This 
research highlights the importance of user attitudes and its significance in managing risks to 
individuals.  Comparisons have been made with road safety campaigns, and this represents a 
useful adjunct to statutory regulation. 
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GLOSSARY  
 
API Application Programming Interface 
ASA Advertising Standards Authority 
BCS British Computer Society 
BPR Best Practice Resource 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China 
CAP Committee on Advertising Practice 
CILIP Chartered Institute of Library and Information Professionals 
CMA Computer Misuse Act 1990 
DMA Direct Marketing Association 
DPA Data Protection Act 1998 
DPD Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) 
DPR Data Protection Regulation 2012 
EC European Commission 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EDAA European Digital Advertising Alliance 
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor 
EESC European Economic and Social Committee 
EP European Parliament 
EU European Union 
EULA End User Licence Agreement 
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
HRA Human Rights Act 1998 
IABUK Internet Advertisers Bureau UK 
ICO IŶfoƌŵatioŶ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s OffiĐe 
ID Identity or Identifier 
IP Internet Protocol 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
LIS Library and Information Service 
NHS National Health Service 
OBA Online Behavioural Advertising 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Ofcom Office of Communications 
OII Oxford Internet Institute 
OSN Online Social Network (see also SNS) 
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PbC Privacy by Design 
PECR  Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulation 
PPI Payment Protection Insurance 
RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
SI Statutory Instrument 
SNS Social Networking Service 
SRO Self-Regulatory Organization 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
W3C Worldwide Web Consortium 
WP Working Party 
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APPENDIX A  –  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF SEARCHES  
 
Sensitivity searches on EbscoHost conducted on 28th November 2014 
The table shows the number of hits for each search and the effect of specifying the names of 
the SNSs included in this research. 
TABLE 23  -  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF SEARCH STRATEGIES  
Search on ‘Privacy’ 
AND ‘Social 
Network*’ 
OR OR ‘Facebook’ OR 
‘Google’ 
Percentage 
increase in hits 
 
8732 12662 45% 
Facebook 10142 12662  
Google 11747 12662  
Badoo 8733 12662  
Hi5 8740 12668  
Instagram 8769 12666  
LinkedIn 8859 12683  
Myspace 8812 12695  
Ning 9164 13043 3% 
Snapchat 8741 12664  
Twitter 9630 12958 2% 
WhatsApp 8741 12664  
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APPENDIX B  –  INITIAL SURVEY OF ATTITUDES TO RISK  
Survey questionnaire administered via SurveyGizmo, in April 2011 
The workplace survey was distributed via the following British Computer Society (BCS) special 
interest groups and other group lists: 
 BCS Information Risk Management and Assurance LinkedIn Group  BCS Information Security Specialist Group on LinkedIn  BCS Law LinkedIn Group  BCS Internet LinkedIn Group  BCS Doctoral Consortium LinkedIn Group  Data Protection and Security LinkedIn Group  Information and Records Management Society LinkedIn Group  JISCMAIL Data-Protection  JISCMAIL Records-Management-UK 
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Social Networks and Privacy 
INTR O DUCT IO N  
Department of Information Science, School of Informatics, City University 
Please complete this survey to help identify issues that are of concern to users and potential users 
of social network services. 
For the purposes of this survey, social networks are web-accessible services, in which personal 
profiles are visible to other users of the service. In other words, individual users provide personal 
data (such as name, address and occupation) in exchange for access to the social network service 
and to other users. 
This survey is intended to explore the issues associated with access to personal data on social 
networks. This is part of a research degree at City University London to examine ways in which 
access to personal data is regulated. The objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
different methods of regulating access to personal data on social networks. 
This survey is directed at users and non-users of social network services. Data gathered in this 
survey will be consolidated so that individual respondents cannot be identified. 
David Haynes, March 2011 
 
1.)  DO YOU  HA VE A N ACT I VE  P R OF IL E O N A SOC IA L N E TWOR K ING S I TE  (SU C H A S 
FAC EBOO K ,  TW I TT ER  OR  YOUTU BE)?  
Social networks are web-accessible services which require individual participants to put 
up personal profiles that are visible to other users of the service. Individuals often have to 
provide personal data (such as name, address and occupation) in exchange for access to 
the social networking service and to other users. 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
US E O F SOCI AL NE TW O R KS  
2.)  WH IC H O F T H E F OL L OWI N G SOC IA L NE TWOR KI NG S I TE S D O Y OU  U S E?  
Tick all that apply 
[ ] Facebook 
[ ] Twitter 
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[ ] Tagged 
[ ] Orkut 
[ ] MySpace 
[ ] Badoo 
[ ] LinkedIn 
[ ] Others (please specify) 
3.)  HOW OF T EN D O YOU  U SE A  S OC IAL NE TW OR K I NG S IT E?  
If you use more than one social networking service, please answer for the most 
frequently used service. 
( ) Daily or more often 
( ) Once a week or more but less than once a day 
( ) Once a month or more but less than once a week 
( ) Less often than once a month 
4.)  WHA T D O YOU  CON S I D ER  T HE MAI N BE NE FI T S  OF  U S ING SO CIA L N ET W OR K S?  
 
5.)  WHA T D O YOU  CO NS ID ER  T H E MA IN R I SK S O F P U T TI NG YOU R  P ER S O NAL D A TA ON 
SOC IA L NE T WOR K S?  
 
6.)  W HAT  M EASU R ES OR  P R ECAU T IO NS S HO U LD  BE  TAK EN TO  P R OT EC T Y OU R  
P ER SO NAL D A TA O N SO C I AL NE T WOR K IN G SER V I C ES?  
Consider what precautions could be taken by: you; service providers; the industry; 
national governments; and international regulators. 
 
NON-USER S  
7.)  IS T HER E A P AR TI C U LAR  R EA SON W HY YO U  D O NO T U S E S OC IA L NE TWOR K ING 
SER VI CE S?  
Please give details 
8.)  WAS P ER SO NAL P R IVA CY A FAC TOR  IN Y OU R  D EC IS IO N NO T TO  U SE SOC IA L  
NE TWOR K ING S ER V I CE S ?  
If so, please elaborate 
9.)  WOU LD  ANY T H ING P ER SU A D E  YOU  TO  U S E A  SO CI A L NE TW OR K ING  SI TE  SU C H A S 
FAC EBOO K ,  L I NK EDIN ,  T WI T TER  OR  O T HER  SO CI AL NE T WOR K SER VI CE ?  
Please give details 
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IS SU E S -  AL L R E S POND E NTS  
10.)  AR E T HER E ANY D EV ELOP ME N TS T HAT Y O U  TH IN K  AR E LI KE LY T O  AFFE C T  T H E 
U SE O F P ER S ONA L D AT A  ON SO C IAL NE TW OR K S I N T HE NEX T 2  YEAR S?  
For instance, are you aware of new services, technology changes, or forthcoming 
legislation that might have an effect 
11.)  HO W E F FE CT I VE D O YOU  T HI NK T HE  DATA  PR OT EC T IO N AC T I S  FOR  P R OT EC T ING  
P ER SO NAL D A TA O N SO C I AL NE T WOR K S?  
The Data Protection Action, 1998 governs the handling and use of personal data 
collected in the UK, regardless of where it is held. It is based on 8 Data Protection 
Principles that can be found on the Information Commissioner's website. 
12.)  DO Y OU  HAV E A NY FU R T H ER  CO MME N T S ABOU T T H E IS SU E S S U R R OU ND IN G  
P R OTE C TI O N O F P ER SON AL D ATA O N S OC IA L NE T WOR K S?  
Please give details below 
 
FUTUR E C ONTA CT  
13.)  I F YOU  AR E IN TER E ST ED  IN T HE  R E SU L TS  O F TH I S SU R VEY  OR  IN P A R T I C IP AT IN G 
IN A  F OL LO W-U P  SU R V EY ,  P LEA SE IND ICA TE B E LO W :  
Please select all that apply. If you give your e-mail address it will only be used for the 
purposes you have indicated in this response and will not be passed to a third party. 
[ ] I would like to be sent a summary of the results of this survey 
[ ] I am interested in participating in a follow-up survey 
[ ] I am willing to be interviewed 
[ ] My e-mail address is: 
 
Thank You! 
David Haynes 
David Haynes is studying for a research degree at the Department of Information Science 
in the School of Informatics at City University, London. He can be contacted at: 
david.haynes.1@city.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX C  –  SURVEY OF LIS  PROFESSIONALS ǯ  ATTITUDES TO SNSS IN 
THE UK 
The Survey was distributed via SurveyGizmo in February 2014.  It was publicised via the 
following forums: 
Discussion lists on JISCMAIL 
 LIS-LINK  RECORDSMANAGEMENT-UK  LIS-PROFESSION  LIS-LIRG 
LinkedIn Groups 
 LIS Research Methods  Information Research  CILIP on LinkedIn  Information and Records Management Society Group  ISKOUK  London Information and Knowledge Exchange 
Twitter 
 Personal Twitter feed @jdavidhaynes and #citylis 
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Social Networks, Risk and Regulation 
INTR O DUCT IO N  
Hi there! 
Thanks for following the link to this City University survey. 
This short survey (no more than 15 minutes) seeks your views on the risks associated with online 
social networking.  It specifically looks at the risks to users in the United Kingdom and the ways 
in which those risks might be managed.  The survey is part of a PhD research study to compare 
different ways of regulating access to personal data gathered by online social networking 
providers. 
Online social networking is based on web-accessible services, which allow users to connect with 
other users to form social or professional networks.  This usually involves setting up a personal 
profile, which is visible to other users. 
In line with City University's research policy, participation in this survey is voluntary.  You have 
the right to withdraw from the survey at any time.  Data gathered in this survey will be 
consolidated so that individual respondents cannot be identified.  The data will be used for 
academic research purposes only.  At the end of the survey there will be a consent statement 
which you will need to confirm before submitting the completed questionnaire. 
David Haynes, February 2014 
BEF OR E W E BE GI N WE NE ED  TO FI ND  OU T W H ET H ER  T H IS SU R VE Y I S  R E LE VA NT TO  
YOU .  WHER E I N T H E UK  D O YOU  L IV E?* 
For the purposes of this survey, the United Kingdom comprises: England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. It does not include the Isle of Man or the Channel 
Islands. 
( ) England 
( ) Wales 
( ) Scotland 
( ) Northern Ireland 
( ) I do not live in the United Kingdom 
[Filter question.  Non-UK responses terminated at this point] 
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US E O F SOCI AL NE TW O R KS  
1)  DO Y OU  HAV E AN  AC TI V E  P R O FI LE ON A N O NL INE  S OC IAL  NE T WOR KI NG S ER V I CE  
SU C H AS :  FA CEB OO K ,  TWI T TER  OR  L I NK EDIN?  
Online social networks are web-accessible services, which allow users to connect with 
other users to form social or professional networks.  This often means putting up a 
personal profile that is visible to other users. 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
2)  IF YOU  D O U SE ON LI NE SO C IAL N ET WOR K ING S E R V IC ES ,  HO W OF TE N D O YOU 
ACC ES S T H EM?  
Use the blank boxes to add the names of online social networks you regularly use, if they 
are not included in the list. 
 
Most days Most weeks Occasionally Never 
Facebook ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Google+ ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
LinkedIn ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
Twitter ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
     
 
R IS K S  
An earlier survey identified a number of risks associated with use of online social networks. 
This has been followed up by an extensive literature survey. In this section we have identified 
the main risks reported so far. We would like your views on what you consider to be the most 
important risks. 
For the purposes of this survey risk is defined as: "an event of unknown probability that has an 
adverse effect or consequence". 
 266 
3)  THI NK ING ABOU T YO U R  O WN U SE O F ON LI NE SOC IA L NE TW OR K S ,  H OW  CONC ER N ED  
AR E YOU  P ER S ONA LLY A BOU T T HE FO LLO W ING R IS KS?  
Please rank them, with the most important risk at the top. 
Please note that this feature is not compatible with early versions of some browsers.  If 
you have difficulty, you can list the risks in the response area for Q4 (the next question). 
________Cyber-bullying or harassment (including stalking) 
________Victim of fraud 
________Identity theft 
________Targeting by official bodies or security agencies 
________Targeting by advertisers 
________Targeting by criminals (e.g. so that they can burgle your home while you are 
away) 
________Discrimination by employer or potential employer 
________Friends, family or colleagues able to see sensitive personal details 
________Strangers able to see sensitive personal details 
________Physical violence or kidnapping 
________Extortion or blackmail 
________Prosecution by authorities because of crime allegations 
4)  AR E TH ER E  ANY O TH ER  R I SK S A SS OC IA TED  W IT H  YOU R  P ER SO NAL  D A TA O N O NL IN E 
SOC IA L NE T WOR K S TH AT  HAV E NO T B EE N IN C LU D ED  IN T HE AB OV E L IS T?  
____________________________________________  
 
MEA SUR E S T O M ANA G E R I S K  
5)  WHO Y OU  T H IN K S H OU LD  HAV E P R I MAR Y R E SP ON S I BI LI TY FOR  P R O T EC TI NG YOU R  
P ER SO NAL D A TA O N ON L IN E SO CIA L N E TWOR KS ?  
( ) Government (UK or European Union for instance) 
( ) Online social network providers (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google) 
( ) Advertisers (who obtain profile data from online social network providers) 
( ) Users 
( ) Other (Please specify): _________________________________________________ 
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6)  TO WHA T EX TEN T  D O YOU  AGR EE OR  D ISAGR E E WI T H T H E  FOL LOW IN G 
STA T EM EN TS?   
These statements all refer to data about you, which is held by social networking services 
(SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn. We are interested in your views about who 
should be responsible for protecting your personal data. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Current data protection legislation is 
effective for protecting my personal data 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
The SNS providers should be 
responsible for protecting my personal 
data without government interference 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
The SNS providers should work with 
government to protect my personal data 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
SNSs should be set up with maximum 
privacy as the default setting 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
My personal profile should only be 
visible to those people or groups that I 
specify 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
SNSs should be designed with 
protection of personal data in mind 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
There should be no external regulation 
of personal data on SNSs 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
As a user I should be responsible for my 
own online privacy 
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  
7)  AR E  TH ER E A NY FU R T HER  MEA SU R E S T HAT  YOU  T H IN K SH OU LD  BE IN P LA C E TO 
P R OTE C T P ER S ONA L D A T A GAT HER ED  BY ON L INE  SOC IA L NE T WOR K S?  
Please give details below. 
____________________________________________  
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BACK GR OU ND I NF OR M A TIO N  
Finally, to help us put the results of this survey into context, could you please answer the 
following quick questions: 
8)  WH IC H AGE R A NGE D O YO U  FA LL IN TO?  
( ) under 18 
( ) 18-24 
( ) 25-34 
( ) 35-44 
( ) 45-54 
( ) 55-64 
( ) 65+ 
9)  GEND ER  
( ) Male 
( ) Female 
10)  AR E YOU  A MEM B ER  OF T HE LIS  P R OFE SS ION (T H IS I NC LU D E S :  LIBR AR IAN S ,  
IN FOR MA T IO N S CI EN T IS T S ,  K NOW LED G E MANAG ER S ,  R ECOR D S  MANAG ER S ,  
IN FOR MA T IO N MANA GER S ,  AND  AR C H IV I ST S)?  
Although this survey is primarily targeted at LIS professionals (including students), the 
results from all respondents will be included in the final analysis. 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
CONS EN T F OR M  
In order to complete this survey we need your informed consent to store and process the data 
provided in your response. If you agree to your response being used, please answer 'Yes' to 
the question below. If you choose not to proceed, your response will be discarded. 
I  AGR EE T HA T MY R ESP O N SE TO T HI S SU R VEY CA N BE U SED  FOR  ACAD EM IC R E SEAR C H  
AND  R E TAI NED  FOR  FU T U R E ACAD EM IC S TU D Y .  MY R ESP O NS E W I LL BE A GGR EGA TED  
SO THA T MY ID EN TI TY  IS  NOT R EV EAL ED  I N A NY P U BLI CA TI ON O F R E SU L T S .*  
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
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CONS EN T CH EC K  
WOU LD  YOU  L IK E TO  R E T U R N TO  TH E SU R V EY C O NS EN T FOR M?  I F YOU  C LI CK  ON  'NO '  
T HI S  W IL L C ON FIR M T H AT YOU  D O N OT WI S H T O P AR T IC IP AT E I N T H E  SU R VE Y AND  
YOU R  R ESP O NS E W IL L B E D IS CAR D E D .*  
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
FUTUR E C ONTA CT  
IF YOU  AR E IN TER ES T ED  IN T H E R E SU L TS  O F TH I S SU R VEY OR  IN P AR T IC I P ATI NG IN A  
FO LLO W-U P  S TU D Y ,  P L E ASE S E LE CT T HE B O X(ES)  BEL OW :  
[ ] I would like to be sent a summary of the results of this survey 
[ ] I would be interested in participating in a follow-up study 
MY E-MA IL AD D R E SS IS :  
If you give your e-mail address it will only be used for the purposes you have indicated 
in this response and will not be passed on to a third party. 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Thank You! 
 
Thank you for completing this survey. 
David Haynes 
David Haynes is currently researching the relationship between risk and regulation of social 
networking services as part of his PhD studies at the Centre for Information Science at City 
University London. He can be contacted at: david.haynes.1@city.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX D  –  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
The following individuals were interviewed in the period March-April 2014: 
Organisation  Contact name Date Type of interview 
Bigbrotherwatch Nick Pickles, Director 17 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
British Computer Society Peter Harris, Chair, Information 
Privacy Expert Panel 
3 Mar 2014 Telephone 
Chartered Institute of Public 
Relations 
Martin Horrox, Regulatory 
Consultant 
2 Apr2014 Face-to-face 
CILIP Guy Daines, Head of Policy 6 Mar 2014 Face-to-face 
Committee of Advertising Practice Malcolm Phillips, Regulatory 
Policy Manager 
6 Mar 2014 Face-to-face 
Direct Marketing Association Chris Combemale, CEO 3 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
Enterprise Privacy Group Toby Stevens 1 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
Information Commissioner’s Office Ian Bourne 19 Mar 2014 Face-to-face 
Information Privacy Group Toby Stevens 1 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
Internet Advertising Bureau, UK Nick Stringer, Director, 
Regulatory Affairs 
11 Mar 2014 Face-to-face 
JanRain Russell Loarridge 8 Apr 2014 Telephone 
London School of Economics Orla Lynsky, Assistant 
Professor of Law 
9 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
Mydex David Alexander, CEO 16 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
Privacy International Anna Fielder (Chair) 7 Apr 2014 Telephone 
tScheme Richard Trevorah 7 Apr 2014 Telephone 
UK Government Department Anonymous Civil Servant 10 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
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INTR O DUCT IO N (FOR  P AR TIC IP ANT S)  
The purpose of this interview is to find out the views of respondents on the different ways in 
which access to personal data on social media is regulated in the UK.  The study is part of a 
PhD research project exploring the relationship between personal risk and regulation of online 
social networking services and follows on from an online survey on risk perceptions among 
users. 
This interview will consist of a series open questions covering: 
 Current measures in place for protecting personal data on online social networking 
services  Your views on the effectiveness of current measures  Specific issues and problems associated with personal data  Potential future measures, including proposed legislation 
The interview is expected to last between 45 minutes and one hour in total.  It will be 
recorded (audio recording) so that the notes can be accurately transcribed and analysed.  We 
may need to contact you subsequently for clarification of any points arising from the 
interview.  We will only do this with your permission. 
This study is subject to the approval of the City University London, School of Informatics 
‘eseaƌĐh EthiĐs Coŵŵittee.  It is oŶe of the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts that all suƌǀeǇ 
respondents should have consented to participation in the study before participating.  [Make 
sure that the respondent has had a chance to read the participant guidelines and has signed 
the consent form before beginning the interview.] 
QUE STI ON S  
PR EL I MI NAR I ES  
Interview with [Name] of [Organisation] on [Date] 
BAC KGR OU ND  AB OU T Y O U R  R EGU LA TOR Y R O LE  
Can you please eǆplaiŶ Ǉouƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s ƌole iŶ ƌegulatiŶg aĐĐess to peƌsoŶal data? 
[Prompts] 
 Code of practice – Training – Awareness  Promotion of good practice  Target audiences 
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 Written guidelines  Current or due for update? 
V IEW S ON R IS K  
What do you think are the main risks that users are exposed to when they use online social 
networking services? [Prompt with a list of risks identified in previous surveys, if necessary] 
Do you think that regulation reduces risks to individual users of social networks?  In what 
ways? 
REGU LA T OR Y ME ASU R E S  I N P LA CE  
What other measures that you are aware of are in place to protect social media users against 
misuse of their personal data? 
[Service providers and advertisers] What measures does your organisation/industry take (have 
in place) to protect users against misuse of their data?  
[SNS Providers and Advertisers] Do you subscribe to an industry code of practice? 
 Who issues the code of practice?  Do you have a contact?  Do you have a copy of the code of practice that I can have? 
V IEW S ON LEG I SLA T ION  
What is your view of the current Data Protection Act as a way of protecting people against 
misuse of personal data that they put up on online Social networking services? 
 Do you think that the current legislation is effective?  Do you think that it could be improved?  If so, in what ways? 
In your view, is this area over- or under-regulated? Why? 
Are you familiar with the proposed European Data Protection Regulation currently under 
discussion? 
 Do you think this is an improvement on the current legislation?  Why? 
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REGU LA T OR Y E FF EC T IV E N ES S  
[Regulators and self-regulators] How do you assess regulatory effectiveness?  
[Regulators and self-regulators] Do you think that risk could be used as a way of measuring 
regulatory effectiveness? 
RESP ONS IB I L I TY FOR  R E GU LA TI ON  
Who should have primary responsibility for protecting users against misuse of personal data 
that they put up on SNS profiles?  [Prompt: users themselves, industry bodies, system 
designers, SNS providers, the government, others?]  
Why? 
FOL LO W-U P  
May we quote you? 
May we attribute any interview comments to you? 
May we identify your organisation? 
May we approach you again if any points need clarifying or if we need to follow up any aspect 
of this interview? 
Can you suggest other people or organisations that you think should be consulted as part of 
this study? – Can I mention your name? 
Thank you  
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APPENDIX E  –  CASE STUDY PROTOCOL  
METH OD  
The protocol was developed from an initial survey during the early stages of the research and 
was supplemented by reviewing the literature.  This was followed by a systematic review of 
online activity and discussions groups about privacy in online social networks.  The majority 
of this investigation took place during the period October 2013 to February 2014 with 
validation of results in December 2014.  The following method was adopted: 
BACK GR OU ND SEAR C H  
“eaƌĐh oŶ Google seaƌĐh eŶgiŶe foƌ the folloǁiŶg: ͞pƌiǀaĐǇ͟ aŶd ͞soĐial ŵedia͟.  The top 
listings were manually scanned to select relevant sites.  Candidate sites were visited to assess 
their relevance to this study.  The main criteria were as follows: 
 Up to date  Articles, blogs, postings on privacy in the context of social networking services  Open and available to general Internet Users (i.e. no membership registration 
required) 
The following were identified as being of particular interest and were tagged using the 
Delicious.com bookmarking service.  They were monitored throughout this study: 
Access https://www.accessnow.org 
Digital Civil Rights in Europe https://edri.org 
eMarketer http://www.emarketer.com 
EPIC - Electronic Privacy Information Center https://epic.org 
EUROPE versus FACEBOOK http://www.europe-v-facebook.org 
Future of Privacy Forum http://www.futureofprivacy.org 
GigaOM https://gigaom.com 
La Quadrature du Net http://www.laquadrature.net 
Open Rights Group http://www.openrightsgroup.org 
Privacy by Design https://privacybydesign.ca 
Public Knowledge  https://www.publicknowledge.org 
TechCrunch http://techcrunch.com 
Technorati http://technorati.com 
The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com 
Truthdig http://www.truthdig.com 
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World Privacy Forum http://www.worldprivacyforum.org 
Your Online Choices http://www.youronlinechoices.eu 
 
Relevant discussion groups on the following social networking sites were also reviewed: 
 Facebook  LinkedIn  Twitter  Google+ 
TR ACKI N G RE GI S TR AT I ON  
The tests were used to generate data about interactions between users, and SNS systems 
during the registration process.  This approach was used to complement the declared policies 
of the SNS providers and the literature about the nature of the risks faced by users.  The 
registration tracking activity was intended to independently validate the obligatory data that 
SNSs say they require in their privacy policies.   
1. Log onto each service to determine the minimum registration details to provide insight 
into exposure of useƌs͛ peƌsoŶal data oŶ “N“s. 
2. Screen capture using the Snipping Tool bundled with Windows. 
3. Analyse and tabulate results 
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APPENDIX F  –  DATA SETS ON CD-ROM 
 
Results of the 2011 Survey (from Appendix B) 
Results of the 2014 Survey (from Appendix C) 
Interview Transcripts and Recordings (from Appendix D) 
Screenshots from Case Studies (from Appendix E) 
Privacy Policies of SNS Providers Downloaded as PDFs 
NVivo10 Project File for Content Analysis 
 
